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Abstract 
 This dissertation reconceptualizes generic distinctions between fiction and testimony 
in accounts of childhood trauma. Scholars such as Leigh Gilmore have argued that while 
writers of trauma stories are burdened by legalistic definitions of evidence and anxieties 
about truth-telling, they nonetheless push at the limits of autobiography, often scuffing the 
border between fact and fiction, in their effort to bring their traumatic stories into language. 
There has not, however, been a sustained effort to understand and legitimize the place of 
fiction in testimony, particularly in cases of adult narrations of recovered memories of 
childhood traumas. My research addresses this lacuna by querying the dynamic relationship 
between fiction and testimony in both autobiographical and fictional accounts of childhood 
trauma. This work is motivated by my desire to open up a scripto-therapeutic space for 
trauma survivors to incorporate stories and use their imaginations to narrate traumatic truths 
rather than strictly evidentiary truths.  
 In Chapter Two of my dissertation, I explore Sylvia Fraser’s My Father’s House 
(1987), a pioneering memoir of recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse. I consider 
this controversial work as a case history of testimony caught between fact and fiction. 
Chapter Three extends my discussion of the controversy over the truth-status of Fraser’s 
traumatic memoir to an analysis of the ways in which three Canadian novels similarly 
challenge conventional boundaries of genre and representation in their fictional articulation 
of recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse: Ann-Marie MacDonald’s Fall on Your 
Knees (1996), Shani Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night (1996), and Gail Anderson-Dargatz’s 
The Cure for Death by Lightning (1996).  In Chapter Four, I argue that Indigenous writers 
specifically employ fiction and storytelling as forms of testimony outside of sanctioned 
Western discursive arenas such as courtrooms and the media. This chapter explores three 
residential school narratives: Vera Manuel’s play, Strength of Indian Women (1998), and two 
novels, James Bartleman’s As Long as the Rivers Flow (2011) and Robert Arthur Alexie’s 
Porcupines and China Dolls (2002). 
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Chapter 1  
1 Narrative Matters: Talking and Not Talking About Child 
Sexual Abuse 
1.1 Overview 
 This project is motivated both by my interest in the particular ways in which child 
sexual traumas put pressure on narrative structures and genres and by my frustration with 
the limited ways in which child sexual abuse narratives are discussed by literary scholars. 
I perceive a disjuncture between the highly imaginative fictional forms that writers of 
child sexual traumas adopt and create on the one hand, and the confining ways in which 
critics discuss these narratives on the other hand. When scholars do discuss incest or 
child sexual abuse, they tend to articulate their analysis either in therapeutic and scripto-
therapeutic terms or by way of poststructuralist trauma theory. The therapeutic view of 
putting one’s trauma into words through a story to promote healing is important, as are 
the many insights regarding trauma’s unspeakability and unrepresentability which can be 
drawn from more recent theories of trauma and memory. I draw upon these discourses, 
yet I want to advocate an approach that encompasses both therapy and theory, while at 
the same time attends to what the trauma narratives themselves can teach readers: that is, 
the necessity of stories and the imagination to any telling, autobiographical or fictional, 
of childhood trauma.  
 The place of fantasy and the imagination in narrations of sexual abuse typically 
function as disavowals of the trauma. My reading of the texts examined in this project 
reveals the opposite: both trauma and healing are profoundly imaginative acts. While it is 
relatively easy to see the connection between healing and the imagination, it is much 
harder to allow a space for the imagination in traumatic experiences. Indeed, as I will 
show in the case of Sylvia Fraser’s My Father’s House (1987), narrating recovered 
memories of childhood abuse is particularly vexed for life-writers upon whom a burden 
of proof is placed by both critics and the reading public. By employing literary 
techniques to tell her story, Fraser is in a double bind: she relies on narrative structures 
and devices in her memoir which necessarily add artifice to her tale, while at the same 
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time insisting that she is telling nothing but the truth. I will argue that any narrative 
reconstruction of past traumatic memories is at some level narrative (re)creation.  
 In choosing to focus on Canadian and Indigenous texts, I do not want to suggest 
that there is anything particularly Canadian or particularly Indigenous about child sexual 
abuse. The choice is much more about my area of expertise—Canadian and Indigenous 
literatures—than it is with these narratives reflecting national Canadian or Indigenous 
issues. I wanted to examine both autobiographical and fictional forms because I 
wondered if there were connections to be made between genres. I realized early in my 
research that the traditional separation of fiction from life-writing in literary scholarship 
might bracket off genres when clearly narratives were blurring them. I initially worried 
about discussing Indigenous narratives, specifically residential school fictions, in the 
broader context of Canadian fiction and life-writing, for the same reasons that I was 
reticent to bring fiction together with life-writing: different genres generate different 
theories and ways of discussing them. I decided that I was not going to produce new 
knowledge or even interesting knowledge if I did not have the courage to follow my 
instincts and pursue the ways in which three very different literary genres approach the 
same problem: how to articulate child sexual abuse traumas which confound both 
memory and narrative. 
 In Chapter Two of my dissertation, I contend that fiction and the imagination are 
necessary tools in articulating trauma stories. I explore Fraser’s My Father’s House, a 
pioneering memoir of recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse that continues to 
garner international critical attention from scholars who question the reliability of 
Fraser’s account of her childhood. I consider this work as a case history of testimony 
caught between fact and fiction, in which Fraser’s employment of what she calls 
“novelistic techniques” adds to the controversy. I explore and elucidate the ways in which 
Fraser’s memoir of extreme traumatic wounding becomes a generic limit-case 
symptomatic of the controversies swirling around writers of child sexual abuse narratives, 
and a representative example of the risks of public disclosure of childhood sexual 
traumas. Moreover, the critical response to Fraser’s memoir reveals anxieties about what 
constitutes legitimate generic modes of discourse when it comes to allegations of child 
abuse. At issue is the troubling intersection of fictional techniques with the 
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autobiographical form, a form which in the case of child abuse allegations takes on 
testimonial properties with all of testimony’s expectations of legal facts and juridical 
truths. Fraser’s critics often fail to take into account the imaginative ways in which 
survivors must engage with narrative models to make sense of their stories. 
 Chapter Three extends my discussion of the controversy over the truth-status of 
Fraser’s traumatic memoir to an analysis of the ways in which three Canadian novels 
similarly challenge conventional boundaries of genre and representation in their fictional 
articulation of recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse. Ann-Marie MacDonald’s 
Fall on Your Knees (1996), Shani Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night (1996), and Gail 
Anderson-Dargatz’s The Cure for Death by Lightning (1996), I argue, fictionalize 
traumas and rely upon border genres such as the Gothic and magic realism to blur 
distinctions between the real and the imagined. These novels all represent childhood 
traumas as mediated sensory experiences that seem to require, like Fraser’s memoir, 
imaginative and hybridized forms to recount stories whose access to the truth is never 
straightforward. Fall on Your Knees employs the visual arts and music aesthetically to 
represent and negotiate the novel’s many traumas. Mootoo’s magic realist novel develops 
a therapeutic imaginary through an aesthetic, sensual engagement with a natural world 
that is at once real and fantastic. In The Cure for Death by Lightning, I demonstrate—
even as I trouble—the ways in which traumas are arbitrated through and find expression 
in the shifting discourses and figures of the text, specifically the scrapbook and, most 
problematically, the Native figure of Coyote.  
 My final chapter comes full circle and argues that Indigenous writers specifically 
employ fiction and storytelling as forms of testimony outside of sanctioned Western 
discursive arenas such as courtrooms and the media. These writers use fiction as a 
pedagogical tool and as a form of activism. In this portion of the project, I explore three 
residential school narratives: Vera Manuel’s play, Strength of Indian Women (1998), and 
two novels, James Bartleman’s As Long as the Rivers Flow (2011) and Robert Arthur 
Alexie’s Porcupines and China Dolls (2002). I contend that these works complicate their 
generic status as fiction by functioning as didactic forms of testimony to residential 
school traumas broadly and, more specifically, to child sexual abuse at the schools. They 
do so, in part, through the primacy these writers place on the centrality of stories to 
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individual lives, to the circulation of stories in their communities, and to the 
transformational power that stories have to teach audiences about the children who 
suffered multiple forms of abuse in government legislated, church-run residential schools. 
I explore these texts as creative forms of testimony that exist outside of Western 
epistemologies and standard historicizing methods. I attend to the ways in which story-
telling strategies are employed to implicate readers as witnesses and to circulate and 
create new knowledges and understandings of the legacies of residential schooling in 
Canada. 
 My choice of texts is not meant to be exhaustive, but is rather a representative 
sampling of available child sexual abuse narratives in Canada. That said, I chose my texts 
for the particular ways they manipulate genre to represent traumatic experiences. My 
most basic criterion for selection was that the narrative had to be primarily focussed on 
child sexual abuse, which narrowed the field significantly, and made my choices for 
Chapters Three and Four relatively easy. Chapter Two, which examines autobiography, 
was more difficult because I had numerous choices aside from Sylvia Fraser’s famous 
memoir, notably Janice Williamson’s Crybaby! (1998) and Elly Danica’s Don’t: A 
Woman’s Word (1988). The scholarly controversy over generic issues in Fraser’s memoir 
is the principal reason for my choice to focus exclusively on her. More specifically, I am 
interested in what the controversy reveals about the place of fiction in autobiographical 
tellings of trauma. The veracity of Fraser’s memoir has been widely questioned by 
scholars because of her use of novelistic techniques and a broader skepticism about adult 
recoveries of memories of childhood sexual abuse, an incredulity that stems from the 
birth of the idea of “False Memory Syndrome” in the 1990s and the ensuing “memory 
wars.” Also troubling for critics is the coherence with which Fraser recounts her story, 
and her lack of self-reflexive doubt regarding her recovered memories.  
 In Crybaby!, Janice Williamson’s memoir of recovered memories of child sexual 
abuse, memories are presented as shifting, uncertain recollections of possible traumas 
that exist “somewhere between imagination and history” (Crybaby! 11). Williamson’s 
memoir has not been censured as Fraser’s has because Williamson self-consciously 
writes in fragments and recognizes her memories to be narrative reconstructions. The 
very fact that she is filled with doubt about the reliability of her memories makes her 
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story more believable to critics. Williamson’s creative blurring of fiction and testimony 
make her memoir an obvious and perhaps easy choice for this dissertation. I do discuss 
Crybaby! in relation to Fraser’s work, but I chose to keep Fraser as my principal focus 
because, while there has been a considerable body of work criticizing My Father’s 
House, far less has been done to explore the ways in which the memoir brings to the fore 
the vexed nature of narrating child sexual abuse in any form. My Father’s House 
becomes a grounding case study for this entire project. The other pioneering Canadian 
memoir of child sexual abuse is, of course, Elly Danica’s Don’t: A Woman’s Word. 
Again, I draw upon this memoir in relation to Fraser, but I do not specifically examine it. 
Danica’s memoir, like Williamson’s, is written in fragments, which means that it 
corresponds to contemporary models of traumatic memory which privilege fragments as 
essentially truer forms of memory. Fraser writes her past into a coherent story with the 
inevitable outcome that it reads as a story, not a fact-based testimony and not a tentative 
set of fragments of memory. Chapter Two of this dissertation thus explores the 
fascinating case of My Father’s House as a limit case of fiction and testimony. 
 In Chapter Three, I focus on three novels written in 1996: Ann-Marie 
MacDonald’s Fall on Your Knees, Shani Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night, and Gail 
Anderson-Dargatz’s The Cure for Death by Lightning. In addition to their coincidental 
year of publication, the novels share gothic and magical realist elements. What interests 
me, however, is the ways in which the three novels represent traumas imaginatively. In 
MacDonald’s novel, traumas are registered sensually by the characters as visual art and 
also music. In Mootoo’s novel, the traumas are depicted largely in the mode of realism; 
however, healing from the traumas is represented entirely through the imagination as 
Mala rewrites her past traumas through her own magical, therapeutic imaginary world. In 
Anderson-Dargatz’s novel, the Native figure of Coyote is employed to represent Beth’s 
sexual traumas visually, so that she sees the mythical animal rather than her father in 
moments of trauma. Beth’s mother, by contrast, uses her scrapbook to encrypt sexual 
traumas—both Beth’s and her own—to symbolically represent otherwise unspeakable 
horrors. In all cases, then, child sexual abuse is represented as a trauma that invites the 
imagination into its articulation. Taken together, these novels provoked my own 
investigation into why a fictionalizing mind seemed essential to apprehending and 
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recovering from trauma when there is so much at stake in the opposite, that is, in 
providing factual evidence for the traumatic event.  
 My textual choices for Chapter Four were in many ways less complicated than 
was my decision to write about child sexual abuse in Indian residential school fictions. In 
an upcoming section, I chronicle the reasons why the discourse pertaining to child sexual 
abuse in the schools became problematic and why I nonetheless focus on it here. In 
choosing Vera Manuel’s Strength of Indian Women, James Bartleman’s As Long as the 
Rivers Flow, and Robert Arthur Alexie’s Porcupines and China Dolls, I am putting 
together three fictional accounts of childhood sexual abuse at residential schools in which 
the authors set out to use the fictional form to educate their readers about the schools and, 
more importantly to these authors, legacies of residential school abuse. My other reason 
for the choices is that there is little existing scholarship on these works. Manuel’s play 
has sadly gone out of print, which has limited its circulation and scholarship. Similarly, 
Alexie’s novel went out of print by virtue of its first publisher, Stoddart, going into 
receivership days following its release. Theytus republished the 2002 novel in 2009. 
There has been increasing scholarly attention to this work since its republication, and I 
expect there will be more to come. Bartleman wrote his novel for the general public. He 
intended it to be didactic rather than literary, which may be why there has not yet been 
any scholarly work addressing it.  
 The most obvious choice of fictions is ironically the one I ultimately decided not 
to foreground, although I do discuss it: Tomson Highway’s Kiss of the Fur Queen (1998). 
After outlining an entire section devoted to this novel, I realized that I had nothing new to 
say that had not already been said in the existing (voluminous) scholarship on Kiss, 
particularly by Sam McKegney in Magic Weapons. McKegney clearly parses the 
testimonial impulse and capacity of Highway’s novel. Rather than rehearse his important 
insights, I decided instead to use Highway’s novel, especially Fagan’s theorization of 
what she terms “Aboriginal trauma theory” through Kiss, to ground my discussion of the 
other works. Richard Wagamese’s new novel, Indian Horse (2012), was a late 
consideration. Wagamese’s lifelong work of blending fiction and autobiography made the 
novel a candidate, but, in the end, child sexual abuse did not figure as prominently as in 
the other works I examine. In Chapter Four, then, I will argue that Manuel, Bartleman, 
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and Alexie all employ fiction as a form of testimony to the traumas and legacies of 
residential schooling in Canada. Together, all of the narratives I explore in this project 
suggest that fiction is a necessary tool in the narration of childhood sexual traumas, 
whether the genre is autobiographical or fictional.  
 I turn now to the broader issues surrounding child sexual abuse discourse in 
literary discursive practices. In the following section, I provide a short history of child 
sexual abuse as a concept, while also discussing the ways in which trauma has been 
theorized in relation to sexual abuse. This contextual background, particularly the 
ambivalences between trauma theory and therapeutic discourse, underpin my argument 
that the child sexual abuse narratives I examine not only blur generic lines but offer 
alternative understandings to how childhood traumas are articulated and represented. 
1.2 A Brief History of Talking About Incest and Child Sexual 
Abuse 
Talking publically about incest and child sexual abuse is a relatively recent phenomena. 
Second-wave feminism made child abuse a public issue and, in so doing, marked the 
advent of contemporary notions of child abuse. The middle to late nineteenth century also 
raised awareness of issues relating to children, but it was framed differently, as cruelty 
against children. Ian Hacking, in “The Making and Molding of Child Abuse,” emphasizes 
the historical malleability and mobility of the concept of child abuse: 
Child abuse is [. . .]  not one fixed thing. We have had something like our 
concept of child abuse for less than thirty years, during each of which it 
has been the focus of intense concern, especially in the United States. 
Prior to that we had a number of ideas that were kept quite distinct, 
ranging from cruelty to children to child molestation. Yet aside from 
occasional scandalous court cases, the public had little interest in such 
matters during the preceding years, 1912-1962. Since 1962 the class of 
acts falling under “child abuse” has changed every few years, so that 
people who have not kept up to date are astonished to be told that the 
present primary connotation of child abuse is sexual abuse. (259) 
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 I will briefly unpack these dates. In the late Victorian period, societies for the 
prevention of cruelty to children marked the only other time in history when child abuse 
was a major issue. Victorian child-saving movements, while heightening awareness of 
sexual abuse, displaced this concern with a focus on juvenile delinquency and separating 
children from their caretakers. Social work was unknown before 1900, but by 1910, there 
were numerous schools of social work. This led to the formation in the United States of 
the federal Children’s Bureau in 1912 (Hacking 266). The hiatus in “public interest” that 
Hacking notes following this period is due, according to Anne McGillivray, to the “new 
social work” that “rejected the criminal focus of late-nineteenth-century reformers. The 
sex offender became the mythical stranger, not the father he so often turned out to be. [. . 
.] Sexual abuse was pushed back into secrecy” (133).   
 Hacking makes a convincing case for marking 1962 as the origin of contemporary 
notions of child abuse. It was then that a group of Denver physicians, led by C. Henry 
Kempe, published “The Battered-Child Syndrome” (266). Hacking argues that their 
rhetoric medicalized the issue as a problem of “sick” adults and, in combination with the 
view that incidences of battered children were on the rise, entrenched child abuse in the 
public imagination (267).
1
 The “Battered-Child Syndrome” was quickly appropriated by 
feminists as the “Battered-Wife Syndrome” in the effort to raise consciousness about the 
untold violence women experienced in the private sphere of the home. The women’s 
liberation movement of the 1970s began to foreground sexual violence, specifically rape, 
as a major site of subordination and political control. In fact, without the feminist 
movement, it is unlikely that the notion of child abuse would have so quickly expanded to 
include child sexual abuse. Roger Luckhurst points to the 1977 Ms. Magazine article 
                                                 
1
 According to Hacking, this paper also “put in place one of the most wide-spread beliefs about child 
abuse: battering parents were battered children, or, more generally, child abusers were abused when they 
were children. At first one read only ‘often parents may be repeating the type of child care practiced on 
them in their childhood.’ That statement is cautious enough, but it has been elevated into a generalization” 
(268). 
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entitled “Incest: Sexual Abuse Begins at Home” as instrumental in the category of rape 
being incorporated more broadly to include sexual abuse (72).
2
  
 Feminist consciousness-raising, then, encouraged victims to disclose their 
traumas, as Judith Lewis Herman says, to break the silence despite the fact that “[t]o 
speak about experiences in sexual or domestic life was to invite public humiliation, 
ridicule, and disbelief. Women were silenced by fear and shame, and the silence of 
women gave license to every form of sexual and domestic exploitation” (Trauma and 
Recovery 28). According to Elizabeth A. Wilson, 
[t]hrough CR [consciousness-raising], a form of personal testimony, 
women began to compare their experiences of sexual violence and to see 
these experiences as related to the political oppression of women rather 
than as idiosyncratic occurrences provoked by “seductive behavior.” 
Although child sexual abuse was not initially the main focus of radical 
feminist attention, its relation to rape was quickly grasped and its affinity 
with personal testimony was established from the beginning. Indeed, over 
the years, no other form of domestic violence has lent itself to 
confessional storytelling like child sexual abuse. (82) 
Moreover, Wilson suggests that prior to feminism, child sexual abuse was thought of as 
so rare an occurrence that it did not warrant discussion (82).
3
 The inception of 
contemporary notions of child abuse is thus in the 1960s. The 1970s and 1980s would 
escalate the circulation of stories of child sexual abuse and change how sexual abuse is 
theorized. 
 With the rise of child abuse as a concept, came the rise in its theorization as more 
and more survivors narrated their traumas. At the time of Judith Lewis Herman’s 
                                                 
2
 While the opening claim of the article would provoke little more than a sigh of recognition today, the 
remark was groundbreaking at the time: “‘One girl out of every four in the United States will be sexually 
abused in some way before she reaches the age of eighteen’” (qtd. in Luckhurst 72). 
3
 Hacking affirms that “[i]t is nevertheless the case that no one had any glimmering, in 1960, of what was 
going to count as child abuse in 1990” (257). Indeed, child abuse is often taken to mean child sexual abuse. 
The term has travelled from being conceived as a rare occurrence perpetrated by “sick” individuals, usually 
strangers, always men, to a ubiquitous phenomena perpetrated mostly by men that victims know—fathers, 
grandfathers, uncles, and trusted family friends. 
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landmark feminist study in the mid-1970s, the results of which were later published in 
Father-Daughter Incest (1981), there was virtually no scholarship on the psychological 
impact of incest and sexual abuse on children. Herman’s study located the problem of 
incest firmly in patriarchy and female oppression, and, in this, is a relic of a time before 
the dissociative model of trauma took hold in the 1980s. Herman’s next book, however, 
Trauma and Recovery (1992), is important, according to Roger Luckhurst, because it 
brings together feminist and psychological scholarship with PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder) and the dissociative model. Herman reworks her earlier study on father-
daughter incest and makes the trauma model the centre of her new text.  Of particular 
importance is that she connects the dissociative symptoms of PTSD to childhood sexual 
abuse. Luckhurst claims that her “insistence that sexual abuse was the primary aetiology 
[in symptoms of PTSD] prompted a challenge to the diagnostic definition of PTSD” (72). 
 Herman was able to challenge the definition by arguing that there were, over the 
last century, three times that a form of psychological trauma emerged in concert with a 
political movement: first, hysteria, the study of which “grew out of the republican, 
anticlerical political movement of the late nineteenth century in France” (9); second, shell 
shock or combat neurosis beginning in the First World War; and third, sexual and 
domestic violence in the context of European and American feminism (9).
4
 Herman 
contends that the post 1970s legitimization of PTSD by Vietnam war veterans paved the 
way for PTSD to be similarly applied to other traumas such as sexual violence. 
Moreover, she makes this radical claim: “[i]t is now apparent [. . .] that the traumas of 
one are the traumas of the other. The hysteria of women and the combat neurosis of men 
are one” (32). The medicalization of trauma allows for its universalization by clinicians 
like Herman who insist, above all, on the commonalities between trauma survivors: 
between rape survivors, combat veterans, battered women, political prisoners, 
concentration camp survivors, and “by tyrants who rule nations and the survivors of 
                                                 
4
 It is worth noting that Hacking agrees with Herman’s linkages: “What underlies all three of these is 
memory, memory of trauma, although the relationship to remembered trauma is different in each case. 
Freud famously came to the opinion that hysterical patients suffer from reminiscences. Post-traumatic 
stress disorder has been entirely incorporated into the science of memory” (Rewriting the Soul 212). 
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small, hidden concentration camps created by tyrants who rule their homes” (Trauma and 
Recovery 3). Herman insists that “[p]eople who have endured horrible events suffer 
predictable psychological harm” (3). Janice Haaken, however, in “The Recovery of 
Memory, Fantasy, and Desire” wonders, “what are the implications of combining 
survivors of child abuse, war, political terrorism, religious cults, and the Holocaust under 
a single psychiatric category?” (1079). She sees a progressive dimension, a 
democratizing impulse, in the search for a universal basis to human suffering, but she 
cautions that “[a]t the same time, the diagnostic embrace of various trauma survivors 
under the PTSD label obscures the specificity of survivors’ experiences and the 
complexity and variability of victim/perpetrator relationships” (1079). In collapsing the 
many distinctions between traumas suffered by various groups and individuals, the 
dissociative model has the potential to elide the dynamics of trauma and the subjectivities 
of its victims.
5
 
 The symptoms of PTSD that all victims ostensibly share include repeated 
intrusive hallucinations, dreams, and thoughts that revive the trauma, at the same time 
that there is an impulse towards numbing and avoiding the recall of the event. Herman 
calls this oscillation the “dialectic of trauma”:  
[t]he dialectic of trauma gives rise to complicated, sometimes uncanny 
alterations of consciousness, which George Orwell, one of the committed 
truth-tellers of our century, called “doublethink,” and which mental health 
professionals, searching for a calm, precise language, call “dissociation.” 
It results in the protean, dramatic, and often bizarre symptoms of hysteria 
which Freud recognized a century ago as disguised communications about 
sexual abuse in childhood. (Trauma and Recovery 1-2) 
The notion that a dual consciousness can arise from extreme childhood trauma was 
initially advanced by Pierre Janet in the late nineteenth century and by Freud’s early 
theory of hysteria which suggested “the presence of a ‘double consciousness,’ 
                                                 
5
 In fact, Roger Luckhurst argues that childhood abuse is particularly prone to universalizing tendencies: 
“crucially, this is trauma no longer bounded by the specific experience of war combat or camp 
imprisonment: adult survivorship of unremembered childhood abuse holds out the greatest possibility of 
universal ascription” (74). 
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conceptualized as the coexistence of internally coherent, yet separate and autonomous, 
operations within the ego” (Haaken, “The Recovery of Memory” 1075). However, 
according to Haaken,  
[t]he dissociation model asserts that traumatic memory is preserved in 
split-off ego formations and emerges over time in a fragmentary 
experiencing of the trauma, often through self-hypnotic trance states, 
flashbacks, or fluctuating identity states. [. . .] In contrast to the repression 
model, dissociation implies a more orderly, “rational” unconscious, guided 
by structured rules with closer access to consciousness. [. . .] The psyche 
assigns various “parts” of the self to the preservation of traumatic 
memories, and these parts retain the integrity of the original experience. 
(1076) 
The mind’s apparent capacity to preserve a coherent representation of the traumatic event 
is at the heart of the dissociative model and underlies the therapeutic notion that 
recovered memories are not only possible but necessary to healing traumatic wounds. 
 A memory preserved is a memory that can be recalled, spoken, and narrated. 
Traumatic memory, unlike “normal” memory, which Janet described as “the action of 
telling a story,” is, according to Herman, “wordless and static” (37, 175): “[t]he traumatic 
moment becomes encoded in an abnormal form of memory, which breaks spontaneously 
into consciousness, both as flashbacks during waking states and as traumatic nightmares 
during sleep” (37). Traumatic memory, says Herman, is intrusive and repetitive, “not 
encoded like the ordinary memories of adults in a verbal, linear narrative that is 
assimilated into an ongoing life story” (37). Without a verbal, narrative context, traumatic 
memory becomes encoded in the form of “vivid sensations and images” (38). Traumatic 
memory, then, is not linguistic but rather iconic and sensory, much like the memories of 
young children according to Herman (38).  
 Cathy Caruth, in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, connects this pathology of 
traumatic memory to the belatedness with which it is experienced: “the event is not 
assimilated or experienced fully at the time, but only belatedly, in its repeated possession 
of the one who experiences it. To be traumatized is precisely to be possessed by an image 
or event” (4-5). Through Freud, Caruth emphasizes both the return of the traumatic 
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dream and its literality: “[i]t is this literality and its insistent return which thus constitutes 
trauma and points toward its enigmatic core: the delay or incompletion in knowing, or 
even in seeing, an overwhelming occurrence that then remains, in its insistent return, 
absolutely true to the event” (5). In Caruth’s theorization, which is based upon 
testimonies of Holocaust survivors, the traumatic experience is quintessentially marked 
by, 
the inability fully to witness the event as it occurs, or the ability to witness 
the event fully only at the cost of witnessing oneself. Central to the very 
immediacy of this experience, that is, is a gap that carries the force of the 
event and does so precisely at the expense of simple knowledge and 
memory. The force of this experience would appear to arise precisely, in 
other words, in the collapse of its understanding. (7) 
This aporia is thus insistent in both its repetition of images and its simultaneous amnesia 
regarding what constitutes these wordless, iconic memories resulting in an 
incomprehensibility of the very occurrence of the trauma itself. 
 As Geoffrey Hartman observes, traumatic knowledge seems to be a contradiction 
in terms (537), yet, at the same time, therapeutic discourse suggests that narrative is the 
only cure for survivors. The nexus of poststructuralist theories of trauma is the collapse 
of knowledge into a spectral gap of an inaccessible yet persistent form of memory that 
eludes as it intrudes and renders impossible any form of narrative. Roger Luckhurst in 
The Trauma Question describes the process as a “haunting absent presence of another 
time in our time. This is then given an ethical turn by Lyotard: any attempt to lay this 
ghostly traumatic trace is a form of tyranny or totalization” (81). In this view, trauma can 
only exist in narrative as an untouchable aporia: “Severe trauma can only be conveyed by 
the catastrophic rupture of narrative possibility” (Luckhurst 81). The problem that this 
theorization creates for victims of trauma has not gone unnoticed by critics. In The Limits 
of Autobiography, Leigh Gilmore summarizes the issue:  
[s]omething of a consensus has already developed that takes trauma as the 
unrepresentable to assert that trauma is beyond language in some crucial 
way, that language fails in the face of trauma, and that trauma mocks 
language and confronts it with its insufficiency. Yet, at the same time 
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language about trauma is theorized as an impossibility, language is 
pressed forward as that which can heal the survivor of trauma. Thus 
language bears a heavy burden in the theorization of trauma. (6) 
 Caruth acknowledges that trauma “requires integration, both for the sake of 
testimony and for the sake of cure. But on the other hand, the transformation of the 
trauma into a narrative memory that allows the story to be verbalized and communicated, 
to be integrated into one’s own, and others’, knowledge of the past, may lose both the 
precision and the force that characterizes traumatic recall” (153). And “beyond the loss of 
precision there is another, more profound, disappearance: the loss, precisely, of the 
event’s essential incomprehensibility, the force of its affront to understanding. [. . .] The 
danger of speech, of integration into the narration of memory, may lie not in what it 
cannot understand but in that it understands too much” (154). Gilmore calls the 
contradiction between asserting language as the only means of recuperating from trauma 
and theorizing language as that which fails in the face of trauma a “constitutive 
ambivalence” (7). In my view, trauma theory collapses on itself in Caruth’s influential 
theorization of it as not only beyond knowledge and language but also, and crucially, that 
it must be preserved as such, that it is somehow a bad thing if understanding the trauma 
means that it loses its force. To view trauma as too precious to touch, to understand, 
without essentially corrupting it, is to freeze the traumatic memory forever precisely as an 
unassimilated trauma that is free to wreak havoc upon one’s psychological well-being. 
The power of speech, rather than its “danger,” is that it can make the trauma 
understandable so that it loses its force, which, I realize, is exactly the opposite of what 
Caruth says. 
 Like Gilmore, Luckhurst similarly observes the contradiction between 
poststructuralist trauma theory and therapeutic discourse focussed on narrative healing:  
[t]here seems to be a flat contradiction between cultural theory that 
regards narrative as betraying traumatic singularity and various therapeutic 
discourses that see narrative as a means of productive transformation or 
even final resolution of trauma. This of course reflects different 
disciplinary imperatives: aesthetic mediations that sustain irresolution and 
explore narrative disjuncture are not written under the rubrics and aims of 
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therapeutic work with traumatized people. One should not be judged by 
the other. (82) 
For me, the contradiction between trauma theory and therapeutic practice suggests a need 
for further theorization to encompass the ambivalences that seem inherent in discussions 
of trauma. The narratives discussed in this dissertation seek imaginative ways to 
represent and articulate unspeakable traumas. In doing so, the narratives straddle both 
trauma theory and therapeutic discourse while at the same time suggesting broader ways 
to understand trauma outside of the limits of any one paradigm. I examine how writers 
use narrative, with the hope of extending my own theorization of trauma by attending to 
the particular stories writers tell and what these stories can teach about trauma. What I 
have found is that traumatic memory finds its expression in the dialogic relationship 
between the trauma and the story of the trauma. 
1.3 Talking About Child Sexual Abuse in Residential 
Schools 
 The vexed nature of discourses on trauma’s theories and trauma’s therapies make 
talking about traumas such as child sexual abuse difficult and discursively limited. 
Talking about child sexual abuse in residential schools presents another set of problems 
altogether. The reluctance on the part of literary scholars to isolate sexual abuse in 
residential schools for Native children as a singular trauma apart from the multiple abuses 
suffered in the schools and their culturally genocidal policies comes from a well-founded 
concern that focussing exclusively on one trauma can result in an effacement of the root 
of the problem—the assimilative colonial policies of the government of Canada. In 1920, 
Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Superintendant of the Department of Indian Affairs, 
famously affirmed to a Parliamentary committee that he wanted “‘to get rid of the Indian 
problem’”: “‘Our objective is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that 
has not been absorbed into the body politic, and there is no Indian question, and no Indian 
Department’” (qtd. in Milloy 46). This barbaric policy to whitewash Natives by 
obliterating their languages, cultural traditions, and spiritual beliefs by separating Native 
children from their families and “schooling” them in Christian, English culture, ripped 
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apart Aboriginal community and family structures, the legacies of which continue to this 
day.  
 The issue that brought the horrendous abuses of the residential school system into 
the Canadian national discursive arena and public consciousness was, in fact, child sexual 
abuse. According to John Milloy, author of the seminal historical study, A National 
Crime: The Canadian Government and the Residential School System, 1879 to 1986, 
“What finally broke the seal on the residential school system affixed by Duncan 
Campbell Scott and others and made public the story of neglect, and physical and cultural 
abuse was, ironically, the deepest secret of all—the pervasive sexual abuse of the 
children. The official files efface the issue almost completely” (296). While child sexual 
abuse thus has the dubious distinction of raising public awareness about the many abuses 
suffered at the schools, one of the problems of privileging this issue above others is that it 
became a rhetorical strategy for the Canadian government to put blame for their violent 
legislation elsewhere. 
 According to Milloy, none of the major reports, even the critical ones, dealt with 
the issue of sexual abuse in the schools, which meant that individual Aboriginal people 
had to come forward if there was to be any light shed on the issue (297). Making 
allegations of child sexual abuse is never easy. The widespread reporting, however, of 
child sexual abuse at orphanages such as Mount Cashel in Newfoundland in the late 
1980s raised public awareness and set the stage for other disclosures of abuse. As Milloy 
observes, “Beginning in 1989-90, abusers, including former residential school staff 
members, were exposed, taken into court in British Columbia and in the Yukon, and 
convicted in each case of multiple counts of gross indecency and sexual assault. This set 
off a chain reaction of police investigations and further prosecutions” (297). One of the 
most high-profile disclosures was Phil Fontaine’s in 1990.
6
 The rhetorically self-serving 
response of the Canadian government was to shine a light upon individual cases of sexual 
abuse as the primary evil of residential schools, while keeping the larger issues of the 
government’s responsibility for architecting and legislating the system in the first place in 
                                                 
6
 Fontaine was, at the time, Grand Chief of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, and was later National Chief 
of the Assembly of First Nations. 
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the shadows. McKegney argues that the Canadian government’s move to point the finger 
at individual perpetrators in the schools essentially protected their own narrative of 
colonial benevolence: 
As is widely recognized, the residential school issue entered the domain of 
contestable public knowledge only after the disclosure by Aboriginal 
victims in the 1980s of sexual abuse suffered at the hands of staff and 
administrators. Reacting to the displacement of residential school 
discourse from obscure academic and political spheres into the public 
arena, the federal government initially sought to maintain discursive focus 
on these specific instances of abuse, which, in effect, pre-empted systemic 
analysis of how the conditions of residential schools not only fostered the 
likelihood of such abuse, but were abusive themselves. Isolating the 
source of the problem in distinct violations of the Criminal Code [. . .] the 
government effectively ensured that the negative effects of residential 
school remained the responsibility of anomalous sadists and perverts who 
slipped through the cracks of an otherwise altruistic system. (146) 
 The first strategy, then, employed by the Canadian government to shirk 
responsibility for the abuses at residential schools was to isolate blame in individual 
“caregivers” at the school and to keep the public discourse focussed on issues as those of 
the past. Milloy describes the pernicious government strategy in the early 1990s as a 
willful decimating of the history of the schools. The government was, according to 
Milloy, “determined to kill the past” by attempting to “efface the history of the system” 
as something that happened back “then” (302). Milloy argues that the churches were 
ahead of the government in their willingness to admit culpability for the criminal 
perversions of their priests and ministers; however, and perhaps as their own strategy to 
deflect blame away from themselves, they argued that the government should share 
blame for the larger issues facing Indigenous communities as a result of the assimilative 
policies of the schools: 
By 1992, most of the churches had apologized, and they continued to do 
so in various forums, regretting in the words of one of the Catholic texts, 
“the pain, suffering, and alienation that so many had experienced.” 
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However, as the churches told the minister in a joint communication 
through the Aboriginal Rights Coalition in August 1992, they wanted it 
recognized that they “share[d] responsibility with government for the 
consequences of residential schools,” which included not only “individual 
cases of physical and sexual abuse” but also “the broader issues of cultural 
impacts: [. . .] the loss of language through forced English speaking, the 
loss of traditional ways of being on the land, the loss of parenting skills 
through the absence of four or five generations of children from Native 
communities, and the learned behaviour of despising Native identity.” 
(299) 
 The church apologies sparked the second rhetorical tactic of the Canadian 
government to avoid responsibility. Their ploy was to focus attention on the need for 
Aboriginal healing. The 1992 response of DIAND (Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development) to the church apologies was not to admit blame or open a public 
inquiry, but to work with individuals and communities to help them heal from past 
abuses. Unlike the churches, there were no apologies and no plans for compensation. The 
government strategy at the time was to put the problem back to Aboriginal communities 
to develop programs according to their needs, rather than focus public attention on the 
system of acculturative violence itself (Milloy 301). Milloy regards the government’s 
strategies as yet another form of colonial violence: “Along with the refusal to apologize 
or to institute a special public inquiry came a focus on the ‘now’ of the problem: 
Aboriginal people now ‘sick,’ not savage, in need of psychological, rather than 
theological, salvation” (302).  This colonial view of the wounded Aboriginal in need of 
healing has persisted to the present day; however, Jo-Ann Episkenew insists upon 
adopting the reverse view: “‘Healing’ does not imply that Indigenous people are sick [. . 
.]. Colonialism is sick; under its auspices and supported by its mythology, the colonizers 
have inflicted heinous wounds on the Indigenous population that they set out to civilize” 
(Taking Back Our Spirits 11).  
 The Canadian government’s strategy to deflect attention away from their own 
culturally genocidal policies by arguing that the issues are the result of the actions of past 
sexually predacious individuals and that, in the present, “sick” Aboriginals must be 
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healed is at the heart of the reluctance of literary scholars to pluck out child sexual abuse 
in residential schools as a topic in and of itself. My view is that there is a difference 
between government strategies to use child sexual abuse to deflect blame away from their 
policies and scholarly work that examines Indigenous narratives focussed on this 
particular abuse. The Indigenous narratives that I analyze in the project make the legacies 
of child sexual abuse at residential schools a primary concern. Both Manuel and Alexie 
are survivors of child sexual abuse and their narratives function as semi-autobiographical 
testimonies to their experiences. Bartleman is not a residential school survivor; however, 
his novel uses child sexual abuse in the schools as a teaching tool for his audience, both 
Native and non-Native Canadians. My view is that scholars can take their cue from 
writers. If writers are grappling with the issue, there is no reason why scholars should 
avoid it. After all, avoidance is a government tactic par excellence to persist in colonial 
practices that are often much more insidious now than in the past because they are being 
implemented in the context of apology and reconciliation. Milloy argues that the initial 
strategies of the government have shifted again in contemporary times: 
Soon after 1986, the schools were moved into the light of public scrutiny 
by media reports and court cases focussing on the deepest secret of the 
system’s course through the lives of children and communities: persistent, 
widespread sexual abuse. In the face of this revelation and as a result of 
intense work by Aboriginal people themselves, the government moved 
from effacement to “apology.” (xvii) 
 Apology is arguably the most recent government tactic to put the issue of 
residential schooling in Canada in the past. What many Canadians do not know or 
remember is that the first apology was not Stephen Harper’s in 2008, but Minister of 
Indian Affairs, Jane Stewart’s, in 1998, under the Crétien Liberal government. The 
narrative of the Harper apology has written over the past, so that he and his government 
will be memorialized as the apologizers for the schools. As I discuss in Chapter Four, the 
Harper government has followed their apology with a series of effacements of 
devastating colonial policies, and they are currently working to erode Aboriginal treaty 
and land rights by way of Bill C-45. It has yet to be seen what the full impact of the 
ongoing assimilative strategies of the Canadian government will be, and the extent to 
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which Indigenous resistive strategies, such as those of the current Idle No More protest, 
will change the course of the Harper government’s insidious policies on Canada’s first 
peoples. 
1.4 Child Sexual Abuse and the Issue of “Critical 
Embarrassment” 
I thought indeed that there was a sacred horror in my tale that rendered it unfit for 
utterance. 
Mary Shelley, Mathilda 
 Child sexual abuse is not only a topic that scholars avoid in connection to 
residential school narratives, but is also, and more broadly speaking, infrequently 
examined by literature scholars of any ilk. It is not that literature does not take the issue 
up. Since Sophocles’s Oedipus the King (c. 420 BC), incest and sexual abuse have been 
recurring themes in fiction, sharing particular affinities with the Gothic, where incest has 
become a stock trope. Despite this, there is an academic uneasiness with incest as a 
primary topic of examination. The emotional discomfort (or perhaps “cringe factor”) that 
comes from having to think about a vulnerable child being sexually abused by an adult 
plays a role in what seems to be a scholarly preference to avoid the issue by examining 
what is perceived to be more literary aspects of novels. This uneasiness with the subject 
matter is not new. When William Godwin read the manuscript of Mathilda, written by his 
daughter, Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley in 1819, he viewed its subject matter—incest—as  
“‘disgusting and detestable’” (qtd. in Nitchie 10). The semi-autobiographical novella 
chronicles the incestuous desires of a father for his daughter. There is no evidence 
beyond the novella itself that Godwin had an incestuous relationship with Shelley. That 
said, and as Elizabeth Nitchie insists, “The biographical elements are clear: Mathilda is 
certainly Mary herself; Mathilda’s father is Godwin; Woodville is an idealized [Percy 
Bysshe] Shelley” (12). As Rosaria Champagne observes, publication of the novella was 
suppressed by Godwin throughout his life, following which it was “dismissed by 
conservative critical standards,” until Nitchie resurrected and published it in 1959 (54). 
The 140-year burial of Mathilda is reflective of anxieties about incest that continue to this 
day.  
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 In the early stages of my work on this project, I presented a conference paper on 
the controversy over Sylvia Fraser’s My Father’s House. The paper generated numerous 
questions from audience members and sparked an engaging group discussion about the 
provocative intermingling of fact with literary techniques in a memoir alleging child 
sexual abuse. Following the paper, a well-known English professor expressed interest in 
my work and gave me some friendly advice: “Focus your dissertation on generic issues 
rather than the sexual abuse itself.” Indeed, genre is a central concern of my project and, 
in this sense, the advice was sage and, most certainly, well-meaning. I wondered, though, 
why it was that English scholars, many of whom analyze traumas of all kinds—war 
traumas, including the Holocaust, diasporic issues of exile and belonging, colonial 
violence, and so on—seemed to be particularly uncomfortable talking about child sexual 
abuse. Janice Williamson, for example, recounts being asked by a professor at a large 
university what the title of her conference paper was. When Williamson “replied with a 
title which spelled out the subject of child sexual abuse in Canada, the scholar suggested 
a more ‘succinct’ title might be ‘Canadian Women Writers: Some Reflections’” 
(“Writing Aversion” 199). Rather than “succinct,” the title suggested to Williamson by 
the professor removes any subject clarity, perhaps, again, as friendly advice. 
 I experienced a less friendly reception to what I had to say about child sexual 
abuse in a graduate seminar on Robert Arthur Alexie’s novel, Porcupines and China 
Dolls, a novel which I examine in this dissertation. Knowing my interest in Alexie’s text, 
the professor of the course invited me to sit in on the seminar. I listened as students 
passionately discussed the horrors of the residential school system in Canada, without 
mentioning the sexual traumas which are at the heart of the novel. When I spoke about 
the testimonial aspects of the novel, including the novel’s imperative to disclose the 
sexual abuse, and its ultimate performative staging of this disclosure at the healing 
workshop, I was quickly silenced. I was told that to single out sexual abuse was to 
essentially elide the much larger issues of colonial violence created by the schools such 
as language loss, culture loss, and the breakdown of family structures. I was told that 
“there is no originary trauma. The traumas are multiple.” I was told that, “not all children 
were sexually abused at the schools.”  I listened as the class moved on to discuss what 
they perceived to be the misogynist aspects of Alexie’s text, along with the ways in 
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which the novel dangerously replays white stereotypes of Natives, such as “the drunken 
Indian.” The silencing impulse of the class on what is unambiguously a major issue, and 
arguably the major issue, of the novel—the after-effects of child sexual abuse—is, in fact, 
representative of a widespread discomfort with the topic and perhaps the lack of critical 
vocabulary to address it. 
 To borrow a term from Lynette Hunter, “critical embarrassment” might best 
generously describe the apparent ambivalence to the issue of child sexual abuse as a 
legitimate enterprise of literary criticism (qtd. in Jones 51).
7
 In the works I examine here, 
there is a spectrum of critically embarrassed responses ranging from avoidance of the 
subject altogether to an earnest albeit minor broaching of the theme to outright hostility. 
Indeed, the harshest criticisms of Fraser’s incest memoir, My Father’s House, have come 
from literature professors who vigorously question the reliability and veracity of her 
narrative. While their intense engagement with her text would seem to suggest direct 
involvement with issues of child abuse, what becomes clear in my analysis is that they 
are much more interested in theories of memory, and with pressing forth their own 
arguments about the ways in which Fraser’s memoir fails to correspond to their 
understandings of trauma. The result is a radical failure to respond to and analyze the 
creative ways in which Fraser pioneers a strategy to write a memoir of her story for 
which there were no available narrative frameworks with which she could work.  
 The novels I discuss in the sections which follow my work on Fraser are all 
primarily focussed on incest or sexual abuse, yet very few critics make the issue their 
principal topic of inquiry. Ann-Marie MacDonald’s Fall on Your Knees has generated 
numerous scholarly articles addressing such topics as her employment of the Gothic, 
cinema and sexuality, gender and ethnicity, miscegenation, magic realism, and literary 
representations of girlhood. While incest traumas are discussed, particularly by critics 
concerned with the connection between trauma and the Gothic, for example, Joel Baetz’s 
“Tales from the Canadian Crypt: Canadian Ghosts, the Cultural Uncanny, and the 
Necessity of Haunting in Ann-Marie MacDonald’s Fall on Your Knees” and Atef 
                                                 
7
 My thanks to Manina Jones for this insight and term to describe it. 
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Laouyene’s “Canadian Gothic and the Work of Ghosting in Ann-Marie MacDonald’s 
Fall on Your Knees,” the spotlight always seems to be on issues other than incest. The 
scholarship on Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night is similarly rich and voluminous, but it 
is almost entirely focussed on postcolonial issues. Jeanie E. Warnock argues that the 
critical emphasis on the novel’s place within postcolonial literature in Canada 
inadvertently elides  
the incestuous sexual violation that lies at the center of the novel. To 
characterize the abuse euphemistically, as “an expression of the 
unspeakable excess of the border-crossing that victimized Mala” (Hoving 
158), or to treat it briefly as a consequence of “the psychological legacy of 
colonialism” (Howells 154), unintentionally reinforces the silence and 
discomfort surrounding disclosures of incestuous abuse. (270-71) 
 Warnock’s frustration with the criticism is a valid intervention into the scholarly 
reticence to engage meaningfully with incest as a sanctioned subject of literary criticism.  
There is a clear pattern of critical avoidance of the issue. Emily Hazlett, for example, in 
her work on Alexie’s Porcupines and China Dolls, suggests that sexual abuse is a 
“redress trope”—a metaphor rather than a lived experience—that fails adequately to 
address the havoc wreaked on Aboriginal families by the residential school system: 
“Redress tropes such as victimization, historical trauma, imprisonment, and sexual abuse 
allow Aboriginal claimants to petition the government for redress. [. . .] At the same time, 
I have argued that these common redress tropes are inadequate in addressing the way 
Aboriginal families experienced the state’s genocidal policies” (68). Through her article, 
Hazlett takes the emphasis away from sexual abuse and focuses her readers on Alexie’s 
opening chapters where broader issues of colonialism are emphasized. In the context of 
residential school narratives, focussing on child sexual abuse to the exclusion of the many 
traumas suffered by the children and articulated by writers is clearly problematic; 
however, when writers make child sexual abuse their focus, avoiding the issue is 
similarly problematic. I want to suggest, however, that child sexual abuse narratives 
disrupt borders between fiction and testimony in provocative and analyzable ways that 
can, in fact, produce new ways of understanding trauma narratives more broadly. 
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1.5 Fiction and Testimony: Which Story Do You Prefer? 
 In her foreword to her short story collection, The View from Castle Rock (2006), 
Alice Munro, while emphasizing that “These are stories,” calls the enmeshing of fiction 
and autobiography in the collection two streams that flow in one channel: 
You could say that such stories pay more attention to the truth of a life 
than fiction usually does. But not enough to swear on. And the part of this 
book that might be called family history has expanded into fiction, but 
always within the outline of a true narrative. With these developments the 
two streams came close enough together that they seemed to me meant to 
flow in one channel, as they do in this book. (n. pag.) 
Munro’s confession that her story collection straddles fiction and autobiography is 
straightforward. She admits the truth of the collection is unreliable, at least “not enough 
to swear on.” The twining of fiction and autobiography in works devoted to child sexual 
abuse is much more problematic because of the risk of falsely accusing someone of a 
serious criminal offence. It is thus crucial that for fiction to be granted a place in 
testimony, the traumatic event must have occurred. What is important to me is that the 
truth of the event can be told using storytelling strategies that include the imagination to 
tell what Roger Luckhurst calls “traumatic truth” (137; emphasis added). For Luckhurst, 
because traumatic memory is shifting and mobile, it is particularly open to fiction and 
may, in fact, be resistant to straightforward, evidentiary truth telling. This dissertation 
will argue that the inherent difficulties of articulating and representing severe trauma can 
be made productive by allowing fiction and autobiography to work in tandem to tell the 
trauma story.  
 In Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, Jacques Derrida theorizes the entwining of 
fiction and testimony in his reading of Maurice Blanchot’s literary fiction, The Instant of 
My Death. Blanchot does not claim in his short text that the traumatic experience he 
describes is a true one, yet Derrida reveals that at the end of World War II, Blanchot was 
placed in front of a firing squad and escaped, just as the story he writes recounts. For 
Derrida, in its promise to tell the truth, “testimony always goes hand in hand with at least 
the possibility of fiction, perjury, and lie. Were this possibility to be eliminated, no 
testimony would be possible any longer” (27). In other words, testimony requires of itself 
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the establishment of truth or facts that would not be apparent without the testimony. Thus 
Derrida argues that “[. . .] if testimony thereby became proof, information, certainty, or 
archive, it would lose its function as testimony. In order to remain testimony, it must 
therefore allow itself to be haunted. It must allow itself to be parasitized by precisely 
what it excludes from its inner depths, the possibility, at least, of literature” (29-30; 
original emphasis). What makes fiction parasitical to testimony is the legal requirement 
for testimonies to be true, as Derrida suggests: “the classical concept of attestation, like 
that of autobiography, seems by law to exclude both fiction and art, as soon as the truth, 
all the truth and nothing but the truth, is owing. By law, a testimony must not be a work 
of art or a fiction” (43). At the same time that the law precludes the possibility of fiction 
in testimony, Derrida nonetheless insists on its presence: “without the possibility of this 
fiction, without the spectral virtuality of this simulacrum and as a result of this lie or this 
fragmentation of the true, no truthful testimony would be possible. Consequently, the 
possibility of literary fiction haunts so-called truthful, responsible, serious, real testimony 
as its proper possibility” (72). For Derrida, then, the “disturbing complicity between 
fiction and testimony” means that the two cannot be separated (43). As Munro perceived, 
there are times when fiction and autobiography are “meant to flow in one channel.” 
 The flow of fiction and autobiography is not confined to fiction. Indeed, Sigmund 
Freud was an early theorizer of the place of fiction in the writing of his case studies. In 
his discussion of the case of Fräulein Elisabeth von R., Freud ponders the storied aspects 
of his writing: 
[. . .] it still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write 
should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the 
serious stamp of science. I must console myself with the reflection that the 
nature of the subject is evidently responsible for this, rather than any 
preference of my own. The fact is that local diagnosis and electrical 
reactions lead nowhere in the study of hysteria, whereas a detailed 
description of mental processes such as we are accustomed to find in the 
works of imaginative writers enables me, with the use of a few 
psychological formulas, to obtain at least some kind of insight into the 
course of that affection. Case histories of this kind are intended to be 
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judged like psychiatric ones; they have, however, one advantage over the 
latter, namely an intimate connection between the story of the patient’s 
sufferings and the symptoms of his illness. (231) 
When Freud observes the “intimate connection between the story of the patient’s 
sufferings and the symptoms of his illness” he is, in effect, perceiving a correspondence 
between the illness and the story of the illness or the trauma and the story of the trauma. 
There is the fact of the trauma and then the story that is woven to articulate the trauma. 
Whether a traumatic narrative is generically fiction or autobiography, fact and story will 
partner precisely to make account of the traumatic event as a narrative. 
 Perhaps the best way to explain the storying strategies used by the writers I 
examine is by way of a novel, one that I do not discuss, and one that has nothing to do 
with child sexual abuse, although it is very much a traumatic narrative. Yann Martel’s 
Life of Pi (2001) chronicles the harrowing survival story of Pi Patel. The story is 
recounted by Pi as an adult, making the bulk of the narrative an act of memory and 
storytelling. Pi loses his entire family when the ship they are on sinks in a storm. Pi 
survives on a lifeboat with an adult Bengal tiger, Richard Parker, for 227 days. When the 
lifeboat begins its journey, there are other animals aboard: an injured zebra, a hyena, and 
an orangutan. The hyena kills the zebra and the orangutan before succumbing to death 
himself by the tiger, Richard Parker. At the end of the story, Pi is asked to recount his 
survival tale to Japanese maritime officials investigating the sinking of the ship. Pi tells 
them the story of his survival with Richard Parker, which is the same story readers of the 
novel have just finished. The Japanese investigators compliment Pi on his story, but tell 
him that they do not believe him, so Pi tells them another story. This one is in the mode 
of traumatic realism rather than the magical story he has previously woven. In this story, 
there are no animals. There is an injured sailor, a cook, and Pi’s mother. The heinous 
cook butchers and cannibalizes the sailor and ultimately kills Pi’s mother. Pi kills the 
cook and survives his many days at sea in solitude. To this story, the Japanese 
investigators cry, “‘What a horrible story’” (345). 
 The two stories are, of course, one. The cook is the hyena; the sailor is the zebra; 
Pi’s mother is the orangutan; and Pi is the tiger who ultimately kills the cook/hyena. Pi 
stories his unspeakable traumas into a narrative that is at once heart-wrenching and 
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magical. The magical realist story is the one the investigators do not believe. Pi tells the 
investigators that he has told them two stories, neither of which they can prove true or 
false. They must take him for his word. Pi argues that what can be proven is that “‘[i]n 
both stories the ship sinks, my entire family dies, and I suffer’” (352). The investigators 
agree that these are facts. Pi asks, “‘So tell me, since it makes no factual difference to you 
and you can’t prove the question either way, which story do you prefer? Which is the 
better story, the story with animals or the story without animals?’” (352). The 
investigators say they prefer the story with the animals and incorporate that one into their 
report. 
 The magical story is the better story for both the writer and the listener/reader 
because it does not require the same commitment to verisimilitude and its horrors. The 
imaginative telling of horrific events is a way to articulate unspeakable experiences in 
terms of an ameliorating story, rather than in the mode of traumatic realism, which can be 
gratuitously sensational and traumatizing for witnesses or readers. Pi seems to suggest 
that the preferred story is therefore the one that blends the real and the imagined, fiction 
and testimony. Just as Pi tells his story through imaginative reconstruction as a means of 
surviving his trauma, so too do the novels I explore in Chapter Three. Recourse to the 
imagination is directly linked to the representation of childhood traumas in MacDonald’s, 
Mootoo’s, and Anderson-Dartgatz’s stories.  
 Eugene L. Arva, in The Traumatic Imagination, posits the term “traumatic 
imagination” to describe the connection between trauma and magical realism within 
which writers and readers “act out and/or work through trauma by means of magical 
realist images” (5). For Arva, 
the traumatic imagination is responsible for the production of many 
literary texts that struggle to re-present the unpresentable and, ultimately, 
to reconstruct events whose forgetting has proved just as unbearable as 
their remembering. The traumatic imagination is also the essential 
consciousness of survival to which the psyche resorts when confronted 
with the impossibility of remembering limit events and with the resulting 
compulsive repetition of images of violence and loss. (5; emphasis added) 
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I want to extend Arva’s theorization of the traumatic imagination as a necessary part of 
psychic registry and recovery in magical realist fiction to the work of this dissertation as 
a whole. I argue that creativity and the imagination are necessary components of the 
trauma story, whether that story is fictional or factual. Fictional forms provide the 
freedom to incorporate magical elements into the representation of trauma, as Chapter 
Three of this project will show. Fiction can also provide a safe space for the telling of 
childhood traumas. The Indigenous writers I discuss in Chapter Four all choose fiction to 
tell their stories creatively in their effort to reach as wide an audience as possible. Like Pi, 
these writers suggest that readers/listeners will prefer a storied telling over a strictly 
realistic one. Chapter Two argues that Fraser’s memoir, while fraught by accusations of 
False Memory Syndrome and outright fabrication, is in fact a grounding case for the 
argument that the traumatic imagination is inseparable from the fact of the trauma. Hers 
is a storied truth. Like Pi’s story, the story of the trauma and the trauma are inextricably 
linked. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Fiction, Testimony, and Child Sexual Abuse: The Case 
of Sylvia Fraser’s My Father’s House 
2.1 Introduction 
 I begin this project by opening Pandora’s box. Published in 1987, My Father’s 
House, Sylvia Fraser’s landmark memoir of recovered memories of childhood sexual 
abuse, continues to garner international critical attention from scholars who question the 
reliability of Fraser’s account of her childhood on three grounds: her use of what she calls 
“novelistic techniques” in a factual autobiography about child sexual abuse; her claim 
that the abuse she suffered resulted in Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD), whereby she 
created an “alter” personality to suffer the abuse for her; and the apparent coherence and 
fullness of recall with which she narrates traumatic memories of this dissociated 
personality, memories which eluded her consciousness until she recovered them as an 
adult in her late forties. While the vitriolic rhetoric of the debate over False Memory 
Syndrome has cooled since the apogee of the “memory wars” in the 1990s, doubts linger 
about the reliability and even the possibility of recovered memories.
8
 In my view, 
Fraser’s use of literary techniques and her skill as a writer to put her tragedy into a story 
that makes sense of her memories and experiences is not only a necessary part of her 
therapeutic process, but also an earnest attempt to recount the truth of her abuse and 
accompanying amnesia. That said, Fraser’s critics ask a valid question: how can she be so 
sure of the truthfulness of memories of a long forgotten, disconnected alter personality 
whose existence and experiences were ostensibly barred from her conscious knowledge? 
                                                 
8
 I discuss the recovered memory debate further on in this chapter. There are many articles and anthologies 
devoted to the topic, most of which are polemical, taking a for or against position towards the so-called 
“False Memory Syndrome.” For a particularly helpful collection of research articles in the 1990s devoted to 
the articulation of both sides of the debate see Appelbaum, Paul S., Lisa A. Uyehara, and Mark R. Elin; 
Gartner, Richard; and Baker, Robert A.. Full bibliographical information is contained in my works cited. 
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As Roger Luckhurst observes, “Fraser [. . .] gives us the first instance where the trauma 
memoir provokes a form of readerly trial, judgement and punishment” (124). 
 My aim in this chapter is to explore and elucidate the ways in which Fraser’s 
memoir of extreme traumatic wounding becomes a generic limit-case symptomatic of the 
controversies swirling around writers of child sexual abuse narratives and a 
representative example of the risks of public disclosure of childhood sexual traumas. 
Moreover, the critical response to Fraser’s memoir reveals anxieties about what 
constitutes sanctioned generic modes of discourse when it comes to child sexual abuse. 
At issue is the troubling intersection of fictional techniques with the autobiographical 
form, a form which in the case of child abuse allegations takes on testimonial properties 
with all of its expectations of legal facts and juridical truths. Fraser’s use of “novelistic 
techniques” complicates a genre broadly committed to telling the truth of one’s life; 
however, the incorporation of fictional techniques—which I take in Fraser’s case to mean 
the skills and practices of a literary story-teller such as plotting, character development, 
and the use of symbolism to weave a narrative—is a necessary complexity when one is 
faced with the challenge of putting past traumatic memories into words through the act of 
narrative reconstruction. The limits of autobiography, which is to say, the limits of truth-
telling conventions when narrating the facts of a life, are too narrow for writers of child 
sexual abuse narratives. Leigh Gilmore reflects upon the limits of autobiography in 
writing trauma stories: 
Telling the story of one’s life suggests a conversion of trauma’s morbid 
contents into speech, and thereby, the prospect of working through 
trauma’s hold on the subject. Yet, autobiography’s impediments to such 
working through consist of its almost legalistic definition of truth-telling, 
its anxiety about invention, and its preference for the literal and verifiable, 
even in the presence of some ambivalence about those criteria. 
Conventions about truth-telling, salutary as they are, can be inimical to the 
ways in which some writers bring trauma stories into language. The 
portals are too narrow, and the demands too restrictive. (“Limit-Cases” 
129) 
31 
 
Fraser’s memoir reveals that an engagement with literary and storytelling 
practices to narrate child sexual abuse is a creative and pioneering strategy to articulate 
traumas that Fraser experienced as incomprehensible as a child. My Father’s House was 
published one year before Elly Danica’s Don’t: A Woman’s Word (1988). While both 
memoirs were ground-breaking in their unflinching narration of childhood incest at a 
time when speaking publically about the subject was still taboo, Fraser’s memoir is 
contentious, in part, because it is written both from the perspective of the adult Fraser and 
her childhood “split personality.” There are essentially two autobiographical “I’s” in 
Fraser’s account. Like Fraser, Danica also experienced a fracturing of her identity at the 
time of the abuse. Danica describes her experience of dissociation or psychic splitting in 
the moment of trauma: “I peel myself out of my own skin. I am no longer myself. I am 
someone else” (53). However, in Don’t, there is one narrative voice telling her story, 
albeit in fragments, throughout her memoir. In My Father’s House, the two narrative 
“I’s” are distinguished by Fraser’s employment of italics to indicate “thoughts, feelings 
and experiences pieced together from recently recovered memories” (Author’s Note). As 
Fraser describes in My Father’s House, these recovered memories are those of her split 
self, her “secret accomplice”: 
When the conflict caused by my sexual relationship with my father 
became too acute to bear, I created a secret accomplice for my daddy by 
splitting my personality in two. Thus, somewhere around the age of seven, 
I acquired another self with memories and experiences separate from 
mine, whose existence was unknown to me. My loss of memory was 
retroactive. I did not remember my daddy ever having touched me 
sexually. I did not remember ever seeing my daddy naked. I did not 
remember my daddy ever seeing me naked. In future, whenever my daddy 
approached me sexually I turned into my other self, and afterwards I did 
not remember anything that had happened. (15) 
Fraser represses her abuse for more than forty years of her life. Born in March of 
1935, Fraser remembers the existence of her other self “in a blaze of discovery” in April 
1983 at the age of forty-eight (MFH 218). This radical forgetting of abuse that continued 
into her teenage years complicates the writing of her memories once she recovers them. 
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Autobiographies are always already narrative reconstructions of memories that create the 
story of a life; however, in Fraser’s case, her amnesia informs the narrative as much as 
her recovered memories. As she says in the memoir, “My life was structured on the 
uncovering of a mystery. As a child, I survived by forgetting. Later, the amnesia became 
a problem as large as the one it was meant to conceal” (252).  
Amnesia is certainly a problem for her critics. Kathryn Robson, for example, 
argues that Fraser’s text, as testimony, seeks “to convince the reader” of her commitment 
to tell the truth (146), yet the memoir “also implicitly raises the question of how Fraser 
can be so sure of memories that were by her own admission unknown to her until shortly 
before she began to write the memoir, that is, how she can ‘truthfully’ represent a past 
that she was previously barred from accessing, and thus how the reader can assess the 
‘truth’ of her account” (147). Conversely, for other critics, Fraser’s memoir of forgetting 
and remembering is a credible, therapeutic act of recovery through narrative. Suzette 
Henke, for example, says that her memoir “proves so vivid and convincing that we, as 
readers, do indeed believe her” (122). Whereas Robson, in her suggestion that Fraser can 
never be certain of the truth of her experiences, seems unconvinced of the story, Henke 
finds truth in the very fact that Fraser narrates her experiences vividly and convincingly. I 
am uncomfortable with the idea that the truth of Fraser’s story lies in its ability to 
persuade readers. For me, the issue is less a rhetorical one than a generic one having to do 
with the limits of the autobiographical form. Notions of what counts as truth—beyond 
what is plausible or implausible, convincing or unconvincing—need to be extended to 
include the vital connection between memory and the narrative imagination as crucial 
parts of the truth-telling process in cases of childhood trauma. 
While Fraser’s memoir has been criticized because of the implausibility that her 
narration of long-buried memories is accurate, I argue that story, memory, and testimony 
necessarily entwine in the discursive act of narrative therapy. I view healing from 
childhood sexual abuse as a profoundly imaginative act where the survivor needs to 
create a story of events that are either forgotten or impossible to remember accurately. 
The story, however, needs to be created and it needs to feel true to the survivor. To insist 
upon accuracy is to miss the point of Fraser’s writing goal, which was to heal through the 
construction of a coherent life narrative. To write a coherent story of one’s life is to write 
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a healing story which ameliorates the fractures to identity created by trauma. As the 
subtitle makes clear, My Father’s House: A Memoir of Incest and Healing was written as 
part of Fraser’s therapeutic journey. Suzette Henke suggests that such narratives are 
“artistic” endeavours as much as they are testimonial ones: “Through the artistic 
replication of a coherent subject-position, the life-writing project generates a healing 
narrative that temporarily restores the fragmented self to an empowered position of 
psychological agency” (xvi). As a limit-case, Fraser’s memoir of healing offers up the 
opportunity to examine what the departures from the demands of testimonial facts and 
autobiographical form can reveal about the place of creativity and story in the therapeutic 
recovery from childhood sexual abuse. 
The analysis and arguments that follow aim to more fully unpack the issues that 
have emerged from the debate over the truth-status of Fraser’s memoir. Before turning to 
an in-depth analysis of these issues, I provide a broad summary of the stakes in writing an 
ostensibly factual memoir that incorporates “novelistic techniques” and takes recovered 
memories of childhood sexual abuse as its risky subject matter. Following this, I address 
the central questions of how and why some children forget their sexual abuse and recover 
their memories only as adults. To this end, I analyze the difference between traumatic 
memories of the Holocaust versus those of child sexual abuse to underscore the logic of 
Fraser’s traumatic amnesia. I offer a brief analysis of Fraser’s autobiographical first 
novel, Pandora (1972), to argue that Fraser uncannily and cryptically encodes her sexual 
abuse by way of fiction years before she recovers her memories. In the case of Pandora, 
fiction reveals facts, while (strangely) My Father’s House seems to function in the 
opposite way—as an autobiography that has been largely criticized as fictional. I 
historicize the recovered memory debate and explore why recovered memories of abuse 
continue to be contentious.  
Finally, I turn to an exploration of how these issues are specifically played out in 
the scholarly controversy over Fraser’s memoir. In doing so, I take a closer look at the 
intersection of the autobiographical genre with Fraser’s fictional techniques by exploring 
what Philippe Lejeune coined “the autobiographical pact” as a way of examining Fraser’s 
pact with her reader, which she describes in her Author’s Note. Indeed, Fraser’s Author’s 
Note has become a springboard for many of the criticisms of the memoir as a whole. 
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Summarizing the key points made by scholars of Fraser’s memoir, I argue that the 
criticism itself reveals much more about anxieties regarding how childhood sexual 
traumas are narrated than with Fraser’s project in writing her story, which becomes lost 
in arguments about memory and the status of truth. At the heart of the controversy is a 
profound incredulity about recovered memories, particularly when they are narrated, as 
Fraser’s are, as part of a coherent story; however, a coherent story is precisely what 
Fraser intended to write. Fraser’s text requires a reading that opens the question of truth 
to include the place of story and creativity in its articulation because of the limits placed 
upon “truth” by the nature of trauma and narrative. 
2.2 Genre, Recovered Memory, and Truth 
Janice Doane and Devon Hodges assert that incest narratives are a “border genre” 
that “exist on a boundary between fact and story” (113). To recover memories of child 
sexual abuse and then to write about those memories is both to speak the truth that abuse 
occurred and create a story of the trauma, which may correspond more to the memory of 
the event than to the event itself. Because memory is, in part, a narrative act, memories 
are never entirely accurate, yet Fraser’s particular employment of fact and story has riled 
her critics. With the exception of Elaine Showalter, none of Fraser’s critics flatly deny the 
allegations of incest made in her memoir. By questioning almost every aspect of the story 
she tells of her life, and suggesting that she has likely recovered false memories, they 
effectively refute her claims, but they do fall short of saying that she was not sexually 
abused by her father. Mark Freeman’s comments are illustrative of the general tenor of 
the critics on Fraser. While he acknowledges that although it seems likely that 
“something must indeed have been going on,” he is “uncomfortable” with “the specific 
account Fraser has elected to offer” (162). The heart of the problem, then, is the way that 
Fraser tells her story.  
If Fraser is guilty of anything, it is not acknowledging that her memoir is on the 
edge of genre—a limit-case—ascribing to what Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson call “the 
myth of autobiography”: “The myth of autobiography is that the story is singularly 
formative, that the gesture is coherent and monologic, that the subject is articulate and the 
story articulable, and that the narrative lies there waiting to be spoken” (9). The lure of a 
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coherent, narratable life story to Fraser is profoundly related and in direct proportion to 
the extent of her traumatic dissociation and amnesia. Critics question her narrative on 
account of its coherence, and yet I cannot imagine anything more necessary to Fraser’s 
healing than finally not only to narrate but wallow in a life that makes sense. Laurence J. 
Kirmayer insists that the very existence of trauma gives rise to this effort: 
Traumatic experience is not a story but a cascade of experiences, 
eruptions, crevasses, a sliding of tectonic plates that undergird the self. 
These disruptions then give rise to an effort to interpret and so to smooth, 
stabilize, and recalibrate. The effect of these processes is to create a 
specific narrative landscape. This landscape must fit with (and so is 
governed by) folk models of memory. Reconstructions of traumatic 
memory involve the building up of a landscape of local coherence to better 
manage or contain it, to present it convincingly to others and, finally, to 
have done with it. (181-82) 
This, then, is the achievement of Fraser’s memoir: the reconstruction of a story of 
“local coherence” as a way to manage her surfacing traumatic memories so that she might 
move on with her life; however, the intermingling of autobiography with traumatic 
forgetting is capable of fuelling and re-fuelling endless criticism because of its inherent 
epistemological quandary of coherently narrating what can never be fully known because 
of the fallibility of traumatic memories. Poststructuralist trauma theory suggests that 
traumatic events are not experienced directly, but rather belatedly (through flashbacks, 
recurrent dreams) and that this unknowable gap in experience precludes direct knowledge 
of the event. Representation of trauma, then, is vexed by fragmentary or ruptured 
understandings that often defy language itself.
9
 In the case of child sexual abuse, where 
memories are sometimes recovered much later in life, the articulation of the past is 
fraught with difficulties. If recovered childhood memories are analeptically re-visioned 
by a remembering adult consciousness, how is the real and the true defined? Can the 
event ever really be fully comprehended, understood, and accurately represented? 
                                                 
9
 For a representative sampling of this view of trauma, see Caruth, Cathy, ed. Trauma:Explorations in 
Memory. 
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Questions such as these plague the reception of Fraser’s text, because she articulates her 
traumas so well and so completely that her process seems to be antithetical to what is 
known and thought about traumatic memory. Janice Haaken and Paula Reavey, for 
example, insist that memory needs to be understood as dynamic: “memory and other 
aspects of mental life are fluid and dynamic. Further, the ‘truth’ of a memory is 
continually open to negotiation, questioning and reconstruction” (6).  
Psychoanalysis has similarly asserted the radically unassimilable nature of 
trauma, or, in Jacques Lacan’s theorization, that the encounter with the traumatic event is 
“real” only “in so far as it is essentially the missed encounter” (55). In the contemporary 
debates over recovered memory, epistemological questions of what is real and what is 
imagined emerge, yet from a psychoanalytical perspective, the task of separating the real 
and the imagined is an impossible one. As Judith Butler puts it, “trauma is, by definition, 
not capturable through representation or, indeed, recollection; it is precisely that which 
renders all memory false, we might say, and which is known through the gap that disrupts 
all efforts at narrative reconstruction” (153). Thus, when one considers trauma from a 
psychoanalytic perspective, Fraser’s memoir is a defiant paradox of narrative 
reconstruction that makes truth-claims as it writes over “the gap” in her memory. 
Contrary to the assertions of psychoanalysis, memories are frequently portrayed 
in popular culture as realistic representations of the event, akin to a photograph or live 
digital recording; for example, in the film, Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince, 
Dumbledore has a collection of glass vials, each storing one of Voldemort’s memories. 
He then uses his Pensieve to review, with Harry, these memories, which are presented as 
exact representations of the event. Scientific research contradicts this view of memory. 
As Kirmayer describes it, 
Memory is anything but a photographic record of experience; it is a 
roadway full of potholes, badly in need of repair, worked on day and night 
by revisionist crews. What is registered is highly selective and thoroughly 
transformed by interpretation and semantic encoding at the moment of 
experience. What can be veridically recalled is limited and routinely 
reconstructed to fit models of what might have—must have—happened. 
When encouraged to flesh it out, we readily engage in imaginative 
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elaboration and confabulation and, once we have done this, the bare bones 
memory is lost forever within the animated story we have constructed. 
(176) 
If all memory is prone to confabulation, then narrating dissociated childhood 
traumas, which are even more difficult to retrieve and recall, seems to me to be a 
profoundly imaginative act, one that Fraser nonetheless insists has truth value. As she 
says in her “Author’s Note” to My Father’s House, “I have used many of the techniques 
of the novelist. [. . .] However, to my knowledge, I have not exaggerated or distorted or 
misrepresented the truth as I now understand it.” Sophy Levy defends the creative 
approach Fraser takes to representation:  
The voice of trauma necessarily uses a language that borders the artistic 
and the actual, as trauma has blurred the two when the abused child is 
convinced that her experiences are false. The displaced manifestations of 
sexual violence in Fraser’s earlier work, criticized as hyperbolic by many 
contemporary reviewers, are rehearsals for a memoir that retains its right 
to use “many of the techniques of the novelist” (My Father’s House, x). 
The trauma narrative disrupts our understandings of genre as 
epistemology; form is no longer the key to evaluating truth-content. (877) 
Levy’s observation that trauma narratives undo the connection between 
autobiography and truth raises the question of what constitutes truth in these cases. If not 
form, then what? Substance is not the answer, because, in Fraser’s case, her story relies 
upon recovered memories. What happens to truth in the case of Sylvia Fraser? For her 
critics, it largely goes missing. Bolstered by scientific and psychoanalytic research on 
memory suggesting its imprecision, potential for distortion, and reconstructive nature, 
literature professors such as Elaine Showalter, Nicola King, and Kathryn Robson argue 
for the impossibility of Fraser’s memories as she presents them, that is, as pristinely 
uncontaminated memoro-facts of the past.
10
 By contrast, a memoir such as Janice 
                                                 
10
 According to Daniel L. Schacter, cognitive psychologists increasingly became interested in memory 
reconstruction and distortion in the 1970s (12). It was also in the 1970s that Elizabeth Loftus and her 
colleagues “demonstrated both that leading questions can systematically alter memory reports [. . .] and that 
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Williamson’s Crybaby! (1998), while it is less known than Fraser’s, has been 
comparatively better received by scholars, because it self-consciously acknowledges her 
murky relationship with past events. For Williamson, “[s]tories are gathered from 
memory and told in images and words that leave tracks somewhere between imagination 
and history” (Crybaby! 11).  
Williamson’s tentative approach to her memories is in some ways shared by 
Fraser who acknowledges in the memoir that “[t]he memories of my other self are 
difficult to recapture because they are so fragmentary” (218). However, Fraser’s 
conceptualization of memory differs from Williamson’s understanding of memory as a 
space of “imagination and history.” By contrast, Fraser takes an archeological view of 
memory in My Father’s House: “For more than forty years the memories of my other self 
lay deeply buried in jagged pieces inside me—smashed hieroglyphic tablets from another 
time and another place. When finally I began the excavation, I brought these pieces to the 
surface in random order, to be fitted into patterns and dated” (218). Like a broken plate 
that can be glued together and returned to its original form, the shards of Fraser’s 
memory, she suggests, can be similarly pasted together to form the original pattern of 
events. Fraser’s critics are troubled by the notion that memories can be unearthed as 
pristine artifacts of the past which can then be narrated without compromising their 
condition. As King insists of Fraser’s memoir, “the ‘truth’ about the preserved and 
rediscovered past only emerges as an effect of narrative itself,” and “the structure she has 
produced is so highly and tightly constructed, and the recovery and representation of 
memory so apparently complete, that doubts arise about the truth status of the events she 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
post-event misinformation can alter memory for an original event” (13). These experiments were important 
in that they heightened interest in suggestibility and eyewitness testimony. (See Loftus, E. F. and J.C. 
Palmer. “Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the Interaction between Language and 
Memory.” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13 (1974): 585-589; and Loftus, E.F., D. G. 
Miller, and H.J. Burns. “Semantic Integration of Verbal Information into a Visual Memory.” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4 (1978): 19-31.) This emphasis continued in the 
1980s with psychoanalysts, such as Donald Spence, emphasizing the reconstructive nature of the past in the 
analytic situation, and that the retrieval situation contributes to the subjective act of remembering (16-17). 
Says Schacter, “The 1980s and 1990s also produced a good deal of research concerning the relation 
between emotion and memory distortion” (18).  
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reconstructs and the appropriateness of [. . .] novelistic techniques for this material” (62; 
original emphasis).   
Fraser’s critics are in line with poststructuralist autobiographical theories which 
trouble the notion of a coherent, stable self, and understand identity as constructed and 
shifting. Contemporary theorizations of autobiography have moved away from fixed, 
coherent notions of a narrating subject with direct access to a knowable past, to more 
flexible notions of subjectivity that acknowledge the constructive aspects of memory and 
identity and allow for shifts and transformations of the self.
11
 The idea of a self-storying 
subject constantly constructing and reconstructing her life story based on available 
narratives, whether the scripts are personal or cultural, marks an important shift in 
understanding the key role that narrative plays in the articulation of lived experience. As 
Paul Ricoeur observes, life is a “story in its nascent state [. . .] an activity and a passion 
in search of a narrative” (29; original emphasis). In Ricoeur’s sense, Fraser searches for 
a narrative to tell the story of her life; however, multiple or dissociated personalities 
complicate autobiography as a genre ostensibly committed to narrating a singular life 
through accessible memories. In choosing a traditional genre to narrate a life fractured by 
trauma, Fraser disrupts expectations of form. Fraser’s critics do not sanction traditional 
autobiographical discourse as a legitimating genre for her story; indeed, employing such 
a form appears to raise questions about its status as testimony. 
My Father’s House needs to be understood in the historical and cultural context in 
which it was written—that is, in 1987, on the heels of second wave feminism when 
“speaking out” about rape represented a new form of empowerment and activism against 
misogynist views of women—as well as in the context of Fraser’s work as a whole. Much 
of the existing criticism analyzes the memoir in isolation. In fact, My Father’s House is 
not nearly as coherent and complete as critics suggest; rather, placed in the context of 
Fraser’s corpus as a whole, it is but one of Fraser’s several textual attempts, and not the 
first, to narrate her abuse. Her 1972 novel, Pandora, a gothic fiction of child abuse, is the 
first, although its autobiographical component is submerged. Written over ten years 
                                                 
11
 See, for example, Paul John Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories. 
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before she recovered her memories, the novel is, as Fraser says, a “minefield of 
incestuous codes” (Book of Strange 133). Her novels that follow are filled with violent 
sexuality, which Fraser only understands retrospectively as emanating from her own 
abuse. At the time, she did not understand why she was choosing to write, for example, 
about tyrannical patriarchs raping young virgins, as she did in the historical novel, The 
Emperor’s Virgin (1980). When she finally wrote My Father’s House, she worked with 
what she thought were completely recovered memories; however, when I interviewed 
her, she revealed that her process of recovering memories has been ongoing since the 
publication of the memoir: 
The gap in My Father’s House is what happened in my high school years. 
I got the externals right in terms of my sense of guilt and shame and being 
a sexual figure in a way that I both asked for and didn’t want. I realized 
that I filled in the gap as if nothing had happened. I just thought that the 
abuse had stopped. It hadn’t stopped; it had just got worse, that’s all.
12
 
In 2005, Fraser published an article in Toronto Life, “Lies My Father Told Me,” 
which recounts horrific memories that surfaced, many years after the publication of the 
memoir, of being taken to a child brothel by her father. These memories are more 
fragmentary than the ones she records in the memoir. She remembers being photographed 
in a house, but she is not sure whether or not she was raped there. Some details, however, 
like the house in which these crimes occurred, are remarkable in the specificity of her 
recall. Clearly, the memories of sexual trauma are more difficult for her to access. There 
is, thus, a pattern of traumatic re-visiting in Fraser’s work that begins in the novels she 
wrote prior to the publication of her memoir and continues to this day. Taken together, 
                                                 
12
 I interviewed Sylvia Fraser on 28 February 2010 in her sunny downtown Toronto condo. I wanted to 
better understand her view of the controversy swirling around her memoir. What struck me when I met 
Fraser, aside from her beauty and elegance, was that her entire condo was decorated with white furnishings 
and white or transparent accessories. Clarity and transparency—seeing what lies beneath the surface—are 
crucial to Fraser’s work as a writer and are reflected in her condo which is really a metaphor for 
transparency. I have included Fraser’s comments to me throughout this chapter for two reasons: to clarify 
her views on the controversy and her reasoning behind her decision to incorporate novelistic techniques 
into the memoir; and to give her a voice alongside those of her critics.  
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these narratives constitute a discontinuous, generically heterogeneous, subjectively 
multivalent, multilaterally compromised series of attempts to narrativize trauma. 
When I spoke to Fraser, she told me that she has written another memoir (not yet 
published) that again revisits her abuse and attempts to fill in the gaps of the original 
memoir. My Father’s House may have the appearance of a totalizing narrative, but 
Fraser’s other work belies this. Significant traumatic memories of the abuse that 
continued well into her teenage years are the subject of her new memoir. My Father’s 
House elides these memories, not in any deliberate attempt to cover them up, but because 
they remained inaccessible to Fraser’s consciousness. As she explained it to me, 
memories seem to return when she is able to cope with them. When she wrote her first 
memoir, “that was about all I could handle at that time. It would have been too much. It 
took another nine months before I had another wham-bam that indicated to me that the 
abuse had carried on a lot longer than I had thought” (Personal Interview). Repetition and 
recursion are hallmarks of trauma. This continual re-working and re-writing of her 
childhood abuse reveals the extent to which her memories continue to evade her, the 
persistence (rather than the absence) of gaps in her memory, and the dynamic and 
productive aspects of trauma in constituting her memories recursively through 
narrative.
13
 If Fraser is fabricating her abuse, as so many of her critics suggest, then her 
life’s work of writing and re-writing her childhood is surely one of the most elaborate and 
least self-serving lies in the history of life-writing.  
The question undergirding all acts of testimony, literary or legal, is always is she 
lying? Oprah Winfrey’s condemnation of James Frey’s memoir, A Million Little Pieces 
(2003), is illustrative of the contempt of the reading public for fallacious memoirs, and a 
reminder that the stakes are high for both writers of traumatic pasts and their readers. 
Frey’s “memoir,” initially endorsed by Winfrey as one of her Book Club selections in 
                                                 
13
 American author Kathryn Harrison’s body of work is another example of the recursive nature of trauma. 
She first fictionalized her incestuous relationship with her father in her debut novel, Thicker Than Water 
(1991). She followed this with a memoir, The Kiss (1997), that not only shares resonances with the novel, 
but actually repeats lines verbatim. Two memoirs follow this one, both taking up issues of her childhood 
and her fraught relationship with not just her father, but also her mother: Seeking Rapture (2003) and The 
Mother Knot (2004). 
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September 2005, sold millions of copies.
14
 Unlike Frey, who concedes in his 2006 note to 
the reader that he “embellished many details about [. . .] past experiences, and altered 
others in order to serve [. . .] the greater purpose of the book,” Fraser insists that she 
recorded her memories of incest without exaggeration. Binjamin Wilkomirski’s 
Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood, is another representative example of 
what can go wrong in the attempt to narrate childhood trauma. Wilkomirski maintains 
that his memoir is true, even though historian, Stefan Maechler, has proved it to be 
false.
15
 What is fascinating in Wilkomirski’s case is that the story he fabricates about 
being a Holocaust survivor in German-occupied Poland in many ways mirrors his real 
childhood in Switzerland. He appears to have reframed his trauma. In his case, what is 
historically false may well be psychologically true. Fraser’s case is different, because 
while she is frequently accused of over-determined plots and even invention, the critics 
have never proven her memoir to be historically false; rather, they question the reliability 
of memories reconstructed and then represented as a coherent life narrative.
16
  
While it is legitimate to question the veracity of any document claiming to be 
non-fiction, it may not be possible to articulate traumatic memories, particularly those of 
childhood, without recourse to fictive narrative structures and devices. Memoirs such as 
Fraser’s are more constructively viewed as acts of fallible memory rather than acts of 
incontrovertible fact. The fact that memory is fallible does not mean that Fraser’s memoir 
should be discredited. Translating memories into a story that makes sense to the survivor 
is, as Peter Brooks demonstrates, a defining quality of mental health: “Mens sana in 
fabula sana: mental health is a coherent life story, neurosis is a faulty narrative” (49). 
                                                 
14
 Roger Luckhurst discusses the memoir boom and the privileging of memoirs over novels by publishers, 
and, by implication, readers. In the case of Frey, he “revealed that the book had been rejected as a novel by 
seventeen publishers but was accepted the instant it was reclassified a memoir” (135). The desire of the 
reading public for memoirs of suffering seems to me to be a type of voyeurism or trauma tourism. 
15
 See Maechler, Stefan. The Wilkomirski Affair: A Study in Biographical Truth. Trans. John E. Woods. 
New York: Schocken, 2001. 
16
 A related example of this is Susanna Egan’s questioning of the distinction between narrative and reality 
in Rudy Wiebe’s collaboration with Yvonne Johnson in Stolen Life: The Journey of a Cree Woman. She 
argues that Wiebe’s novelistic and protective intervention into Johnson’s story elides the “discrepancy 
between messy experience and deliberate narrative experience” (24).  
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This chapter makes a case for moving beyond legal definitions of truth beyond a 
reasonable doubt in memoirs of child abuse and beyond the binary, true or false rhetoric 
of the recovered memory debate to allow for both contemporary theorizations of 
memory’s fallibility and memoirs like Fraser’s that negotiate traumatic memories through 
creative narrative strategies to produce a coherent life story. The demands of trauma on 
narrative and empirical reality necessitate readings that extend debates about memory and 
its articulation to questions that explore what counts as truth in limit-cases such as 
Fraser’s. 
2.3 How Could She Forget? MPD, Adaptive Forgetting, 
Repression, and Dissociation 
2.3.1 MPD 
When it comes to allegations of incest, the truth matters: legally, politically, 
personally, and, importantly, to readers, who function as witnesses to the narrative 
testimony. Familial, social, and intellectual contexts inscribe boundaries upon and 
legitimate discourse for the rehearsal of life stories. As Kirmayer suggests, “Trauma 
narratives are rhetorical forms that emerge from the effort to anneal or bridge sundered 
parts of the self. Traumatic memories are imaginatively reconstructed along narrative 
lines guided by bodily experience and cultural models of memory and self” (191-92). 
Fraser’s pioneering trauma narrative emerged as a rhetorical form of remembering in her 
effort creatively to bridge what she began to perceive as radically separate parts of 
herself. Trauma memoirs such as Fraser’s exist on the border between legal testimonies, 
which focus on the facts and evidence of the case, and literary memoirs, which are 
culturally informed, often sanctioned modes of self-expression which work with available 
cultural narratives that readers will recognize and perhaps relate to.  
As Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson observe, “In telling their stories, narrators 
take up models of identity that are culturally available. And by adopting ready-made 
narrative templates to structure experiential history, they take up culturally designated 
subjectivities” (9). The ready-made identity model taken up by Fraser in the memoir to 
give structure to her experience is Multiple Personality Disorder. For Fraser, the form of 
her forgetting in some ways responded to cultural contexts for theorizing the effects of 
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child sexual abuse. Fraser calls her dissociative strategies for survival Multiple 
Personality Disorder in her memoir, as that was the current and available psychological 
terminology that best expressed her experience; however, and paradoxically, while Fraser 
works with culturally available scripts to disclose her abuse, it is precisely her use of 
certain cultural models available to her—particularly, MPD—that opens up questions 
about the reliability of her narrative.  
In Remembering Trauma, Richard J. McNally notes that MPD was introduced 
into the third Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) in 1980 
and “was defined by at least two distinct, complex, and integrated personalities within the 
same person, each of which assumed control over the person’s behavior at different 
times” (11). MPD was classified as a severe dissociative disorder which fractured 
consciousness and identity. MPD was believed to begin in childhood as the result of 
overwhelming sexual, physical, or emotional trauma (McNally 11). McNally suggests 
that the “belief that severe childhood trauma causes MPD became popular only after the 
appearance of the best-selling book [by Flora Rheta Schreiber in 1973] and film about 
Sybil, a woman who had developed 16 personalities after having been brutalized 
throughout her childhood by her mother” (11). In the early 1980s, child sexual abuse and 
MPD were thus emerging discourses in public consciousness.  
Fraser notes the rise of official cases of MPD in the United States in the 1980s, 
along with the continuing skepticism about its existence and connection to child sexual 
abuse (BS 127-28). Ian Hacking has traced the trajectory of MPD: “In 1972 multiple 
personalities were almost invisible. Ten years later they were noticeable enough for there 
to be talk of an epidemic. [. . .] In 1992 they are a thoroughly visible minority, 
particularly in North America” (“MPD and its Hosts” 3). Indeed, the 1994 DSM-IV 
renamed MPD Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) to reflect current models of memory 
and trauma. McNally describes the shift in thinking that changed MPD to DID: “The 
notion of dozens of distinct personalities inhabiting the same body was abandoned in 
favor of the view that the real problem was that these patients lacked even a single 
coherent identity” (13). Despite the change in name, DID continued to be theorized as a 
coping strategy to prevent traumatic childhood memories from entering into 
consciousness 
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In The Book of Strange (1992), a non-fiction volume published five years after My 
Father’s House, Fraser provides the cultural context for her self-diagnosis of MPD, 
noting that she had seen the 1957 movie, “The Three Faces of Eve,” starring Joanne 
Woodward dramatically switching between three completely separate personalities: Eve 
White, Eve Black, and Jane. Rather than the histrionic switching performed in the film, 
Fraser’s corresponds much more closely to dissociative states of consciousness, whereby 
she psychically removed herself from situations of abuse. At the time, however, there was 
no other language for this than the discourse of MPD.
17
 Fraser elaborates that, “As nearly 
as I can determine, my personality divided into two about the time I was five as the result 
of my father’s oral rape of me. From then on, it was ‘my’ job to take on the world while 
my Other Self did scary and repellent things in my father’s bedroom” (BS 128; original 
emphasis).
18
 Fraser has the insight, after writing My Father’s House, that this “Other 
Self” or the “Child Who Knows” is, in fact, herself, her birth personality, making the 
“Child who Doesn’t Know” the constructed self she presented to the world:  
The Child Who Knows is not a phantom of my dreams; I am a figment of 
hers. [. . .] It’s as if I have spent a lifetime building an elaborate house, 
choosing the wallpaper and furniture with care, landscaping to taste, only 
to discover that I do not have title to the land it occupies. My birth 
property is off somewhere in the forest, a brambly piece of unmarked 
                                                 
17
 Fraser had also consulted her 1974 Encyclopedia Britannica, which, as she says, did “little to dispel the 
sinister melodrama” (BS 123) that clung to her and to the phenomenon of MPD as she tried to understand 
her strange behavior and feelings. From the encyclopedia, she learned that MPD is “an extreme form of 
dissociation in which traumatic experiences, cut off from conscious awareness, develop into one or more 
separate identities. In all the world’s history, the Britannica claims only 100 cases have ever been found. 
Only one hundred? Can I be one hundred and one?” (BS 123; original emphasis). Fraser dates this 
reflection 5 December 1984, before the publication of My Father’s House, and shortly after she first 
recovers memories of her abuse, indicating her early search for a language to diagnose her experiences in 
terms of available conceptual frameworks. 
18
 Note that an earlier quotation in this chapter has Fraser locating the splitting of her personality at around 
age seven. The earlier quotation is from My Father’s House, which preceded the publication of The Book of 
Strange. The discrepancy is because as Fraser continued to recover her memories, she realized not only that 
the abuse lasted longer than the memoir contemplated, but also that it began earlier. 
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territory containing one child’s untended grave. (BS 129; original 
emphasis) 
While the passage reveals self-annihilation as a paradoxical strategy for survival, 
the connection between child sexual abuse and MPD that many researchers now take for 
granted, as Judith Lewis Herman does, has been challenged by Ian Hacking. Hacking 
suggests that survivors of child abuse, in an effort to put a coherent narrative to their 
experiences, adopt the language and structure of MPD or dissociation as a sort of 
metanarrative to explain their pasts: 
The intimate relationship connecting recovery of traumatic memories of 
child abuse with multiple personality is no accident. For although I fall 
short of saying memory simply is narrative, I agree with [Gilbert] Ryle 
that one becomes good at recalling the critical part of one’s past when one 
acquires the skill to cast it into a coherent narrative. That is precisely what 
is provided by the causal lore of multiple personality, for good stories use 
explanations. Dissociation is explained as a coping mechanism. The 
multiple comes to understand that she is as she is now because of the way 
she deployed coping mechanisms in the past. A narrative structure is 
available that can then be filled in with the appropriate scenes. (Rewriting 
the Soul 256) 
For Hacking, then, MPD or DID are available narrative models that may or may 
not clinically exist for understanding adaptive mechanisms for coping with abuse. In 
viewing MPD as a cultural narrative, Hacking is on side with advocates of False Memory 
Syndrome, who argue along similar lines. Elaine Showalter, discussed in detail further on 
in this chapter, is one such supporter of this skeptical view of both MPD and recovered 
memory. For others, like Herman and Jennifer Freyd, recovered memories have truth 
value, and reflect complex strategies for dealing with abuse through dissociation, which 
they view as an adaptive form of forgetting. One can play chicken and egg with Hacking 
and ponder what came first, the dissociated condition or the available cultural narrative of 
dissociation. There is, however, a cogent logic to the arguments of Freyd and Herman 
who say dissociation is an adaptive response to ensure a child’s survival in a family 
system upon which the child is wholly dependent.  
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2.3.2 Adaptive Forgetting 
Fraser’s extended period of amnesia and the subsequent recovery of her memories 
following years of sexual abuse are principal issues plaguing the critical response to her 
memoir. Not all child sexual abuse survivors forget their abuse. Danica, for example, has 
the opposite problem: “I don’t want to remember. Memory pursues me” (12). How is it 
possible to forget repeated episodes of sexual abuse? In Betrayal Trauma: The Logic of 
Forgetting Childhood Abuse, Freyd asks her readers to consider the pressure on a child 
suffering sexual abuse at the hands of a parent or trusted adult in a position of power and 
authority over the child. Young children do not have the emotional or cognitive capacities 
to integrate adult sexual violations of them into their experiences and understandings of 
the world. Depending on the severity of the abuse, some children may not recognize that 
they are being sexually imposed upon. Furthermore, perpetrators will deny that they have 
done anything to the child, and ask the child to remain silent and to forget, often under 
threat of extreme punishment.  
As Freyd observes, “Sexual abuse perpetrated on a child by a trusted caregiver is 
a perfect opportunity for the victim to create information blockage. To know is to put 
oneself in danger. Not to know is to align oneself with the caregiver and ensure survival” 
(4). A family system of denial and silence will reinforce the child’s inclination to block 
the event and preserve his or her attachments. In Fraser’s case, and like many other 
victims, the death of her father was a condition of her remembering. As Fraser says, 
“When my father died, he came alive for me. A door had opened [. . .]. Before I could 
pass through it to wholeness and health, my other self would have to give up her secrets” 
(MFH 211).The opposite is also true: her attachment to her living father necessitated her 
forgetting. Freyd reinforces the point: “If betrayal by a trusted caregiver is the key to 
predicting amnesia for abuse, attachment is the key to understanding why amnesia is 
adaptive in instances of such betrayals” (69). For Freyd, forgetting the abuse is a way for 
the child to maintain the relationships upon which the child depends.  
Herman in Trauma and Recovery similarly argues that childhood abuse requires a 
family climate of terror, domination, and fear in which healthy parent-child relationships 
are radically disrupted. Therefore, the child must find ways to adapt to situations of terror 
in which the child is absolutely helpless. Herman theorizes that because children 
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nonetheless deploy their immature systems of psychological defenses in abusive 
situations, they develop “extraordinary capacities” as a way to adapt to their 
circumstances (96). Herman suggests here that dissociated states of consciousness may 
occur in abused children to help them adapt: 
All of the abused child’s psychological adaptations serve the fundamental 
purpose of preserving her primary attachment to her parents in the face of 
daily evidence of their malice, helplessness, or indifference. To 
accomplish this purpose, the child resorts to a wide array of psychological 
defenses. By virtue of these defenses, the abuse is either walled off from 
conscious awareness and memory, so that it did not really happen, or 
minimized, rationalized, and excused, so that whatever did happen was not 
really abuse. Unable to escape or alter the unbearable reality in fact, the 
child alters it in her mind. (102) 
According to Herman, there is a connection between the severity of childhood 
abuse and the ability of children to dissociate themselves from that abuse through 
alterations in consciousness. As Fraser writes in her memoir, “Even now, I don’t know 
the full truth of that other little girl I created to do the things I was too frightened, too 
ashamed, too repelled to do, the things my father made me do, the things I did to please 
him but which paid off with a precocious and dangerous power” (15). Herman posits that 
in situations like this, “Dissociation [. . .] becomes not merely a defensive adaptation but 
the fundamental principle of personality organization” (102). Trauma radically disrupts 
normal psychological functioning in adults. Accordingly, says Herman, in children, 
repeated trauma will alter a personality that is in the process of forming (96). Fraser’s 
dissociated identities (which she calls MPD) were thus her creative form of adaptation to 
the traumas she experienced as a child. 
2.3.3 Repression versus Dissociation 
I have been using the broad term “amnesia” to describe Fraser’s memory loss, but 
I have also used the terms (or quoted people who have) “repression” and “dissociation” 
without clearly distinguishing their meanings.  I view both terms as forms of adaptive 
forgetting. Distinguishing between the terms, however, sheds light upon the workings of 
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traumatic amnesia and helps to make sense of from a memory perspective Fraser’s MPD. 
Suppression, repression, and dissociation are all forms of forgetting, which is perhaps 
why the terms have been frequently collapsed together or otherwise muddled in 
discussion of childhood abuse.
19
 For Laurence J. Kirmayer, the “distinction between 
forget, repress, ignore, and dissociate is not simply an arbitrary choice of metaphor. Each 
is a phenomenologically distinct form of not-remembering” (191). By 
“phenomenologically distinct” Kirmayer means that suppression is a conscious form of 
forgetting, a will to forget, if you like; repression is an unconscious form of forgetting 
motivated by fears and desires; and dissociation is a (conscious or unconscious) splitting 
of consciousness whereby memories are partitioned off and the trauma is not integrated 
into a stable identity (Kirmayer 179).  
Janice Haaken, through Freud’s early theory of hysteria, provides a helpful 
analogy for distinguishing between dissociation and repression. She understands 
dissociation as vertical splits in consciousness or “double consciousness” and repression 
as the horizontal splits of the repression model to which Freud eventually shifted (“The 
Recovery of Memory” 1075-76). In other words, dissociation is a dividing wall; 
repression is sub-flooring. Freyd sees both dissociation and repression more broadly as 
types of “knowledge isolation” (15). She perceives “a distinction [. . .] between a lack of 
awareness of the past (which may be called memory repression or traumatic amnesia) and 
a lack of awareness of the current situation (which may be called repression of affect or 
dissociative state of consciousness)” (15). Arguing that the work on trauma and 
psychological defenses often neglects to account for the difference between failure to 
recall a past event (or repression) and failure to access in the present information that 
would be normally available (or dissociation), she contends the primary confusion in the 
scholarship around traumatic amnesia is between memory and consciousness. Freyd’s 
clarification is an important one: repression can be viewed as an issue of memory, 
                                                 
19
 Indeed, the term “repression” has been particularly contested. Although not germane to the overall 
argument of my project, the debate needs to be acknowledged that how repression is defined, and even 
whether it exists at all, continues to be actively disputed, as a recent scientific journal devoted to debating 
the topic attests. See Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29.5 (2006). 
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dissociation as an issue of consciousness. All forms of forgetting or alterations in 
consciousness are adaptive and protective mechanisms for the child who suffers abuse. 
According to Kirmayer, research suggests that trauma-related amnesia and 
dissociated memories likely have multiple explanations: altered registration of the event 
at the time of the trauma because of a narrowing of attention, emotional interference with 
information processing, and alterations in self-consciousness. Victims might avoid 
thinking about what happened or actively suppress their memories and deliberately not 
respond to cues that prompt their memory to think about the event. Says Kirmayer, 
“Traumatic memories may be isolated from other networks of association by interpreting 
them as dissonant or inconsistent with self-representation and personal history” (180). If 
individuals refuse to speak about what happened and actively deny events to themselves 
and others, then “such denials may undermine the processes of rehearsal and semantic 
bridge-building necessary for ready recall” (Kirmayer 180). 
In her review of Freyd’s Betrayal Trauma, Sylvia Fraser draws upon neuroscience 
to argue why some survivors of childhood abuse forget, and, in so doing, describes her 
experience of dissociation: “the neurological determinant for either the fixing of memory, 
or its short-circuiting, is believed to be the stress hormone adrenaline: A surge stimulates 
neural receptors, but too much floods neural receptors, preventing normal processing and 
integration. The result is a person who both knows and doesn’t know at the same time” 
(“Abuse Wars”). What I find interesting about Fraser’s comment is less the accuracy of 
the science she relies upon or the impulse to find a rational explanation to her question of 
how she could possibly forget her many years of abuse, than the condition of her 
consciousness as simultaneously knowing and not knowing, which is to suggest the 
distinction between memory and consciousness that Freyd perceives. What memory 
stores is not always available to consciousness. As Fraser says, “Paradoxically, traumatic 
events seem to be both the least forgettable and the most forgettable of all experiences” 
(“Abuse Wars”). In this condition of both remembered and forgotten, traumatic memories 
partitioned off from consciousness through dissociation in some ways mirror the state of 
the uncanny.  
Shoshana Felman’s reading of the uncanny through Freud in What Does a Woman 
Want? is illustrative of this doubleness: “Freud’s psychoanalytic definition of the 
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‘uncanny’ (das Unheimliche) as the anxiety provoked through the encounter with 
something that, paradoxically, is experienced as at once foreign and familiar, distant and 
close, totally estranged, unknown, and at the same time strangely recognizable and 
known” (56). Fraser similarly describes her experience in My Father’s House in her 
chapter entitled, “The Other.” Fraser’s description of the dissociation she experienced as 
a result of the abuse is, in one sense, radically complete: “Even now, I don’t know the full 
truth of that other little girl I created to do the things I was too frightened, too ashamed, 
too repelled to do” (15). Yet, the two selves are uncannily intertwined. As Fraser says, 
“She knew everything about me. I knew nothing about her, yet some connection always 
remained. Like estranged but fatal lovers, we were psychically attuned.” (15).  
Felman suggests, following Freud, “that what is perhaps most uncanny about the 
uncanny is that it is not the opposite of what is canny but, rather, that which uncannily 
subverts the opposition between ‘canny’ and ‘uncanny,’ between ‘heimlich’ and 
‘unheimlich’” (65). Thus, defying the clear opposition between the two, Fraser’s 
dissociated self seems to be not entirely other or opposite but rather a subversion of the 
very notion of multiple selves where her alter personality communicates with her in the 
slippage between the two: “She telegraphed messages to me through the dreams we 
shared. She leaked emotions to me through the body we shared” (MFH 15). Fraser’s 
dissociated or alter personality is not as contained as the concept of dissociation implies. 
As Kirmayer argues, “Dissociation is often depicted in the literature as a rigid walling off 
of memories in an all or none fashion, but this does not accord well with either clinical or 
experimental evidence. In clinical reality, as in the laboratory, dissociation is found in all 
degrees of intensity in the same individual and is characterized more by its fluidity than 
by its rigid constancy” (180). Fraser’s separate selves share a fluidity and even inhabit 
each other in a specular way: “Hers was the guilty face I sometimes glimpsed in my 
mirror” (MFH 15). Her uncanny encounter is with a self which is, through distortions of 
memory and consciousness, both known and unknown.  
2.4 Pandora: Encountering Fraser’s Other Self 
Fraser’s first novel, Pandora, might be the best textual evidence supporting Fraser’s 
claim of a dissociated “other self,” the one she uncannily catches sight of in her mirror. 
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Published in 1972, Pandora was written over a decade before Fraser recovered her 
memories of child sexual abuse. The autobiographical novel spans the first eight years of 
the life of Pandora Gothic. Fraser told me that she was initially worried that using 
“Gothic” as a family name was “over the top.” She realized, however, that hers “was a 
gothic childhood” (Personal Interview). The father in the novel, Lyle Gothic, is a butcher 
by trade and has a hooked arm. This, too, retrospectively embarrassed Fraser, as she says, 
from two perspectives: “one, because it was a phallic symbol, so obviously a phallic 
symbol [. . .] it would have been recognized as such, but also it was too close. I think that 
my discomfort was because this was too close to my own story, which could surface” 
(Personal Interview). For me, the Gothic family depicted in the novel uncannily reflects a 
broader textual haunting by the specter of Fraser’s “other self,” who might be understood 
as the novel’s protagonist, Pandora.  
 In My Father’s House, Fraser slips into italics, signifying recovered memories of 
her childhood split personality, and suggests that Pandora was in fact co-authored by her 
dissociated self: “My other self has learned to type. She presses my keys, throwing up 
masses of defiant memories—stream-of-consciousness stuff without punctuation” (149). 
The collaboration is an unconscious one: “whatever is hidden in the psyche will struggle 
to reveal itself. Through Pandora, my other self had acquired a voice” (MFH 153). Two 
scenes in particular capture Fraser’s repressed memories of abuse (those suffered by her 
“other self”) that were, as I will show, unconsciously surfacing in her writing of this 
novel. The first scene involves an incident of sexual abuse with “the breadman”; the 
second scene dramatically records a physical and emotional beating suffered by Pandora 
at the hands of her father. Not only a sublimated narration of child sexual abuse, this 
scene, I argue, features the appearance of Fraser’s other self in a mirror. 
 The only overt scene of sexual abuse in the novel occurs when Pandora is offered 
a ride on the breadman’s wagon. The breadman, with “pointy teeth, like the whale that 
swallowed Pinocchio,” tries to win Pandora’s affection with a chocolate éclair, and then 
tries to fondle her (68). Pandora fights back, only to be tricked into putting her hands in 
his pocket to search for promised coins. The breadman holds her hands inside his pants, 
saying “‘Pat the nice puppy. Play with the nice puppy. Does your father have a nice 
puppy? Take out the nice puppy’” (71). As a metonym for the phallus, the puppy is not 
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just the breadman’s. The question, “‘Does your father have a nice puppy?’” suggests that 
the writer—Pandora and/or Fraser—is thinking about her father’s “puppy” in the context 
of narrating a scene of sexual abuse with the breadman. The father, of course, is also the 
breadwinner. The slippage between the breadman and the breadwinner is again suggested 
when Pandora tries to escape the breadman, who proceeds to choke her: “Panic clogs 
Pandora’s chest. It explodes through her throat. The breadman clamps his hand over her 
mouth. He jams the scream back into her body. She convulses” (71).  
Pandora’s choking and convulsions mimic Fraser’s description in My Father’s 
House of her physical response to her first substantial memory recovery of the abuse: “[. . 
.] my jaws open wider than possible and I start to gag and sob, unable to close my 
mouth—lockjaw in reverse. These spasms do not feel random. They are the convulsions 
of a child being raped through the mouth” (220). The emphasis, then, in the passage 
above in Pandora on the mouth, throat, and convulsions during a scene of sexual abuse is 
textual, fictional evidence of a repressed memory of Fraser’s oral rape leaking into the 
narrative. When Pandora escapes the breadman, she becomes, as Fraser does as a child, 
incapable of articulating her experience: “Pandora is afraid, but she cannot name her fear. 
Pandora is ashamed, but she cannot name her shame. Fear and shame gorge like buzzards 
on her burden of guilty knowledge, leaving only a few twisted bones” (72). The twisted, 
bare bones of her story uncannily emerge through substitutions (breadman/breadwinner) 
and screened recollections of oral rape. 
 Perhaps even more striking for its dramatization of repressed memories of abuse 
is the scene in which Lyle is punishing Pandora for expressing anger that her beloved cat 
was euthanized by her parents without her knowledge. Lyle’s punishment involves 
stripping Pandora of “her brattishness” by literally demanding that she remove all of her 
clothing (132). The scene is an extended one, with Pandora slowly taking off her 
clothing, as if it were a striptease. Pandora strips to her underpants, but her father insists, 
“‘I said everything’” (133). Pandora’s mother, Adelaide, and twin sisters, Adel and Ada, 
who have been quiet watchers of the scene, become collaborators in the removal of 
Pandora’s underpants: “Adel pins down Pandora’s shoulders. Ada uncoils her legs. 
Adelaide, with a look of supreme distaste, pulls down her pants. Pandora tries to squeeze 
them between her thighs. The cloth peels away like adhesive from new skin” (134). The 
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collaboration of family members in the abuse clearly suggests a broader pattern of 
collusiveness, particularly the mother’s.
20
 The names of the twins also suggest a 
replication of the mother figure, with Adel and Ada being very close to Adelaide. The 
forced stripping of Pandora screens a much more prolonged and violent pattern of sexual 
abuse, while it is at the same time a representative example of a form of sexual assault on 
a child, with family members implicated as collaborators. 
 The scene takes a revelatory turn when Lyle picks up the naked Pandora with his 
hooked arm and “hangs her, full-length, in front of the mirror” (134). Lyle’s hooked arm, 
as a metonym for the phallus, is here holding up Pandora to a naked view of herself in the 
mirror. It is as if Pandora’s existence depends upon the support of the phallus to make her 
real; without it, and without the abuse, there would be no need to create Pandora as a 
character or alter personality. Fascinatingly, Pandora’s subjectivity seems to collapse in 
the wake of her reflection. Or is it the writer, Fraser, who is coming undone at the sight of 
Pandora?: “Pandora gapes at herself in the mirror. She sees the mirror tremble, warp, then 
begin to melt. She feels herself tumble, backward, into the mirror . . . over and over and 
over and over into the liquid silver . . . . she tries to catch hold of the mirror. She catches 
her own flesh. She reaches down, gently, to cover her wounds” (134; original ellipsis). It 
is as if Fraser, in writing this passage before remembering the abuse or knowing the split 
nature of her psyche, is psychologically dissipating at the sight of her other self in the 
mirror. She tries to catch hold of this self, and catches her body, specifically her genital 
area: “Lyle slaps her. ‘Filthy brat! How dare you “handle” yourself in front of me!’” 
(134). To this, Pandora “collapses in shame.  I thought it was the breadman, but it was 
YOU!” (134; original emphasis). Fraser’s otherwise random use of italics in the novel 
seems unconsciously motivated here. There are no quotation marks around the line, “I 
thought it was the breadman, but it was YOU!” The italicized “I” is Fraser’s other “I,” 
who, chillingly, speaks directly and names her father as her sexual abuser. Quotation 
marks are unnecessary, because this is not speech that is being directly quoted. It is, 
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 Fraser, in fact, had only one sister, Irene. She likely used twins in the novel to avoid implicating Irene in 
the story. 
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rather, a part of Fraser’s self (“Pandora”) speaking to her father and to another part of 
herself (the adult, Sylvia). 
 Fraser, however, cannot seem to hear what her other self is saying or even 
understand that her other self is speaking. This collapse of understanding is reflected in 
the narrative, which slips into magic realism.
21
 The extended fantasy section is written in 
italics, signifying a possible slippage between Fraser and Pandora. Words also slip, as 
when a band can be heard playing, “Pack Up Your Pussycat in Your Old Kit Bag and 
We’ll Meet Again, Pussycat” (134-35; original emphasis). Using “pussycat” to stand in 
for “troubles” seems to be an obvious sexual reference, and the suggestion that “we’ll 
meet again” might be Pandora’s uncanny foreshadowing of a future connection with the 
adult Fraser. Roman type indicates a brief moment of realism, where Lyle locks up 
Pandora in the cellar. What follows is a lengthy italicized section which is at once 
hallucinatory and dream-like: “The door is bolted, and sealed. Black Hands push 
Pandora’s head toward the toilet bowl. It is full of . . . No! it is full of flowers—red, gold, 
blue—floating in the sweet milk. Pandora sticks out her tongue. She dips it into the milk. 
It scalds. It shrivels. It falls off. It floats away on a heaving bosom of sour milk” (135; 
original emphasis and ellipsis). This is one of the rare moments I wish I were a 
psychoanalyst. What I might venture to say is that the strange image reflects Pandora’s 
(that is, Fraser’s child personality’s) loss of memory and speech to articulate it, 
symbolized by her dead tongue floating away in collusive maternal fluid, which sours and 
scalds. Nazi imagery follows, as “Blue gas rises in a cloud from the flowers” (135). 
Pandora is a pussycat clawing at “the gas chamber with the bloody stumps of her paws. 
The poison riddles her white fur. Her guts pour through her skin, like tomatoes through a 
sieve. A cleat-boot stands beside her. ‘Strip!’” (135). The colour imagery of sexual red 
seeping out of white innocence in a Holocaust-like gas chamber with her father standing 
as a Nazi in a cleat-boot symbolically replays the sexual abuse, and, again, it does so 
through substitution: here the Holocaust for child sexual abuse.
22
 
                                                 
21
 In Chapter Three, I discuss at length the connection between magical realist images and the 
representation of trauma. 
22
 The passage shares resonances with Sylvia Plath’s famous poem, “Daddy.” 
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 Looked upon with the full knowledge of Fraser’s later memory recovery and her 
claim of Multiple Personality Disorder as the direct result of a prolonged period of child 
sexual abuse, Pandora reads like a thinly veiled, almost overly symbolic recollection of 
past sexual traumas. It seems obvious from reading Pandora that Fraser was sexually 
abused by her father. Fraser’s alter personality, Pandora, makes it so. It is as if she is 
trying to shout out to the adult Fraser to remember her and her abuse. Fraser spoke to me 
about the difficulty she had writing Pandora: “Why Pandora was so hard to write was 
because the film between my other self and my self, the writer, was getting so thin that I 
was in great danger of remembering before I was ready.” In other words, memories were 
bubbling below the surface, but Fraser was not yet ready to incorporate her tragedy into 
her identity. It was all there in the novel, the manuscript of which was over two thousand 
pages. As Fraser concedes in her memoir, Pandora was “written in the first person 
hysterical. It’s like a gush of primordial pain from a part of me I never knew existed” 
(MFH 151). Hysteria is essentially a conversion disorder, where unassimilated 
psychological traumas are manifested or converted into physical symptoms, such as 
convulsions or pain. Pandora may be a representative example of an hysterical text—by 
which I mean a narrative which converts unremembered sexual traumas into a coded text. 
Pandora is then a symptom of Fraser’s unacknowledged childhood abuse. As Suzette 
Henke observes of the novel, Pandora 
functions as a waking dream, a frame for the reconstruction of a trauma 
narrative so dangerous that it can only be expressed in the veiled discourse 
of a fictional persona. Fraser’s alter ego Pandora, curiously constructed by 
her dissociated “other self,” reiterates repressed memories split from 
conscious recollection and buried in the secret chambers of a tormented 
psyche. A censored truth seeps out in fictional form, disguising and 
distorting the incest trauma that Sylvia is not yet ready to acknowledge. 
(138) 
After I asked Fraser about the extended scene of abuse described above and even 
read parts of it to her from the novel, she said, “I don’t even remember the scene.” I 
postulate that she does not remember it because she did not write it; “Pandora” did. In an 
interview with Alan Twigg in 1978, before recovering her memories of sexual abuse, 
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Fraser said without irony, “The main thrust of all my work is an attempt to make the 
unconscious conscious” (99). When I asked Fraser about her statement, she said that 
when she heard the oft-quoted line by Carl Jung, “until you make the unconscious 
conscious, it will direct your life and you will call it fate,” she “seized” upon it, “without 
having any knowledge that, boy, was that ever going to be my story” (Personal 
Interview). At the time of her interview with Twigg (an interview which she only 
“vaguely” remembers) she had no idea of the truth of her statement. Perhaps Twigg was 
interviewing “Pandora,” which is why she similarly does not remember what she said. 
Pandora is a fictional, unconscious testimonial that needs to be considered as a 
companion text to My Father’s House, particularly in its disturbing enmeshing of fiction 
and testimony. Ironically, the fictional Pandora in many ways reads as a testimonial, 
while the non-fictional My Father’s House is read by many as a confabulation of the 
highest order. For Henke, “The fabulations of a novelist cannot, after all, be scrutinized in 
the light of historical accuracy. Fraser’s fictional protagonist Pandora is free to explore 
intriguing emotional puzzles that are never fully unraveled. Deliberately re-creating her 
troubled childhood in the guise of autobiographical fiction, the circumspect author can 
tell the truth aslant” (137-38). For me, Fraser’s text is much less conscious of itself than 
Henke suggests. Fraser does indeed “tell the truth aslant”; however, she does so 
unconsciously, or rather, her child alter, “Pandora,” does so, aslant. 
2.5 Holocaust Memories Versus Child Sexual Abuse 
Memories 
Fraser’s uncanny relationship with dissociated parts of her identity complicates 
poststructuralist trauma theories of memory which frequently emphasize a belated, 
recurring image of the event that defies language. I assert here, through the work of 
Kirmayer, that traumatic memories of the Holocaust are fundamentally different from 
those of child sexual abuse. While Herman conflates the pathological symptoms of 
Holocaust survivors and child sexual abuse survivors as “complex posttraumatic stress 
disorder,” Kirmayer distinguishes the two by examining the ways in which memory is 
shaped socially and culturally. Whereas memories of the Holocaust can be experienced 
communally, those of child sexual abuse are most frequently experienced privately in 
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shame and isolation. The distinction is critical to understanding recovered memories of 
childhood abuse, particularly in light of poststructuralist trauma theories, for example, the 
works of Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman, and Dori Laub, which have been largely 
focussed on the testimonies of Holocaust survivors, but which have been, nonetheless, 
frequently applied to other traumas, such as child sexual abuse.  
Caruth theorizes the pathology of Posttraumatic-Stress Disorder as that which lies 
in the structure of experience rather than in the event itself: “ the event is not assimilated 
or experienced fully at the time, but only belatedly, in its repeated possession of the one 
who experiences it. To be traumatized is precisely to be possessed by an image or event” 
(4-5). Kirmayer agrees that Holocaust survivors are overwhelmed by their memories. As 
he says, “Their problem is not the limits of memory but of language—the inadequacy of 
ordinary words to express all they have witnessed” (175). He contrasts this to the 
experience of childhood sexual abuse survivors who, rather than being overtaken by 
intrusive memories, often have no memory of their abuse until they are adults. Caruth 
further argues that one of the paradoxes of trauma is “that in trauma the greatest 
confrontation with reality may also occur as an absolute numbing to it, that immediacy, 
paradoxically enough, may take the form of belatedness” (6). Kirmayer argues along 
similar lines, but makes an important distinction between detachment and dissociation:  
For the Holocaust survivor, the reaction is one of being overwhelmed and 
then responding by numbing, detachment, or suppression so that one’s 
story sits forever at the edges of consciousness to be worked around or 
told in fragments. For the survivor of childhood abuse, the response to 
overwhelming trauma is a form of mental escape by resolute partition of 
memory, self, and experience. There is no narrative of trauma then, no 
memory—only speaking in signs. (175) 
Kirmayer continues his line of argument to suggest that Holocaust survivors have 
closer access to their memories than do child sexual abuse survivors. In a departure from 
Caruth’s oft-quoted theorization of trauma as “the collapse of its understanding” (7), 
Kirmayer makes a case for distinguishing the pathologies of traumas on precisely the 
grounds of the possibility of knowing. For him, Holocaust testimonies involve Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder and are characterized by intrusive memories which provide a 
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pathway to knowledge of the trauma; on the other hand, child abuse testimonies are 
characterized by dissociative disorders and amnesiac gaps in memory without the same 
level of access to knowledge of the traumatic events (187). Whereas a Holocaust survivor 
can often provide testimony based on memory, albeit vexed by impartial recollections 
and the difficulties of narrativizing unspeakable events, child sexual abuse survivors, says 
Kirmayer, tend to show more gaps in memory and have trouble recalling events.
23
  
It may be easier to forget abuses when there is a prohibition against remembering, 
as there is with children who are sexually abused. Memories of the Holocaust, by 
contrast, can be experienced in more public ways, with families often conducting rituals 
of remembering and mourning. Accordingly, Kirmayer suggests that “While Holocaust 
stories involve bearing witness to what is widely, if not universally, recognized as a 
human catastrophe, personal stories of abuse are revelatory, shameful, and damaging to 
the individual and family. In the case of childhood abuse, it is precisely the distinctive 
qualities of the socially constructed relationship to the past that foster dissociation” (188). 
For Holocaust survivors, the narrative process of remembering, reconstructing, and 
telling the tragedy to other family and community members allows for memory rehearsal 
and helps to maintain recollections. Child sexual abuse occurs privately in an atmosphere 
of fear, helplessness, and denial. If family members are aware of the abuse, they 
sometimes themselves dissociate from it and encourage silence to preserve their family 
system and reputation.  
In Sylvia Fraser’s case, she discovered after the publication of her memoir that 
her mother was indeed aware of the abuse. In The Book of Strange, Fraser reports a 
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 He goes over possibilities for the difference, arguing that Holocaust survivors should be displaying more 
rather than less dissociative symptoms given the severity of their experience. He posits that the age at 
which the traumas occur might have something to do with it, as most Holocaust testimonies are from 
survivors who were adolescents or adults at the time. He troubles his distinction between amnesia and 
intrusive memories, yet reasons that the difference may be in the social and cultural context for 
remembering: “Certainly, there are many—probably, the majority of—individuals who tell of their 
childhood abuse without dissociation. And there must be Holocaust survivors who have dissociated their 
experience and whose stories, therefore, have not been told. In fact, intrusions and amnestic gaps often co-
exist in the same individual. The distinction between prototypical narratives then, may not reflect actual 
differences in psychopathology but rather differing expectations for recollection and different contexts for 
retelling” (188). 
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conversation with her father’s doctor at her mother’s funeral. His doctor corroborates the 
abuse to Fraser by telling her that he and her father discussed the incest several times 
(64).
24
 Her family preserved the secret until both parents had died. This collusive family 
system of silence is precisely the environment that fosters the type of forgetting that 
Kirmayer theorizes.
25
 Fraser’s response to abuse that she could not name was to 
dissociate her memories. As Kirmayer observes, “When the costs of recollection seem 
catastrophic for self or others, memory may be sequestered in a virtual (mental) space 
that is asocial, a space that closes in on itself through the conviction that no telling will 
ever be possible” (189). The difference, then, between Holocaust memories and 
childhood sexual abuse memories is the difference between a public space of mourning 
and memorial, and a private space of terror and shame; it is the difference between an 
acknowledged, public collective memory of an atrocity that needs to be told, and an 
unacknowledged, private memory that disappears from history in a story that cannot be 
told. 
The logic of forgetting child sexual abuse seems compelling; however, the idea 
that someone could forget their abuse only to recover those memories later in life is 
highly contentious. I turn now to the recovered memory debate, as it is central to an 
understanding of the controversy over Fraser’s pioneering memoir on the topic. 
2.6 The Recovered Memory Debate 
2.6.1 Freud and Janet: The Fathers of the Memory Debate 
The stage for the contemporary debate over recovered memory was arguably set 
in the 1890s by Sigmund Freud, and also his contemporary, Pierre Janet. Indeed, over a 
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 Fraser told me that she did not record the entire conversation in this text: “The conversation went on. 
‘Your mother was such a gem. We never knew how she could stand your father.’ And I said, ‘Well, she 
didn’t know.’ And he said, ‘Yes she did. I talked to her about it too.’ He said, ‘Such a wonderful Victorian 
woman. She didn’t even blink an eye’” (Personal Interview). 
25
 Fraser grew up in a parochial, insular community in the 1930s and 1940s. According to Fraser, her 
mother could not say the word “fun” without saying “good, clean fun.” Even the word “divorce” could not 
be uttered aloud in her home. Fraser asks how the word “incest” could possibly be uttered or acknowledged 
in such an environment (Personal Interview). 
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century ago, Freud and Joseph Breuer in Studies on Hysteria developed an aetiology of 
therapeutically recovered memories that, it turns out, is remarkably prescient to current 
theories which, as I have discussed, locate dissociative disorders in the experience of 
childhood sexual abuse. Freud’s “seduction theory” similarly found that the cause of 
hysteria in his female patients was repressed child sexual abuse. Freud ultimately 
renounced this theory, however, and concluded that his female hysterics had false 
memories. Herman opines, 
By the first decade of the twentieth century, without ever offering any 
clinical documentation of false complaints, Freud had concluded that his 
hysterical patients’ accounts of childhood sexual abuse were untrue: “I 
was at last obliged to recognize that these scenes of seduction had never 
taken place, and that they were only fantasies which my patients had made 
up.” (14)
26
 
Freud’s conclusion that the women “made up” stories of childhood sexual abuse is an 
early example of the distrust in women’s stories of sexual trauma that continues to the 
present day.  
In earlier stages of his work, however, Freud uncovered through his 
psychoanalytical practice the connection between hysteria and child sexual abuse. Freud 
and Breuer open their study with the observation that adult hysterical symptoms have 
their origin in events occurring much earlier; moreover, the precipitating event is 
frequently forgotten without the patient realizing the connection between past traumas 
and present symptoms. It is the job of the analyst to help the patient recover their 
memories: “As a rule it is necessary to hypnotize the patient and to arouse his memories 
under hypnosis of the time at which the symptom made its first appearance; when this has 
been done, it becomes possible to demonstrate the connection in the clearest and most 
convincing fashion” (Studies on Hysteria 53). For Freud and Breuer, memories had to be 
not only recovered, but also framed into a narrative as part of the hysteric’s therapeutic 
journey. Freud and Breuer conceptualize memories of trauma in dissociative terms: a 
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 See Freud, Sigmund. “An Autobiographical Study.” Standard Edition. Vol. 20. Trans. J. Strachey. 
London: Hogarth, 1959. 34. 
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traumatic memory “acts like a foreign body which long after its entry must continue to be 
regarded as an agent that is still at work” (56-57). Their insight led to an idea that 
continues to prevail in therapeutic practice: “each individual hysterical symptom 
immediately and permanently disappeared when we had succeeded in bringing clearly to 
light the memory of the event by which it was provoked and in arousing its accompanying 
affect, and when the patient had described that event in the greatest possible detail and 
had put the affect into words” (57; original emphasis). Here marks an early theorization 
of therapeutically recovered memories, abreaction, and the talking cure.
27
 They conclude 
that in every case of hysteria “the splitting of consciousness” (62; original emphasis) or 
“‘double conscience’” (63) is not only present but “a tendency to such a dissociation [. . 
.] is the basic phenomenon of this neurosis” (63; original emphasis). 
Freud then departs from Breuer in his theorization of hysteria and publishes, 
under his own name, his conclusion for the cause: “I was obliged to recognize that, in so 
far as one can speak of determining causes which lead to the acquisition of neuroses, 
their aetiology is to be looked for in sexual factors” (339-40; original emphasis). Freud 
follows this generalized claim of “sexual factors” with his 1896 “The Aetiology of 
Hysteria,” where he triumphantly announces,  
the thesis that at the bottom of every case of hysteria there are one or more 
occurrences of premature sexual experience, occurrences which belong to 
the earliest years of childhood but which can be reproduced through the 
work of psycho-analysis in spite of the intervening decades. I believe that 
this is an important finding, the discovery of a caput Nili in 
neuropathology. (203; original emphasis) 
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 The term repression is also used for the first time in this study by Freud and Breuer as a motivated 
defence mechanism. In this sense, their early use of the term conforms much more to dissociation than to 
the way Freud would later theorize repression after his abandonment of the seduction theory. They view 
traumatic memory as partitioned off from normal consciousness: “these experiences are completely absent 
from the patients’ memory when they are in a normal psychical state, or are only present in a highly 
summary form. Not until they have been questioned under hypnosis do these memories emerge with the 
undiminished vividness of a recent event” (60; original emphasis). They further argue that “severely 
paralysing affects, such as fright” lead to dissociated, “abnormal psychical states such as the semi-hypnotic 
twilight state of day-dreaming,” making impossible any reaction to the event (61). 
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Within a year of publishing “The Aetiology of Hysteria,” Freud would renounce his view 
that sexual abuse was the cause of hysteria, a finding that he once thought equivalent to 
locating the source of the Nile. Freud famously abandons his seduction theory in his 21 
September 1897 letter to Wilhelm Fliess. Freud writes of his disappointment at his lack 
of success and his surprise “that in all cases, the father, not excluding my own, had to be 
accused of being perverse” (264; original emphasis). Freud reasons the impossibility of 
such a high frequency of sexual abuse in Viennese families, including his own, and 
concludes that his patients must have imagined their abuse. Freud later clearly states in 
the 1933 “New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis” that, 
In the period in which the main interest was directed to discovering 
infantile sexual traumas, almost all my women patients told me that they 
had been seduced by their father. I was driven to recognize in the end that 
these reports were untrue and so came to understand that hysterical 
symptoms are derived from phantasies and not from real occurrences. It 
was only later that I was able to recognize in this phantasy of being 
seduced by the father the expression of the typical Oedipus complex in 
women. (120)
28
 
In the same letter to Fliess Freud laments that his expectation of “eternal fame [. . 
.] certain wealth, complete independence” was now over because, “Everything depended 
upon whether or not hysteria would come out right” (266). For Freud, the stakes were 
high. He seemed, on the one hand, to be invested in the truth status of his seduction 
theory. On the other hand, it is hard to know for sure whether Freud earnestly believed in 
the logic of his retraction or if he was forced to give up his theory because it was not 
popular with his peers.
29
 Either way, his theory connecting child sexual abuse to hysteria 
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 The feminist backlash to Freud’s repudiation is now well-worn ground. As Herman contends, “Out of the 
ruins of the traumatic theory of hysteria, Freud created psychoanalysis. The dominant psychological theory 
of the next century was founded in the denial of women’s reality. Sexuality remained the central focus of 
inquiry. But the exploitive social context in which sexual relations actually occur became utterly invisible. 
Psychoanalysis became a study of the internal vicissitudes of fantasy and desire, dissociated from the 
reality of experience” (14). 
29
 Freud had to contend with the vexed nature of recovered memories of child sexual abuse following his 
publications on the topic. Freud fulminates against his peers in a 26 April 1896 letter to Wilhelm Fliess, “A 
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was forsaken for years only to be more recently revived as an important early work on 
recovered memories of sexual abuse. As Herman observes, Freud’s “The Aetiology of 
Hysteria” remains cogent today: “A century later, this paper still rivals contemporary 
clinical descriptions of the effects of childhood sexual abuse. It is a brilliant, 
compassionate, eloquently argued, closely reasoned document. Its triumphant title and 
exultant tone suggest that Freud viewed his contribution as the crowning achievement in 
the field” (13).  
In constructing his aetiology of hysteria, including the therapeutic cure of 
unearthing the sexual trauma through hypnosis followed by abreacting the event, and 
then by publically repudiating the reality of his patients’ experience of sexual abuse, 
Freud laid the ground work for both sides of the current recovered memory debate. 
Freud’s substitution of fantasy for the lived experience of sexual abuse provided an early 
example of what is now called False Memory Syndrome. Ian Hacking regards Freud’s 
work on hysteria—his seduction theory followed by his retraction—as fundamentally an 
earnest search for the truth. In this, Freud was the exact opposite of his contemporary, 
Pierre Janet, who often lied to his patients under hypnosis if he thought it would help 
them. In fact, Janet’s method involved excising memories from his patients by 
convincing them under hypnosis that the trauma did not happen. To put it another way, 
Janet’s method was to create false memories in his patients to help them heal. For him, it 
was not the truth that mattered, but the cure.  
In many ways, then, Freud and Janet are the fathers of false memory. Hacking 
suggests that the memory debates recapitulate these “bygone battles”: “In the matter of 
lost and recovered memories, we are the heirs of Freud and Janet. One lived for Truth, 
and quite possibly deluded himself a good deal of the time and even knew he was being 
deluded. The other, a far more honorable man, helped his patients by lying to them, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
lecture on the etiology of hysteria at the psychiatric society was given an icy reception by the asses” (184). 
On 4 May 1896 Freud laments, “Word was given out to abandon me, for a void is forming all around me. [. 
. .] Things are so difficult and trying that it requires, on the whole, a strong constitution to deal with them” 
(185). 
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did not fool himself that he was doing anything else” (197). Does it matter if Janet’s 
patients were cured by a lie? On the one hand, I am troubled by the ethical implications 
of the therapeutic manipulation of memory, whether it involves excising traumatic 
memories by lying, as Janet did, or creating false memories of trauma, which is precisely 
what concerns the False Memory Syndrome Foundation. On the other hand, while Janet’s 
method might be dubious, he not only has the best interests of his patients in mind, he 
also offers up the possibility of a cure for his patients by relieving them of the traumatic 
memories which have brought them to psychoanalysis in the first place.  
2.6.2 False Memory Syndrome 
The debate about false memories of child abuse is not about the fact that false 
memories exist or can be created. Indeed, the work of Freud and, in particular, Janet 
demonstrates the unsettling truth that false memories can be implanted into patients by 
therapists. This possibility, along with a significant body of research devoted to proving 
that memory always involves distortion, fuels the rhetoric of advocates of False Memory 
Syndrome. The term was coined in 1992 by the False Memory Syndrome Foundation 
(FMSF) in the United States. Fraser, who has clearly positioned herself in opposition to 
the FMSF, has called the term an unscientific, “invented malady” evidenced by that fact 
that it is not listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“Freud’s 
Final Seduction”). Essentially a support and advocacy group for parents whose children 
claim to have recovered memories of past sexual abuse, the foundation was started by 
Pamela and Peter Freyd, and is still directed by Pamela Freyd. Her daughter, Psychology 
professor Jennifer Freyd, whose work I quoted earlier, accused her father of sexual abuse, 
which he denies.
30
 In a political climate which encouraged survivors to speak out about 
child sexual abuse, and in light of clinical research that connected child sexual abuse to a 
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 I discussed Freyd’s betrayal theory earlier without acknowledging her personal story of recovered 
memories of child sexual abuse, and the ensuing public controversy with her parents and their foundation. 
While her own experiences may indeed have sparked her research interests, Freyd’s oft-cited theory stands 
on its own merits above the fray. Elizabeth Loftus, whose research supports the efforts of the FMSF, also 
recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse, although hers were spontaneous recoveries. In both cases, 
and out of respect for these scientists, my preference is to separate their research from their personal 
experiences. 
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whole host of psychological maladies from anorexia to depression, this group raised the 
question of whether all of the allegations could be true, and if it were possible that poorly 
trained or ideologically motivated therapists keen to find a cure for what ails their 
patients were leading them to the false conclusion that they had been sexually abused as 
children. Pamela Freyd perceived an epidemic of false accusations and lobbied, through 
her foundation, to discredit the story of her daughter and others who made similar 
claims.
31
    
The foundation grounds the validity of its claims in scientific research on 
memory, for example, the work of American psychologist and expert on human memory, 
Elizabeth F. Loftus. In “Some People Recover Memories of Childhood Trauma That 
Never Really Happened,” Loftus and Ira E. Hyman, while acknowledging the possibility 
that events can be forgotten and subsequently remembered, contend that when memories 
are recovered in therapy, “Unfortunately, memory recovery techniques may result in the 
creation of false childhood memories” (4). They say it is impossible to distinguish 
between a true memory recovered in therapy and a false one without corroborating 
evidence. They argue that repression is a legacy of Freud, and question whether 
something can, in fact, be repressed and linger in one’s psyche, affecting behaviour 
without conscious knowledge of it. These researchers insist that there is a lack of 
evidence proving the existence of repression. Human memory, they say, is fallible, and 
suggestions of childhood sexual abuse can become accepted parts of one’s memory (5).  
In one of her more famous studies, Loftus and her colleagues conducted an 
experiment to prove that, through suggestion, false memories could be implanted into the 
minds of participants. In this case, the false memories had to do with being lost in the 
mall as a child. While the study does prove, as Janet did, that false memories can be 
created through suggestion, the study has been criticized because a memory of being lost 
in the mall is very different from a memory of child sexual abuse. Many people have had 
the experience of being lost or feeling lost as children, which could make this memory a 
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 The importance of this foundation surely lies in the help it provides those individuals wrongly accused of 
abusing their children. The problem, however, is that the opposite is also true: the foundation unwittingly 
provides support and advocacy for fathers who did sexually abuse their daughters as children. 
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particularly easy one to create falsely.
32
 Notwithstanding her critics, Loftus remains a 
well-respected scientist and influential supporter of the False Memory Syndrome 
Foundation. Equally well-respected, and positioned on the opposite side of the debate, is 
the Freyd’s daughter, cognitive scientist Jennifer Freyd. Even skeptics of recovered 
memory acknowledge the validity of Freyd’s betrayal theory of traumatic memory. Karl 
Sabbagh, for example, devotes a book-length study to arguing against the possibility of 
recovered memory; however, in qualifying the terms of Freyd’s arguments, he concedes 
their value: “Jennifer Freyd’s betrayal trauma theory can only be an adequate explanation 
of memory repression if abuse by a caretaker is perceived as traumatic by the child at the 
time” (153). In other words, even though some children do not experience their abuse as 
traumatic, for those that do, memory repression, as Freyd suggests, is an adaptive 
response. In the case of recovered memories of sexual abuse, what science seems to 
reveal is its capacity to prove empirically both sides of the debate, which is the main 
reason why the controversy continues to this day.
33
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 Richard P. Kluft, for example, critiques Loftus’s “lost in the mall” experiment, in part, by turning the 
tables and contending that some “retractors,” those people who claim to have recovered false memories of 
abuse in therapy, “change their minds in the context of strong interpersonal pressures that have features in 
common with those exerted upon individuals in the lost-in-the-mall scenario and the child sexual abuse 
accommodation syndrome. Could it be that retractors rather than therapy patients demonstrate the forces 
the Dr. Loftus has studied?” (49). Kluft further argues that “Another aspect of the Loftus research that has 
received little attention is that only a small minority of the subjects who received misdirection cues took the 
indicated misdirections. Most did not. This research might be cited as evidence that most persons, even 
those subject to an intense campaign to distort their memories and induce confabulations, will reject such 
suggestions” (49). The “Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome” to which Kluft makes reference is 
Roland Summit’s theory and shares similarities with Freyd’s betrayal trauma theory in emphasizing 
memory distortion to preserve an attachment. For more information about his theory see Conte, Jon R., ed. 
Critical Issues in Child Sexual Abuse: Historical, Legal, and Psychological Perspectives. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage, 2002. 
33
 As recently as 26 January 2011, CBC Radio’s, “The Current,” with Anna Maria Tremonti, highlighted 
that the debate over recovered memory continues to this day. Tremonti’s show featured, in part, the story of 
Hilary Stanton, whose many alter personalities were ostensibly the result of childhood trauma including 
sexual abuse. Stanton’s Psychologist, Cheryl Malmo, argued that there is neuroscientific evidence that 
trauma is stored separately in the brain, and that when a trauma is occurring, parts of the brain shut off, 
suggesting empirical evidence for dissociation. On the other side of the debate is Psychiatry Professor, Joel 
Paris (McGill University) who argued that there is no such thing as MPD, and that memories of abuse 
recovered in therapy are false. He claims that there is absolutely no scientific evidence for dissociation. 
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Not just scientific research, but also the stories of “retractors” are used as 
evidence by the foundation that recovered memories are often false and lead to the 
destruction of innocent families.
34
 The stories tend to follow a similar tragic trajectory of 
depressed, middle-class women in therapy being pedaled a child sexual abuse narrative 
by therapists, and then, after destroying their families, often in the courtroom, realizing 
that they have been duped into imagining heinous assaults that never happened. Indeed, 
the self-help handbook on coping with recovered memories of sexual abuse, The Courage 
to Heal (1988), by Ellen Bass and Laura Davis, bears a heavy burden in inciting the 
backlash against the recovered memory movement. The main problem lies in their oft-
quoted introduction, where they say, “If you think you were abused and your life shows 
the symptoms, then you were” (22).35 The text problematically encourages a self-
diagnosis of sexual abuse without the need to have any memories of abuse. In a section 
entitled, “But I Don’t Have Any Memories,” Bass and Davis say, “If you don’t remember 
your abuse, you are not alone. Many women don’t have memories and some never get 
                                                 
34
 The most recent published story of false memories of child sexual abuse typifies the pattern of events 
that lead the individual to the discovery that they have fabricated memories in therapy. Meredith Maran’s, 
My Lie: A True Story of False Memory, published in 2010, opens with two epigraphs: the first comes from 
Adolph Hitler, who says, “Make the lie big, make it simple, keep saying it, and eventually they will believe 
it”; the second comes from, wait for it, Homer Simpson: “Marge, it takes two to lie. One to lie and one to 
listen.” The quotation from Hitler invokes what False Memory Syndrome advocates see as Nazi-style 
feminist rhetoric and suggests that ostensibly recovered memories of child sexual abuse are a “lie,” a 
pervasive feminist-inspired epidemic among white, middle-class American women. A few short pages 
later, Maran quotes Richard Gardner, in the event the reader missed the first Nazi comparison: “We are 
currently living in dangerous times, similar to Nazi Germany. Sexual abuse hysteria is omnipresent” (5). 
Homer Simpson’s lines are meant to conjure the therapist’s office, where the unsuspecting patient 
confesses the “lie” to the listening and nodding therapist who has orchestrated it. What follows is Maran’s 
prologue describing a hike that she took with a friend, Joanne. Joanne asks if Maran has ever done anything 
terrible and regrettable. Maran replies that when she was in her thirties, she accused her father of 
molestation. After not speaking to him for eight years, and depriving him of contact with her children, she 
realized that he hadn’t molested her. 
35
 The symptoms are as general as they are copious and include feeling “bad, dirty, or ashamed,” 
“powerless, like a victim,” “different from other people,” “disconnected, isolated, and alone,” “shame,” 
“confused,” “dead inside,” “afraid of people,” and also include finding it difficult to “identify their needs,” 
“recognize their feelings,” “differentiate between emotions,” “express feelings,” “calm down when they get 
upset,” “trust people,” “make close friends,” “create or maintain healthy relationships,” “give or receive 
nurturing,” and so on ad infinitum. 
69 
 
memories. This doesn’t mean they weren’t abused” (81).36 As the stories of “retractors” 
continue to surface, the existence of false memories and accusations needs to be 
acknowledged, whether they are created by therapists or by reading a dodgy self-help 
book. 
Similar debates began in Canada, where the FMSF quickly extended its reach. In 
Ontario, the debate was initially staged in The Toronto Star. The Toronto Star debate 
represents an early rehearsal of the terms of the debate that would continue in earnest 
throughout the 1990s. In May of 1992, journalist Bill Taylor wrote a series of three 
articles on recovered memory. In the first, “What if Sexual Abuse Memories are 
Wrong?”, Taylor opens with a story of a father who claims his daughter falsely accused 
him of molestation. He enlists sympathy for the father by suggesting there is no 
presumption of innocence because of a popular logic, especially in regard to children’s 
testimony, that says, “Why would she say it if it wasn’t true?” (16 May 1992). He moves 
on to “the Browns” (not their real names) who, like other parents, “are alarmed that their 
children seemed to be living normal lives, usually with fulfilling and well-paid jobs, until 
                                                 
36
 Almost as problematic as the suggestion that vague feelings of unhappiness could signal past sexual 
abuse, is the apparent consumption of this edict as true by “survivors.” According to Elizabeth A. Wilson, 
Rosanne Barr’s mother, during a CNN call-in show on repressed memory featuring guest Ellen Bass, 
blamed The Courage to Heal in leading hundreds of daughters, including her own, to falsely accuse their 
parents (91). To imagine that women are gullible enough to accept a logic as flimsy as Bass’s and Davis’s 
seems unlikely, particularly given the ramifications to family members of false accusations. Yet, Roseanne 
Barr’s mother turned out to be correct. In an interview with Oprah Winfrey, aired on 14 February 2011, 
Barr says that accusing her father of incest was the worst thing she has ever done. She blames The Courage 
to Heal, and says that while her father was cruel, their relationship was not incestuous. Yet, Maran says that 
her false memory of being abused by her father had its inception in the editorial work she did for a 
pioneering feminist researcher, whose book she thinly disguises as The Incest Secret. In fact, Maran is 
acknowledged as providing invaluable editorial assistance by Diana E.H. Russell in The Secret Trauma, the 
1986 landmark study of 930 randomly drawn women of whom 16 percent reported sexual abuse by a 
relative before the age of 18, and the more general finding that 38 percent, or just over one in three, 
reported at least one experience of child sexual abuse (xvii). As Maran describes it, “I didn’t just hand out 
the Kool-Aid. I drank it. I didn’t just write about recovered memories; I spent a decade trying to recover my 
own. Shortly after the 1988 publication of the Bible of the recovered-memory movement, The Courage to 
Heal, I joined the ranks of the self-identified incest survivors and accused my father of molesting me” (7). 
For Maran, her memories and subsequent retraction shifted with the changing political climate: “When the 
culture tilted toward disbelief, I leaned that way too. In 1996, I faced the truth that my accusation was 
false” (8).  
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they consulted a therapist about a minor problem, unrelated to sexual abuse. It is the 
therapists, the parents believe, who are inducing patients to recall ‘repressed memories’ 
of childhood abuse.”  
He follows this now familiar rhetoric with the equally familiar move to ground 
the claims of false memory in science. He quotes a psychiatrist, Saul Levine, from 
Sunnybrook Health Science Centre, who says that memory is unreliable, and that because 
sexual abuse has become “trendy,” “Everybody wants to jump on the bandwagon.” 
Levine says, “The whole area attracts a lot of flakes” (qtd. in Taylor). Following a series 
of one-sided quotations from experts, including FMSF supporters Ralph Underwager, 
Elizabeth Loftus, and Roseanne Barr’s parents, Taylor resurrects the Browns, “both well-
paid professionals—intelligent, articulate, comfortable in their roomy home,” whose 
story is typical: their once loving and perfect daughter becomes hostile and 
uncommunicative after recovering memories of abuse in therapy. Taylor ends his entirely 
sympathetic article on the plight of the falsely accused with the phone number of the 
FMSF.
37
  
To this astonishingly unbalanced piece of journalism, Sylvia Fraser weighs in 
with her passionate, albeit similarly polemical, response, “Desperately Wanting not to 
Believe,” also published in the Toronto Star (28 May 1992). Fraser begins with what has 
now become one of the main arguments in support of recovered memory. She argues that 
most incest survivors, contrary to the position of the FMSF, resist believing recovered 
memories as they arise: “Far from being the dupes of overzealous therapists, who 
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 The second article, with the tag-line, “True or False? The Psychiatric Community Knows Incest is Real, 
but Worries that when Over-eager Therapists Uncover Repressed Memories of Sexual Abuse that are False, 
Families can be Needlessly Torn Apart” (18 May 1992), continues along similar lines, although this time 
he opens with an alarmist quotation from FMSF director, Pamela Freyd: “Unfounded accusations of 
childhood sexual abuse are tearing apart families all over North America.” Again, Taylor follows with 
experts who all advocate against recovered memory, and ends with a critique of The Courage to Heal, with 
the FMSF phone number as his now familiar closing gesture. The final article introducing Torontonians to 
the issue, “Therapist Turned Patient’s World Upside Down” (19 May 1992), is devoted to the story of a 
recanter, whom Taylor interviews by phone. As she lives in Dallas, her name was likely given to him by 
the FMSF. Again, hers is a typical script: she goes to therapy, recovers false memories of abuse, then 
recants her story saying she is a victim of False Memory Syndrome. The article ends with the recanter, 
Lynn Gondolf, saying that therapists prefer middle-class women because they are able to pay their fees, 
making them perfect victims. The phone number of the FMSF beckons at the close of the article.  
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diagnose incest where it doesn’t exist, apparent incest victims are more apt to cling 
irrationally to the hope that their memories will be proved wrong and that their parents 
will emerge blameless and worthy of love. To lose that hope is to be plunged into a 
lonely chaos of guilt and terror.”
38
 Fraser points out that surfacing memories of abuse 
need validation rather than repudiation. She takes up this topic again in her 1994 article 
for Saturday Night, “Freud’s Final Seduction.” Here she makes the case that the tactics of 
the FMSF follow the logic of Freud’s repudiation of his seduction theory:  
Just as Freud recoiled from “too many cases” of incest by deciding that all 
children, as a group, are guilty of harbouring sexual fantasies about their 
parents, so the FMS foundation plays on this same repugnance to protest 
that its members are innocent victims of their children’s sexual fantasies. 
Like Freud with his Oedipus complex, the foundation with its false 
memory syndrome invalidates the personal experience of thousands of 
people, whose stories its members don’t know, by providing society with a 
theory that denies their reality, while allowing the accused to bask in the 
comforts of group denial.
39
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She gives counter-examples: a woman she met who didn’t want to believe her memories even though her 
father spent time in jail for molesting other children. When on her book tour in Britain, Fraser notes a 
controversy around Marietta Higgs, a pediatrician whom parents, politicians, police officers, and media 
judged as revealing too many cases of sexually abused children. Fraser points out that further investigations 
proved that over 75 percent of her diagnosed cases were true. Fraser insists, “Her story demonstrates the 
well-known human impulse to shoot the messenger bearing the bad news. It also shows our society’s 
perverse tendency to rush to the protection of sex crime perpetrators instead of their victims.” Not just 
victim-blaming, but the family system that allows abuse is taken up by Fraser: “The awesome power of 
denial in the psychology of an incest survivor is almost impossible for persons with a normal upbringing to 
understand. Often the incestuous pattern has been passed down through both sides of a family, generation 
upon generation, with victims unerringly marrying potential abusers so that their own children are molded 
from the cradle as sexual slaves.” 
39
 The first major critique of Freud’s abandonment of the seduction theory came, of course, from Jeffrey 
Masson’s controversial book, The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of the Seduction Theory. The 
book was first published in 1985, well before the start of the debate over False Memory Syndrome. The 
third edition of the book, published in 1992, acknowledges Sylvia Fraser for her pioneering work on sexual 
abuse. Following the debate, Masson re-contextualizes his text in terms of the debate over false memory, in 
part, by changing his subtitle to “Freud and Child Sexual Abuse.” 
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For Fraser, like many feminist researchers and scholars on the subject, the FMSF and its 
advocates use silencing tactics to deny women’s lived experiences, thereby pushing 
sexual abuse back into its cloaked, nineteenth-century status of unspoken family 
secrets.
40
  
While the focus on both sides of the debate on the empirical validity of recovered 
memory has illuminated the complexity of the issue, the cultural and social aspects of 
both narrative and memory as determining forces in how stories are told and consumed is 
sometimes lost in the emphasis on the sciences of memory. Humans are cultural and 
social beings, not just biological ones, and the interactions between culture and the 
science of human memory complicate stories of abuse as they are reconstructed and 
retold for public consumption through life-writing or media or in the court rooms where 
allegations of sexual abuse are sometimes fought on the grounds of the validity of 
recovered memories. As a cultural artifact with remarkable staying power, Fraser’s 
memoir continues to be consumed according to dominant popular and academic 
epistemologies, while simultaneously, and paradoxically, being criticized for precisely 
the ways in which it conforms to dominant narratives of recovered memory and healing, 
and for failing to account for the possibility of false memories or the fallible nature of 
reconstructed ones.  
In discussions of Fraser’s memoir, critics often use scientific research to press 
forth their arguments about memory, which have the secondary effect of discrediting 
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 The exchange between Taylor and Fraser caught the attention of Ian Hacking, who appears to have 
initially sided with the FMSF, only to remove himself from the debate by the mid-1990s, an indication that 
the debate was becoming too hot to touch. His 1994 article, “Memoro-politics, Trauma and the Soul,” 
appears to be an early version of a chapter, “Truth in Memory” in his 1995 book-length study, Rewriting 
the Soul. Hacking, in the book, leaves out two key words from his description of the extent to which the 
Toronto Star’s publication of articles on the FMSF increased their Ontario memberships. In the book, 
Hacking writes, “A Philadelphia phone number was given, and about four hundred readers of the Star 
called at once” (121). In the earlier article, he writes, “A Philadelphia phone number was given; about 400 
readers of the Star called at once (including me), and 180 Torontonians thereupon subscribed to the 
Foundation" (30; emphasis added). There is a curious absence of any mention of this article in the book, 
even though many of the lines are exactly replicated, with no acknowledgement of parts being previously 
published, and no reference to it in his bibliography. It is probably not surprising that he decided to skip his 
apparent involvement with the FMSF in his longer book. The politics of such a position would almost 
certainly raise eyebrows.  
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Fraser’s account of her traumas. As Freyd insists, when the recovered memory debate 
becomes its fiercest, the issue is not memory: “the real issue is whether the alleged abuse 
happened” (“Memory and Dimensions of Trauma” 144). Whether the abuse happened is 
often lost in the critical scholarship on Fraser because of its focus on memory models and 
her use of novelistic techniques. By analyzing the arguments of her main critics, I attempt 
to show the extent to which they are governed by the paradigms and zeitgeists of their 
times, as surely as Fraser was, to promote an understanding of Fraser’s memoir as a 
culturally informed document upon which shifting, circulating understandings of 
recovered memories of child sexual abuse have played out as a controversy that has stood 
the test of time. The staying-power of the controversy over Fraser’s memoir (which has 
been ongoing for twenty-five years) is an example of the capacity of limit narratives to 
unsettle established boundaries for thinking about vexing issues such as Fraser’s 
profound amnesia following her abuse.  Fraser’s memoir, by both insisting upon and 
blurring the boundaries of truth in its articulation and representation of recovered 
memories, opens up new possibilities for understanding the place of creativity in 
narrating the story of child sexual abuse. And it does so controversially. 
2.7 The Controversy over My Father’s House 
The initial criticism of Fraser’s text coincided with the formation, in the United 
States, of the False Memory Syndrome Foundation and the ensuing “memory wars” of 
the 1990s. Elaine Showalter, in Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture 
(1997), questioned Fraser’s memories in terms of the recovered memory debate to argue 
that recovered memories of abuse are culturally specific, “hysterical epidemics” that have 
no more truth value than alien abductions. The second main critical impulse came after 
the debate over false memory had cooled, starting in 2000, with Nicola King’s, Memory, 
Narrative, Identity: Remembering the Self. This line of argument contends that Fraser’s 
memoir is too well plotted, too complete, and too coherent to be believed. The most 
recent article that takes up this line of attack against Fraser is a chapter by Robson in the 
2010 edited collection, Memory Matters: Contexts for Understanding Sexual Abuse 
Recollections.  
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Both lines of argument—the first based on False Memory Syndrome, and the 
second grounded in a poststructuralist skepticism of Enlightenment-style autobiographies 
which narrate knowable, unified selves—share a distrust of totalizing metanarratives that 
aim to explain fragmentary, traumatically vexed childhood memories in terms of a 
coherent story that identifies a newly created and unitary adult subject healed by this very 
process of narration. While I grant Fraser’s critics their argument that no past or self can 
possibly be as reliably remembered or knowable as Fraser’s account describes, I will 
argue that both lines of argument reveal the limitations of viewing accounts of recovered 
memories of childhood sexual abuse as necessarily false, while failing to take into 
account the imaginative ways in which survivors must engage with narrative models to 
make sense of their stories. 
2.7.1 The Author’s Note: Fraser’s Controversial “Autobiographical 
Pact” 
At the heart of the controversy, and representative of many points of criticism, is 
Fraser’s Author’s Note. Roger Luckhurst finds Fraser’s note to the reader contradictory. 
He wryly calls Fraser’s memoir one of the most “formative” of the era “since it presented 
an entirely new sense of the ‘revisionist’ feminist autobiography, encapsulated in the 
bewildering and apparently self-cancelling words of the Author’s Note” (122). Luckhurst 
points to the “contradictions in the idea of an amnesiac autobiography” (124), and in the 
fact that novelistic techniques are used for a true story. Jane Kilby views the project as a 
“conceit,” and an “incredible” one at that: “My Father’s House is built on a perhaps more 
incredible, or at least distinctly more complex, conceit than that of attempting to establish 
the reality of incest for a potentially hostile audience, for she is writing of that which 
‘was unknown’ to her for most of her life up to that point” (52). The question Kilby raises 
is one raised by most critics of Fraser: how does one write an autobiography of a divided 
personality, whereby a dissociated self, separated from the experiences and consciousness 
of a primary self, lives through abuse that for which, strictly speaking, the primary self 
was not present? As Kilby puts it, “How do you write your autobiography when strictly it 
is a biography, but not the biography of someone who may, indeed, seem very real, but of 
someone who is barely real to you, for, as Fraser puts it, not only was this other her 
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‘shadow-twin’, but at times also she passed like a figure in a dream?” (53). Psychology 
professor Mark Freeman similarly questions Fraser’s story, finding it “downright 
incredible [. . .] particularly her profound amnesia” (151). I quote here the full text of 
Fraser’s Author’s Note: 
   The story I have told in this book is autobiographical. As a result of 
amnesia, much of it was unknown to me until three years ago. For clarity, 
I have used italics to indicate thoughts, feelings and experiences pieced 
together from recently recovered memories, and to indicate dreams. It is 
important to keep this device in mind while reading this book. 
   To provide focus and structure, I have used many of the techniques of 
the novelist. I have also adopted fictional names and otherwise disguised 
persons who appear in the narrative. No attempt has been made to create 
full or balanced characterizations, only to portray such persons and myself 
as our lives relate to this difficult story. However, to my knowledge, I 
have not exaggerated or distorted or misrepresented the truth as I now 
understand it. 
   That my father did sexually abuse me has been corroborated by outside 
sources. Our family secret, it appears, was not such a secret after all. 
This, then, is Fraser’s complex and variegated autobiographical pact with the 
reader: to tell the truth as she knows it, while protecting the identities of her friends and 
colleagues. Her use of fictional names, in disguising identities of living people, also helps 
to protect her legally. In an e-mail correspondence, Fraser clarified what she meant by her 
use of “novelistic techniques”: “the ‘novelistic’ techniques I referred to in my Author’s 
Note had only to do with the handling of my conscious memories, not my memories of 
the abuse” (“Re: question”).That Fraser isolates her use of novelistic techniques to record 
events that she always remembered while suggesting that no such fictionalizing was 
employed to narrate the abuse she forgot illustrates her sensitivity to a potentially 
incredulous audience and her awareness of the importance of truth in sexual abuse 
allegations. Fraser puts a legalistic requirement of absolute truth upon her recovered 
memories of abuse. At stake is that if she were to acknowledge that her recovered 
memories underwent some process of revision in the act of narration, her memoir could 
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be dismissed as false. Revisionist traumatic memories, however, are still traumatic 
memories that open a window to the truth even if that truth has been storied by the 
narrating memory of the subject. While acknowledging her use of story in narrating 
ongoing memories, Fraser’s refusal to concede the place of fiction in the articulation of 
her recovered memories needs to be read as her profound commitment to truth-telling 
rather than as an implausibly complete or disingenuous recollection of identity-shattering 
traumatic events.  
When I met with Fraser, she told me that she began writing My Father’s House as 
a fiction about incest, employing the techniques she used in writing her earlier novels, 
including her autobiographical novel, Pandora. When she admitted to herself that she 
was actually writing a memoir, she realized how useful novelistic techniques were to her 
story. Fictional techniques were thus an essential tool for her to first narrate her story. 
Not just a novelist, Fraser is a journalist, and, indeed, worked for many years for the 
Toronto Star before writing Pandora.  As a novelist and a journalist, Fraser is, at least 
generically speaking, comfortable straddling both fictional and factual discourse. In the 
memoir, her authorial narrative “I” employs fictional techniques while the “I” of her 
italicized “other self” insists upon facts and truth. I asked Fraser about whether she 
thought it were possible to narrate traumatic, recovered memories of abuse without some 
recourse to fiction or the imagination in the reconstruction of the past. She emphasized 
her discomfort with my suggestion that truth and fiction could intermingle in memories 
of trauma; however, she elucidated an important distinction between “photographic truth” 
and “emotional truth”: 
I don’t like blurring. In terms of my life as a journalist, I say I served the 
facts. In terms of my life as a novelist, I say the facts served me. On the 
other hand, there’s something that I call greater truth; that is, say you’re a 
novelist, but you’re telling a true story. The thing about relationships is not 
the big scene; the thing about relationships is the repetition: something 
happens over and over again, and then there’s the trigger that explodes 
things. But that’s boring to write about. That’s a photographic truth. But if 
you take those ten arguments that somebody has and put it into one 
humdinger of an argument, then it tells the emotional truth of the ten, but 
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it does it in shorthand and it does it in a dramatic way. That to me is the 
novelist’s art, whether it’s something based on reality or whether it isn’t. 
That’s what drama is. It does contain the truth. In some ways, it’s more 
truthful, but I hesitate to say that because while I did that in My Father’s 
House—that’s what I meant by using the novelist’s techniques—[. . .] I 
did not [use novelistic techniques] in terms of the incest. 
My contention is that if Fraser were to extend what she says here to grant the possibility 
that her recovered memories might also convey “in shorthand” the “emotional truth of 
ten” repeated events of abuse, rather than insisting upon them as “photographic truth[s],” 
her memoir would not be subject to the same level of skepticism.  
In addition to her employment of “novelistic techniques,” Fraser’s use of italics to 
record the incest experienced by her “other self” has bothered her critics. I view her use 
of italics as a creative strategy to narrate recovered memories. Fraser’s critics view them 
as a problematic device that gives the pretense of a pristine version of newly remembered 
traumatic memories. In keeping with her view that the past cannot be anything but a 
shifting construction of an adult consciousness in the present, King, for example, objects 
to Fraser’s use of italics as “narrative techniques which attempt to hold past and present 
apart, so that the past can be represented as if uncontaminated by the consciousness of the 
remembering subject” (63). King seems to be prescribing a method of narration that is 
entirely focussed on the process of remembering as not remembering rather than as an 
effort to recount a life as one does remember it. She says the text holds on to a 
philosophy of representation (faithful imitation) that postmodernism and the concept of 
belated memory has disrupted (63). King suggests that while Fraser, in reminding the 
reader to keep her use of italics as a device in mind, seems to acknowledge the 
reconstructive aspects of her process of remembering her story, that, in fact, the contrary 
is true: “I feel the reader is often being invited to assume just the opposite: that is, that the 
past, bracketed off in italics as it is, has been recovered ‘pure’ from the timeless 
dimension in which it waited until recovered by the subject” (66).
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 Indeed, the italicized sections read as if they are true and complete memories. Narrated in the present 
tense, the italicized sections recording Fraser’s abuse have a visceral quality which heightens the sense of 
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Fraser’s use of italics to represent her divided personality was intimately 
connected to her process of accessing the part of her psyche fractured by traumas. 
Novelistic techniques became a crucial turning point in Fraser’s process of both 
discovery and recovery. I want to emphasize again the publication date of her memoir. In 
1987, there were few memoirs of this nature being read or discussed. Fraser pioneered a 
narrative method for articulating recovered memories of child sexual abuse and 
multiplicity. Without previous models to guide her, Fraser found a way to represent 
traumas vexed by fragmentary and ruptured understandings that can defy language. As 
Roger Luckhurst observes,  
trauma is not necessarily a stable or straightforwardly evidential or 
narratable event, but might be mobile, subject to all kinds of 
transformation and revision. This might well be the defining element of a 
traumatic memory, and what makes it particularly amenable to fictional 
narrative instead. The new kinds of autofiction that scuff the boundaries of 
fictional and factual discourse work to confound the legal measure of true 
and false precisely in  order to preserve, in a different way, an “alternative 
jurisdiction,” a  traumatic truth. (137) 
I liken Luckhurst’s use of the term “traumatic truth” with Fraser’s “emotional 
truth”: trauma needs flexible borders of truth to capture its blurring of reality. Fraser’s 
autobiographical position is important, and, indeed, her Author’s Note makes clear that 
she is a divided subject in the process of healing those divisions through acts of 
remembrance and reintegration. What is partly at issue with Fraser’s critics is the idea 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
realism: “My daddy plays with my belly button, my daddy plays with my toes as he did when I was little. [. . 
.] Now I lie on my daddy’s bed, face buried in his feather pillow. I shiver, because the window is open, the 
lace curtains are blowing and I haven’t any clothes on” (8). While the careful attention to detail lends 
reliability to this memory, Fraser’s apparent fullness of recall of recovered memories such as this trouble 
her critics who understand memory as much more fragmentary. I agree with Fraser’s critics that her 
memories may be inexact recollections of events. However, I disagree with them that the unreliability of 
memories in general and Fraser’s radical amnesia mean that she is disingenuous or that her story is not 
credible. The memory described in italics above has truth value even if it is not as precise as the narrative 
suggests. 
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that writing an autobiography requires a coherent subject, a notion that has been troubled 
by psychoanalysis and, more recently, postructuralism. That said, and as Gilmore notes, 
autobiography as a Western tradition “is both a corollary to the Enlightenment and its 
legacy, and which features a representative ‘I’ at its center. This version has been 
displaced from within and without autobiography itself as critics argue that the tradition 
was never as coherent as it could be made to appear, its canonical texts formally unstable 
and decidedly multivoiced” (2). Despite the displacement of the representative “I” of the 
Enlightenment by a less coherent postmodern “I,” Fraser’s claim to having two separate 
“I’s” exists on the borderland of postmodern notions of subjectivity. 
Fraser disrupts Enlightenment and postmodern traditions of autobiography 
precisely by both adopting an Enlightenment model of a knowing subject with a coherent, 
narratable life, while at the same time subverting that model with novelistic techniques 
and, more radically, a life that requires two coherent “I’s” to narrate it. Fraser’s Author’s 
Note encapsulates this contradiction and pledges to convey the truth of her story as she 
understood it at the time. Philippe Lejeune defines the autobiography as “Retrospective 
prose narrative written by a real person concerning his own existence, where the focus is 
his individual life, in particular the story of his personality” (120; original emphasis). 
Lejeune’s use of the word “story” is purposeful. He could have used the word “fact,” but 
he instead emphasized the “autobiographical pact.” In his Foreword to Lejuene’s On 
Autobiography, Paul John Eakin writes that Lejeune’s “autobiographical pact” was his 
answer to the problem of distinguishing factual from fictional discourses: “the 
autobiographical pact is a form of contract between author and reader in which the 
autobiographer explicitly commits himself or herself not to some impossible historical 
exactitude but rather to the sincere effort to come to terms with and to understand his or 
her own life” (ix). This is precisely what Fraser pledges in her Author’s Note. 
Kilby, however, finds Fraser’s use of the word “story” in the first line of the 
Author’s Note—“The story I have told in this book is autobiographical”—“hesitant,” as 
if to suggest that Fraser is not sure of the text’s status as autobiography versus story (52). 
By Lejeune’s definition, an autobiography is a “story of [a] personality.” However, in 
Kilby’s view, Fraser’s memoir, “as a life story [. . .] is impossible to write” (53). Fraser 
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cannot win with the critics: she is figured as too coherent and too divided to be believed. 
Gilmore argues that,  
The truthfulness of knowledge about the self and trauma as it arises in 
relation to self-representation immediately confronts the issue of 
judgment. The association of autobiography with representativeness, 
confession, and testimony suggests some of why this should be so. So 
does the history of identifying memory as a central and vulnerable 
location of identity, and trauma as a threat to the self due to how it injures 
memory. (144) 
I agree with Gilmore that judgments come with any act of autobiography. As 
Lejeune observes, “Confronted with what looks like an autobiographical narrative, the 
reader often tends to think of himself as a detective, that is to say, to look for breaches of 
contract” (14). And, indeed, Luckhurst admires King’s detective work as she “expertly 
unravels” inconsistencies in Fraser’s use of roman and italics (124). As a limit-case, 
Fraser’s memoir pushes at the edges of credulity for readers keen to question what she 
admits are injuries to memory and identity. In Gilmore’s terms, “In the imagined 
encounter with such judgments, many writers seek grounds other than the explicitly 
testimonial for self-representation [. . .] swerving from the center of autobiography to its 
outer limits” (14). That she is both a coherent and divided subject puts Fraser on the 
margins of autobiography; however, her memoir is a testament to the possibility of such 
writing with Fraser presenting herself as a coherent subject perfectly capable of writing 
her fractured life story.  
 The following sections take up Fraser’s major critics as symptomatic of the 
scholarly failure to read My Father’s House as a legitimate trauma story. In responding to 
these writers, I want to highlight just how high the ethical stakes are in the scholarly 
analysis of abuse narratives. My Father’s House, in fact, self-reflexively anticipates the 
incredulity critics express about its trauma story. The memoir recounts an interview 
between Fraser and “Gerald Nash” about Pandora. Nash says, “‘The realistic detail in 
your book astounds me. How can you remember so many things when I can barely 
remember the names of my teachers?’” (155 MFH; emphasis added). “Nash” might have 
been the first of Fraser’s long line of critics to question her memory and its apparent 
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concision. Nash goes on to read an extended section of Pandora which tells the story of a 
“breadman” who sexually abuses Fraser as a child. Nash confronts Fraser about the event 
and says, “‘I don’t believe that incident for one minute’” (MFH 158). He concludes that 
Pandora “‘is typical of the kind of hysterical imaginings we’re seeing too much of these 
days’” (MFH 158). The scene unwittingly foreshadows the critical response to the 
memoir itself, while it also reveals Fraser’s awareness of the potential skepticism of her 
readers. 
 Brooks notes that in the psychoanalytic scene transference creates a “dialogic 
relation of narrative production and interpretation” between the analyst and analysand 
(50). The relationship of the reader of a text to its writer parallels the transference that 
occurs in psychoanalysis: “if the story told has been effective [. . .] the act of transmission 
resembles the psychoanalytic transference, where the listener enters the story as an active 
participant in the creation of design and meaning, and the reader is then called upon 
himself to enter this transferential space” (51). This transferential space needs to be an 
ethical one, which is not to say that it should be uncritical. An ethical space is a dialogic 
one, with well-researched, open-minded, and fair analysis of the subject, a subject who is 
allowed to speak and so is part of the conversation. Fraser’s voice is either silenced by 
arguments that she is lying about her past or by the omission of key pieces of 
information.   
2.7.2 “Hysterical Epidemics”: Recovered Memories and MPD 
Elaine Showalter’s Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture (1997) 
is representative of the highly problematic terms in which trauma narratives such as 
Fraser’s are read. Indeed, the bravado and inaccurate claims with which Showalter 
discredits Fraser’s story is unparalleled in the criticism of My Father’s House.
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 Fraser was upset enough about Showalter’s claims to write a letter to her publisher, Columbia University 
Press. As she said to me in an e-mail, “After receiving a legal letter from me, Showalter and her publisher 
agreed to remove all mention of My Father’s House from reprints and to stop shipping this book into 
Canada. Unfortunately, since then, critics of similar ilk have continued to quote Showalter, and each other’s 
assumptions, instead of referring to the text of My Father’s House, building up layer upon layer of false 
information, that gained authority with repetition” (“Re: question”). 
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Showalter discredits Fraser’s memoir and Fraser herself as a witness to her life is 
surprising coming, as it does, from the pioneer of “gynocriticism.” In her ground-
breaking essay, “Toward a Feminist Poetics” (1979), Showalter promotes the 
construction of “a female framework for the analysis of women’s literature, to develop 
new models based on the study of female experience, rather than to adapt male models 
and theories” (131). As she explains it, “Gynocritics begins at the point when we free 
ourselves from the linear absolutes of male literary history, stop trying to fit women 
between the lines of the male tradition, and focus instead on the newly visible world of 
female culture” (131). Despite being an important and crusading advocate of an 
unfettered women’s literature grounded in their experiences, Showalter, in her later 
scholarship, invalidates Fraser’s experiences. In fact, Showalter’s scholarship collapses in 
its confrontation with My Father’s House by systematically countering her earlier 
gynocritical theory with an inability to accommodate Fraser’s story or even to read the 
memoir at the most basic level. 
In Hystories, Showalter makes the broad argument that hysteria truly is the 
wandering womb, and has travelled to contemporary times: “Contemporary hysterical 
patients blame external sources—a virus, sexual molestation, chemical warfare, satanic 
conspiracy, alien infiltration—for psychic problems” (4). Showalter’s circuitous rhetoric 
involves labeling valid syndromes, like Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Gulf War 
Syndrome, “hysterical epidemics,” which, in her terms, are no different from alien 
abductions or paranoid conspiracy theories. She similarly discredits recovered memories 
of sexual abuse as fanciful and self-serving responses to circulating cultural narratives of 
hysteria. Showalter thus opens her monograph by juxtaposing a nurse with Chronic 
Fatigue Syndrome who commits suicide with the help of Jack Kevorkian, to a Gulf War 
veteran with psychological problems, to a daughter who, under the influence of hypnosis 
and the guidance of a therapist, recovers memories of childhood abuse and falsely 
accuses her father of a crime he did not commit, to a Harvard professor who claims that 
little grey aliens are sexually experimenting with US citizens, to Oklahoma bomber 
Timothy McVeigh’s claim that the government implanted a surveillance microchip in his 
buttocks during the Gulf War, to right-wing militias in Montana accusing the government 
of chemically altering the blood of Americans to create a New World Order. She follows 
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this contentious opening hook with her thesis statement: “These sensational cases 
exemplify individual hysterias connecting with modern social movements to produce 
psychological epidemics” (3).
43
  
All of this is related, according to Showalter, not to real traumas but to “millennial 
panic”: “The heroes and heroines of 1990s hysteria call themselves traumatists and 
ufologists, experiencers and abductees, survivors and survivalists. [. . .] As panic reaches 
epidemic proportions, hysteria seeks out scapegoats and enemies—from unsympathetic 
doctors, abusive fathers, and working mothers to devil-worshipping sadists, curious 
extraterrestrials, and evil governments” (5). For Showalter, there is no difference between 
a trauma theorist, like Cathy Caruth, and someone who studies aliens, no difference 
between an incest survivor, like Fraser, and a survivalist burying herself in a cave to 
await the apocalypse: all are mindless consumers and reproducers of headlining stories. 
Calling these “epidemics” of hysteria “hystories,” she insists that it is only because the 
stories share similarities in the way they are told, that doctors and researchers believe 
they are true (6). The stories share similarities, says Showalter, not because the trauma of 
being sexually abused might share common characteristics with other traumas, but 
because “patients learn about diseases from the media, unconsciously develop the 
symptoms, and then attract media attention in an endless cycle” (6). According to this 
bandwagon logic, recovered memories of abuse, UFOs, war traumas, and government 
conspiracies are all part of a new, hysterical American culture unable to understand its 
psychic distress except by feigning a contemporary malady.  
In her discussion of recovered memories of sexual abuse, Showalter firmly places 
herself on side with advocates of false memory syndrome:
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 Herman, in Trauma and Recovery, similarly connects the emergence of particular psychological traumas 
to political movements, but she does so to argue that “The systematic study of psychological trauma [. . .] 
depends on the support of a political movement” (9). For Herman, the absence of a supportive political 
climate to legitimate the study and discussion of sexual violence inevitably leads to “the ordinary social 
processes of silencing and denial” (9). In Showalter’s view, the fact that traumas emerge together at a 
particular period in history has nothing to do with a changing political climate that might allow such a 
discourse; rather, the trauma is voiced to parrot what is already a dominant cultural narrative created by 
individual, sensational cases of hysteria.  
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I deplore the credulous endorsements of recovered memory and satanic 
abuse that have become part of one wing of feminist thought. I try to ask 
feminist questions about the sources behind these syndromes, accusations, 
and conspiracy theories. What needs are women attempting to meet 
through these therapeutic investments, sickness lifestyles, and emotional 
hystories? (11) 
Showalter conflates recovered memories of abuse with ritual satanic abuse in a rhetoric 
designed to discredit women without the appearance of doing so. “Trying to ask feminist 
questions” suggests a benevolent concern for women; however, embedded in her 
questions is the assumption that women are lying to meet their needs. She condescends as 
she concedes that while she has come “to doubt the validity of therapeutically recovered 
memories of sexual abuse [. . .] I do not wish to belittle those who believe in their 
memories. People do not generate these confabulations out of an intention to deceive. 
They may need to define an identity, to work out anger toward the accused, or to respond 
to cultural pressures” (147).  
Her supposition of “confabulation” and her patronizing language extend to her 
discussion of MPD, where she devotes a section to Fraser, whom she discredits. Like 
Hacking, Showalter is distrustful of MPD as a diagnosis: “Guess what—it’s another case 
of multiple personality. Along with recovered memory, the diagnosis of multiple 
personality syndrome has become epidemic in the U.S. since the 1980s” (159).
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 In her discussion of recovered memories of abuse, Showalter paraphrases Loftus to suggest that memory 
is prone to decay and distortion (147). Through the work of Richard Ofshe and Ethan Watters, she argues 
that recovered memory studies are “seriously flawed” (148). She cites Frederick Crews to argue that in a 
short time period, an epidemic has emerged of women who, suffering from a host of complaints, discover 
that repressed sexual abuse is the cause (146).See Ofshe, Richard, and Ethan Watters. Making Monsters: 
False Memories, Psychotherapy, and Sexual Hysteria. New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1994; Crews, 
Frederick. The Memory Wars: Freud’s Legacy in Dispute. New York: New York Review of Books, 1995; 
and also, Loftus, Elizabeth, and Katherine Ketcham. The Myth of Repressed Memory: False Memories and 
Allegations of Sexual Abuse. New York: St. Martin’s, 1994.
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 Showalter’s condescending tone even extends to her treatment of Hacking, whom she carelessly refers to 
as a “rumpled professor” (160). I have to say that I find it shocking that a scholar of her caliber and 
reputation would take such a seemingly reckless approach to her colleagues and subject matter. 
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that MPD was invented by recovered memory advocates to explain why children forget 
sexual abuse, she contends that MPD would not exist except to justify the existence of 
recovered memory (159). After the briefest explanation of how multiple personalities 
spring into being to deal with the trauma, she says that “alters” can be contacted by 
therapists through an “Inner Self-Helper,” an alter personality that mediates between 
alters. The impression Showalter gives is that therapists are as flaky and prone to 
imagination as their gullible female patients, whom they have in a trance.  
Following her arguments that recovered memories of sexual abuse by adult 
women are false and MPD is an invention to explain psychological problems, Showalter 
uses Fraser’s My Father’s House as a representative example of such cultural “hystorias.” 
Showalter begins, “One of the most frequently cited texts is Sylvia Fraser’s My Father’s 
House: A Memoir of Incest and Healing (1984), which describes a split personality 
created by Fraser’s sexual relationship with her father, an experience she had forgotten 
until adulthood, when she consulted a therapist in Toronto” (165). Fraser did not recover 
her memories in therapy, a crucial point upon which Showalter’s arguments against 
Fraser hinge. In fact, Fraser recovered her memories spontaneously and recounts this in 
the memoir. Fraser’s friends tell her that a mutual acquaintance, “Joker (Gerald) Nash,” 
has molested a child (219). Upon hearing the allegation against Nash himself, Fraser 
makes an association to her own childhood and remembers being orally raped by her 
father (220).
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Showalter nonetheless forges ahead by essentially fabricating a story about Fraser 
to press forth her own argument:  
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 Not only does Fraser give clear evidence in the memoir that her memories returned unprompted by a 
therapist, but she has repeatedly restated this since the publication of My Father’s House. In her 1994 
article, “Freud’s Final Seduction, Fraser emphasizes that “no therapist can be accused of misleading me, 
since none was involved in the initial recovery. I had read no books on incest, belonged to no survivor 
groups, and had no conscious interest in this subject, which had not yet become topical.” In fact, according 
to Fraser, “Ironically when the book was published, the fact that I was NOT under a therapist’s care to give 
authority to my memories, was perceived to be its weakness. After the FMSF gained public and media 
support, this was considered my memoir’s strength—a strength that the FMSF and its supporters had to do 
everything they could to destroy through distortion of the text” (“Re: question”).  
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Under hypnosis with a sympathetic therapist Fraser recovered memories 
of abuse, which explain to her satisfaction why she has never been 
completely happy and why she had an affair that ended her marriage to a 
decent, loving man. Since her therapist believed that child abuse often 
leads to multiple personality syndrome, he encouraged Fraser to locate her 
other self. (165) 
None of this is true, but to be fair, part of the confusion comes from the memoir, where 
Fraser does indeed describe visiting a hypnotherapist in Toronto (225-27); however, she 
clearly does so only after she recovered her memories. The therapist’s response is 
important: “Dr. Steven is cautionary: ‘Are you sure you want to keep stirring up these old 
memories? Why not rest a bit? Maybe you’ve had enough’” (MFH 227). Far from 
implanting false memories, her hypnotherapist urges her to be prudent.  
 Fraser describes a series of visits to “Dr. Steven,” but it is not entirely clear from 
the memoir how many times she sees him or if she recovers new memories while under 
hypnosis. For instance, she opens one paragraph by saying, “On subsequent visits to Dr. 
Steven’s office I produce other childhood memories in which I express a growing sense 
of panic and wrongdoing, and then of abject helplessness. When I block, he suggests: 
‘Try moving the image of yourself away from your house to some imaginary place that’s 
safer’” (226). What follows is a fascinating passage where Fraser possibly does confront 
her “other self,” but not as Showalter suggests, for at no point does the hypnotherapist 
suggest such an alter or a reunion with one. Under hypnosis, Fraser sees “some kind of 
barrier. It feels shiny, like a mirror. Yes, it’s a mirror. [. . .] I can’t see what the child sees 
because now I seem to be the reflection in that mirror looking out at her [. . .] that is, at 
myself” (227). This can be read as a reflection of a dissociated part of herself that she is 
only starting to have access to. Agitation jolts her out of her hypnosis and she tells her 
therapist that the eleven- or twelve-year-old child she sees in the mirror is too old to be 
real, because, at this point, Fraser has only recovered memories of abuse as a small child, 
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and still has not recovered memories of abuse that continued throughout her years at 
school.
47
  
Showalter, however, emphasizes that women fabricate litigious stories as rubrics 
for understanding their psychological problems. In her effort to make this point, 
Showalter repeats her own fiction that Fraser is fabricating MPD to explain the breakup 
of her marriage: “Fraser does not have dramatic or even visible symptoms of either 
grande or petite hystérie. But she cannot accept responsibility for the affair that destroyed 
her marriage; she blames the affair on her other self” (165). That Fraser documents her 
classic symptom of hysteria—convulsions—in the memoir is ignored by Showalter, who 
rehashes her false claims about Fraser again and again in what becomes belittling rhetoric 
to discredit her: “In order to account for the adulterous affair, Fraser must posit an 
incestuous relationship with Daddy. Actually, she never quite remembers the incest, but 
she knows it happened. It must have, for otherwise why wouldn’t she be happy? Why 
wouldn’t she be faithful?” (166). Despite many scenes in the memoir of detailed, 
remembered incest, Showalter blithely and, really, confusingly makes the claim that 
Fraser “never quite remembers the incest.” I can find nothing in the published literature 
to support any of Showalter’s erroneous statements about Fraser. 
2.7.3 Memory Models: Archeological versus Nachträglichkeit 
Nicola King negotiates Fraser’s memoir as a limit case for memory models of 
testimony. She devotes a chapter of her monograph, Memory, Narrative, Identity: 
Remembering the Self, to a comparison of My Father’s House to Margaret Atwood’s 
fictional autobiography, Cat’s Eye. King argues that both texts employ similar models of 
memory to “to enable its subject-narrator, who has [. . .] ‘forgotten’ a traumatic 
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 I asked Fraser about the hypnotherapist depicted in the memoir. She replied by e-mail saying that, 
“About eight months AFTER my memories had returned, and BEFORE writing My Father’s House, I 
made three trips at most to a hypnotherapist whose name I had seen on a door in a mall. In fact, I believe I 
went only twice, though I give the impression I went more often than that in MFH” (“Re: question”; 
original emphasis).The doctor was a GP who, for the most part, helped people quit smoking. As Fraser 
says, “Like most therapists of the time, he had no experience whatever with sexual abuse memories, and 
was a somewhat reluctant participant.” Rather than creating new memories, these sessions fleshed out 
memories she had already recovered.  
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childhood, to ‘see [her] life entire’” (8). In Atwood, the fictional character, Elaine, looks 
into her blue marble “cat’s eye” and remembers her “life entire” (Cat’s Eye 420), which, 
by comparison, and, indeed, King goes on to suggest, Fraser similarly fully recollects, all 
at once, her life entire. Whereas King accepts the novelistic convention that a first-person 
narrator has a more or less complete access to the past, she is less accepting of this model 
of remembering in autobiographies (64). She points to Fraser’s “sudden moment of 
revelation which is prepared for by means of an intricately plotted chain of events and 
coincidences. Over-determined or highly coincidental fictional plots may be 
unconvincing, but they obviously do not create the same kinds of doubt about the truth of 
the events being narrated as can arise in texts which claim autobiographical status” (64).  
To make her argument that Fraser’s representation of memory recovery creates 
doubts about the veracity of those memories, King identifies two contrasting notions of 
memory in psychoanalytic theory, both developed to address traumatic memory: “[t]he 
first is suggested by Freud’s frequent use of the analogy between the recovery of the 
buried past and the excavation of an archaeological site; the second by his reference to 
the ‘retranscription’ of memories and the structural principle of Nachträglichkeit” (11). 
Used but not fully developed by Freud, the term Nachträglichkeit has been translated by 
Jean Laplanche as belatedness or afterwardness (11). King questions Fraser’s memories 
precisely because her recovery of them seems analogous to an archaeological unearthing 
of a knowable past, as in the first model of memory, rather than a belated retranslation of 
a forgotten, elusive past, as in the second model. Accordingly, King argues that the kind 
of self and narrative truth that Fraser constructs is flawed by her “archaeological 
metaphor” (62) of uncovering buried memories, which for King, is an outdated Freudian 
model “which has been thrown into question by recent work on the later Freudian notion 
of Nachträglichkeit,” which suggests reconstruction of the past rather than recovery (61). 
King insists that reconstruction changes the memory of the event, which changes its truth 
status: “[Nachträglichkeit] makes explicit the fact that memory, operating as it does in the 
present, must inevitably incorporate the awareness of ‘what wasn't known then’” (12). 
The quotations that King employs to make this point sometimes simplify Fraser’s 
process, making it sound as though her memories can be put neatly and simply together 
to form a whole. King argues, for example, that Fraser makes “explicit use of the 
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archaeological metaphor, comparing her resurrected memories of sexual abuse to 
‘smashed hieroglyphic tablets,’ which, when she ‘finally began excavation’ had to be 
‘fitted into patterns and dated’ (218)” (62). What she does not include is the passage in 
the memoir which precedes and complicates this one: “The memories of my other self are 
difficult to recapture because they are so fragmentary” (218; emphasis added). King slips 
over Fraser’s acknowledgement in the memoir that she has difficulty accessing many of 
her memories, yet she troubles Fraser’s understanding that her fragmented memories can 
be fitted together like a puzzle.  
 While I agree with King that memories are much more reconstructions than 
untarnished recoveries, her binary model of memory—that is, either repression or a more 
complicated form of re-writing past memories in the present—fails to account for the 
possibility of dissociated memories or altered states of consciousness, such as those of 
Fraser, that foreclose the possibility of retrieval. It is easy to understand from a 
psychoanalytic perspective that all memories are essentially false memories. There is, 
however, a fundamental difference between that claim and the claim that because all 
memories are false, they have no truth value whatsoever. Where this argument falls short 
is in its assumption that the fact of memory distortion means that Fraser’s abuse is open 
to question or did not occur. The process of remembering childhood traumas may indeed 
change those memories, which are always already corrupt versions of the real that can 
never be fully apprehended. The question becomes the extent to which the real encounter 
has been re-written and whether this re-writing necessarily corrupts its essential truth, 
that is, that sexual abuse occurred.  
In her deployment of theories of narrative and memory to dissect the body of 
Fraser’s text, King brings to the fore the risks of autobiographical representation. In 
narrating their stories, survivors risk re-traumatization. As Leigh Gilmore says, 
autobiography “offers writers the opportunity to promote themselves as representative 
subjects, that is, as subjects who stand for others. It also threatens writers with 
unsympathetic scrutiny. [. . .] Public and private life are interwoven in such a way that 
either legitimation or shaming is always possible” (4). King’s analysis reinforces the 
divide between theories of memory and remembering subjects, discrediting, as Showalter 
does, Fraser as a witness to her own life. For King, “The text [. . .] demonstrates the 
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powerful appeal of the model of memory as total recovery of the past; even when the past 
is traumatic this model is nostalgic in its comforting assumption that nothing is lost and 
that wholeness and reintegration are possible” (64). By calling Fraser’s narrative impetus 
toward reintegration “nostalgic,” King asserts her scholarly authority over Fraser, 
marking her as gullible—entranced by an impossible vision of wholeness and healing.  
Like Showalter’s, King’s analysis cannot accommodate Fraser’s story. 
While King is careful to say that her analysis “is not an attempt to disprove the 
facts of [Fraser’s] sexual abuse,” but rather to look at how her narrative constructs the 
“truth,” she proceeds, as Showalter did before her, to deconstruct Fraser’s narrative to 
establish precisely the questionable veracity of her memories. And, like Showalter, she 
does so, in part, by suggesting that Fraser’s claim to Multiple Personality Disorder is a 
construction, in this case, a narrative rather than hysterical one:  
The repression of the memory of a few isolated incidents of infantile abuse 
is much easier to accept than the idea of the conscious and repeated 
repression of the knowledge and memory of a more or less continuous 
experience. The idea of a second self which “takes over” and even 
participates in the sexual relationship could be seen as a construction 
which overcomes this difficulty whilst also creating others in its place. 
(76) 
King questions that Fraser repressed abuses that continued into her adolescence and flatly 
says that “it becomes harder for the reader to accept” (85). King ignores a significant 
body of research that attests to a pattern of Dissociative Identity Disorder in adult 
survivors of child sexual abuse. While she does not go so far as to say that Fraser was not 
abused, King clearly expresses her incredulity towards Fraser’s story. The tenor of King’s 
criticism is thus representative of the breakdown in scholarship on Fraser: no one (except 
Showalter) wants to say that Fraser is lying, but many are skeptical of her story as she 
writes it.  
Jane Kilby, for example, in Violence and the Cultural Politics of Trauma (2007), 
argues that despite Fraser’s insistence that she is telling a true story, “Fraser can do 
nothing to settle the questions that always come to haunt a claim to repressed sexual 
trauma: is it real? Is it really possible to forget that you were repeatedly abused and raped 
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throughout your childhood?” (48). Doubting but reluctant to completely disavow Fraser’s 
memories, Kilby concludes instead that by “borrowing the techniques of the novelist, 
Fraser has ended up telling a somewhat bad story, and one that trades structurally on the 
‘thrill’ afforded a plot building towards a shocking denouncement” (64). Following King, 
Kilby sees Fraser’s plotting as sensational; however, there is nothing shocking about 
finding incest in a text carrying the subtitle, A Memoir of Incest and Healing. Kilby 
concludes that Fraser is a “second-rate novelist” and a “second-rate analyst” of her own 
life: “She reads her dreams too literally, while writing too obviously” (65). I have been 
reluctant to include Kilby’s evaluative comments about Fraser’s writing because they 
seem irrelevant to the larger issues raised by her memoir. On the other hand, Fraser’s 
“obvious” writing style, which is also to say something about the clarity of her prose, 
leaves critics nonplussed because of their preconceptions regarding the structure of 
trauma narratives as shifting, tentative, and fragmentary recordings of wounds too 
horrible to confront clearly and directly, as Fraser does. 
In an interview with Janice Williamson about writing her memoir of incest, 
Don’t: A Woman’s Word, Elly Danica explains the technical difficulties she experienced 
in writing about her abusive childhood:  
when I tried to write in what I thought were appropriate ways—how I’d 
been taught language—the writing was awful, almost sentimental, because 
when you try to put the story into “normal” narrative structure, the pain is 
not there. The language we are obliged to use works to obliterate or 
minimalize our pain. In patriarchal language we’re not supposed to tell the 
truth about our lives and our pain. (84; original emphasis)  
Child sexual abuse, as Danica suggests, does not easily fit into prescribed patriarchal, 
humanist autobiographical traditions. If Fraser had used a more experimental form, 
would she have been subject to such criticism? Indeed, it is my contention that had Fraser 
called her memoir a novel, readers would have concluded that she had been sexually 
abused as a child. In using a conservative form to tell her radically other story, Fraser 
disrupts expectations created by the tradition upon which she draws. Sexual abuse 
narratives are necessarily limit cases: in their desire to know what really happened and 
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speak the truth, they confront the limits of narrative models available to unravel that 
truth, and, in so doing, confront the limits of truth itself. 
2.7.4 Narrative Coherence, Fragments, and Truth 
Closely related to King’s criticism that Fraser’s memoir is unconvincing because 
of its insistence on memories as recoveries rather than reconstructions is the 
condemnation of Fraser’s narrative as too coherent to be true. This line of argument, like 
King’s, is compelling, particularly when one considers the structural aspects of most 
trauma narratives. Laurie Vickroy, in Trauma and Survival in Contemporary Fiction 
(2002), argues that traumatic narratives  “internalize the rhythms, processes, and 
uncertainties of traumatic experience within their underlying sensibilities and structures” 
(3). According to Vickroy, these narratives reflect the fragmentary and recursive aspects 
of traumatic experience: “Writers have created a number of narrative strategies to 
represent a conflicted or incomplete relation to memory, including textual gaps, [. . .] 
repetition, breaks in linear time, shifting viewpoints, and a focus on visual images and 
affective states” (29). Fraser’s memoir seeks to compensate for her troubled relation to 
memory precisely through a narrative that recovers past traumas to make sense of them 
and to integrate them as a coherent part of her identity. Fraser carefully structures her 
narrative to make it comprehensible to herself and cogent for her readers. Rather than a 
series of fragments, as in Danica’s memoir, Fraser begins her story with her childhood in 
a section called “Remembering,” and then moves through her adolescence and adulthood 
until she recounts her memory recovery in “Revelation,” and finally her healing process 
in “Resolution.” Indeed, remembering, revelation, and resolution are part of Fraser’s 
therapeutic process, which aims to reintegrate and make coherent what trauma severed in 
her childhood. Trauma narratives as a genre, however, tend to be more fragmentary and 
shifting than Fraser’s clear and linear memoir.  
 Kathryn Robson, in “‘Truth’, Memory and Narrative in Memoirs of Child Sexual 
Abuse” (2010), takes up issues of coherence and form in traumatic autobiographies by 
comparing Fraser’s memoir to Janice Williamson’s, Crybaby! Published in 1998, 
Crybaby! is self-reflexively experimental, on the border between history and imagination, 
as Williamson tentatively narrates what she admits are sketchy, fragmentary recovered 
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memories of sexual abuse. The memoir is written in fragments which include photos, 
poems, captions, magazine excerpts, letters, prose sections, and reflections on scholarly 
quotations encompassing a range of theorists and philosophers, from French feminists 
such as Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigiray to the philosophers Maurice 
Blanchot, Pierre Bourdieu, and Roland Barthes to theorists of memory and trauma such 
as Shoshana Felman, Cathy Caruth, Judith Lewis Herman, Jennifer Freyd, and Ian 
Hacking. As an English professor, Williamson has written not only an erudite but a 
postmodern text that creates a dialectical relationship with and responds to contemporary 
theories of trauma and narrative. As such, the memoir marks a radical departure from the 
more traditional form of autobiography taken up by Fraser.  
Whereas Fraser attempts to narrate a coherent story of her past, Williamson 
regards her past as elusive and its narration almost impossible. Writing in the gaps of her 
memory with full understanding of its fallibility, she asks, “is the fictive my only 
alternative to silence and repression?” (73). For Williamson, memory is always a 
reconstructive process, and therefore an imaginative act of narration. Robson compares 
Fraser’s memoir to Williamson’s to argue that narratives, like Fraser’s, in which a 
cohesive, meaningful self is articulated, are “bound up in cultural notions of ‘truth’ and 
integrity according to which ‘truth’ is somehow connected to coherence. Fraser judges 
her recovered memories to be ‘true’ because they make sense and cohere to her pre-
constructed narrative models” (147). Clearly preferring Williamson’s incredulity towards 
memory and absolute truths, Robson insists that Williamson’s refusal to create a 
coherent, grand narrative of her life makes her story of abuse somehow truer than 
Fraser’s:  
My reading of Crybaby! suggests that the “truth” of child sexual abuse lies 
in a fragmented, rather than coherent narrative, and that any attempt to 
establish a definitive “truth” or to construct a single narrative explanation 
works at the expense of other possible versions of the past. In the context 
of child sexual abuse, Crybaby! intimates, “truth” is itself fragmentary, 
located in the (crucially shifting) disjunction between different potential 
stories and subjects. The very attempt to measure and define “truth” is 
itself shaped by narrative; this does not mean abandoning the possibility of 
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establishing “what really happened”, but taking on board narrative 
discontinuities and gaps, exploring narrative’s capacity to invent and 
experiment, rather than reverting to a coherent and over-told story of 
villains and victims. (153) 
I could not agree more with Robson insofar as she articulates a plea to admit 
experimental and creative elements into trauma stories. What I take issue with is the way 
she uses Fraser’s memoir to service her argument. Her suggestion that Fraser reverts to a 
“coherent and over-told story,” which is also to say a simple, clichéd story, while 
Williamson’s fragments complicate well-worn plots and ring true twists Williamson’s 
approach at the expense of Fraser’s. What Williamson is searching for is not a model that 
privileges fragments, but rather one that allows for their validity in the absence of more 
cohesive recollections. As Williamson says, “More work needs to be done in exploring 
how we can admit variations on stories, half-memories and imagined reveries into our 
understanding of child sexual abuse” (“Writing Aversion” 222). If memory is always 
suspect, what, then, is the point of putting one’s recollections into a narrative that makes 
sense of the past? The value of a coherent narrative, such as Fraser’s, lies in its 
therapeutic potential. To criticize, as Robson does, Fraser’s attempt to make sense of a 
life that eluded her for so many years by insisting that her effort to integrate fragments 
into a coherent narrative is disingenuous is to forestall her therapeutic process and 
foreclose alternate healthy plots in her life narrative. 
2.8 The Achievement of My Father’s House 
 
Brooks argues that patients enter psychoanalysis “because of the weakness of the 
narrative discourses that they present: the incoherence, inconsistency, and lack of 
explanatory force in the way they tell their lives” (47). The task of the psychoanalyst is to 
help the analysand integrate the fragments of past traumas into a story that makes sense 
of that past. The achievement of My Father’s House is precisely that it narrates a 
coherent life story. Psychology professor James Pennebaker researched the connection 
between translating past traumas from inchoate emotions into language. In Opening Up: 
The Healing Power of Expressing Emotions, he argues that Multiple Personality 
Disorder, frequently linked to childhood sexual abuse, arises from extreme trauma that is 
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never discussed. The detachment of language-based experience from emotional 
experience creates the disorder; connecting the two can help to heal the individual 
sufferer: “Whereas the failure to translate powerful emotions into language appears to be 
psychologically unhealthy, linking the two systems is beneficial” (97). Active talk 
therapies are helpful treatments, says Pennebaker, but so too is writing, as it externalizes 
the event and preserves the memory (98). Pennebaker concludes by asserting the value of 
a coherent narrative to mental health: 
People who benefit most from translating their experiences into language 
tend to write in a particular way. Just as we are drawn to good stories in 
literature or the movies, we need to construct coherent and meaningful 
stories for ourselves. Good narratives or stories, then, organize seemingly 
infinite facets of overwhelming events. Once organized, the events are 
often smaller and easier to deal with. Particularly important is that writing 
moves us to a resolution. Even if there is no meaning to an event, it 
becomes psychologically complete. (103) 
I conclude, in part, with a paradox: Fraser is telling the truth about what traumas 
prevented her from encountering as real and registering as conscious events. What she 
could not know helped her adapt and survive. The truth of her story lies in her 
corroborating evidence, and in her life-long recursions into narrative. Like the Lady of 
Shalott, “‘weaving her endless tapestries from shadows in mirrors’” (MFH 151), Fraser 
writes her story again and again. Her memoir, in the context of her autobiographical first 
novel, Pandora, her non-fiction, The Book of Strange, and her second, unpublished 
memoir, is more fruitfully viewed as but one of her repeated attempts to narrate her 
traumatic childhood. The truth of her famous memoir lies in these recurring acts of 
remembrance. Having said this, I turn to Judith Butler, who argues for the impossibility 
of truth in traumatic incest: “To avow the seriousness of the violation, which is ethically 
imperative, it is not necessary to compel the subject to prove the historical veracity of the 
‘event.’ For it may be that the very sign of trauma is the loss of access to the terms that 
establish historical veracity, that is, where what is historical and what is true become 
unknowable or unthinkable” (156). Whereas most of Fraser’s critics put quotation marks 
around the word “truth,” Butler puts the “event” in quotation marks, signaling the 
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encounter as open to question rather than the truth. This is also to say that there is truth in 
traumatic missed encounters, “non-happenings” in Butler’s terms. Fraser’s story needs to 
be understood by what it cannot say, rather than simply by the discursive mode and genre 
in which she chooses to speak. Butler insists that a representation of traumatic incest,  
must be read for what it indicates, but cannot say, or for the unsayable in 
what is said. What remains crucial is a form of reading that does not try to 
find the truth of what happened, but, rather, asks, what has this non-
happening done to the question of truth? For part of the effect of that 
violation [. . .] is precisely to make the knowing of truth into an infinitely 
remote prospect; this is its epistemic violence. To insist, then, on verifying 
the truth is precisely to miss the effect of the violation in question, which 
is to put the knowability of truth into enduring crisis. (156-57) 
Criticizing the veracity of Fraser’s memoir is, then, to miss that the repeated 
violations of Fraser as a child are precisely in the impossibly coherent adult 
representations of what could not be apprehended at the time. Fraser’s use of the 
autobiographic form brings to the fore the quandaries of representing traumas that have 
never been fully encountered but continue to haunt the victim. Occupying a site of 
contradiction and paradox, Fraser’s incest memoir reveals its truths through its crisis of 
truth. The fact that Fraser has written another memoir that revisits her many years of 
sexual abuse suggests that there are significant gaps in My Father’s House. I cannot say 
what those gaps are. What I can say is that if Fraser decides to publish her latest memoir, 
her critics will be forced to reexamine My Father’s House as a moment-in-time narration 
of her circumlocutory story. At the end of My Father’s House, Fraser writes, “Now I can 
close the coffin, truly close it” (242). Having said this, she returns to the coffin, and like 
Pandora, opens the lid again and again, as she continues to remember and weave the story 
of her past. 
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Chapter 3  
3 (Re)Mediating Fictions: Representing Trauma in Ann-
Marie MacDonald’s Fall on Your Knees, Shani Mootoo’s 
Cereus Blooms at Night, and Gail Anderson-Dargatz’s 
The Cure for Death by Lightning 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter extends my discussion of the limits of genre and the place of 
storytelling in writing traumatic memories, as Sylvia Fraser does in her memoir, My 
Father’s House, to an analysis of the ways in which three Canadian novels similarly 
challenge conventional boundaries of genre and representation in their fictional 
articulation of recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse. I argued in my last chapter 
that because trauma troubles the border between what is real and what is imagined, 
creative writing techniques, such as Fraser’s employment of italics and novelistic 
techniques, while controversial in autobiographies, are necessary in the narration and 
representation of encounters vexed not only by the distortions of time and memory, but 
also by the very nature of the traumatic encounter, which is often registered by the senses 
rather than through language. As Judith Lewis Herman argues through Pierre Janet,  
Janet described normal memory as “the action of telling a story.” 
Traumatic memory, by contrast, is wordless and static. [. . .] One observer 
describes the trauma story in its untransformed state as a “prenarrative.” It 
does not develop or progress in time, and it does not reveal the 
storyteller’s feelings or interpretation of events. Another therapist 
describes the traumatic memory as a series of still snapshots or a silent 
movie; the role of therapy is to provide the music and words (175). 
In the absence of a therapist to help give voice to unassimilated traumatic 
experiences, the characters in the novels I explore here perform the therapeutic work of 
giving account of their traumas by transforming traumatic memories into words, music, 
or pictures they can understand. Trauma, it seems, needs translation from experience to 
word, an act necessitating mediation through the imagination to make possible 
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interpretation. This chapter thus takes up three novels which all represent childhood 
traumas as arbitrated encounters, that is, as traumas that characters imaginatively recreate 
to mediate events too painful to apprehend directly: Ann-Marie MacDonald’s Fall on 
Your Knees employs the visual arts and music as principal aesthetic negotiators of the 
Piper family’s many traumas; in Shani Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night, it is the natural 
world of plants and animals through which Mala imaginatively expresses and heals from 
her abusive past; in Gail Anderson-Dargatz’s The Cure for Death by Lightning, the 
fictional autobiography that Beth writes and the scrapbook that her mother “writes” 
encrypt traumatic memories and also carry a scripto-therapeutic purpose. Beth’s and 
Maud’s traumas are represented both through a coded form of writing and through the 
animal world, in particular, the Native figure of Coyote through which Beth imagines and 
stories her abuse.
48
  
These novels thus all represent childhood traumas as mediated sensory 
experiences that seem to require, like Fraser’s memoir, imaginative and hybridized forms 
to recount stories whose access to the truth is never straightforward. And like Fraser, 
these authors transgress boundaries of form to tell stories that seem to defy linear 
narrative. As with Fraser’s memoir, the novels I explore here find trauma’s expression 
through flexible genres that incorporate both realism and acts of imagination. All employ 
conventions of the Gothic and magic realism to create hybridized forms that mix the 
fantastic with the real as a creative strategy in the narration of childhood traumas. The 
Gothic, however supernatural it can seem, serves to heighten an already gothic reality by 
capturing the horrors and uncanny hauntings that characterize the experience of child 
sexual abuse; similarly, magic realism, in its refusal to privilege the real over the unreal, 
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 It is perhaps telling that despite the horrific (and still sometimes elided) subject matter of these novels, 
they all share general popularity and critical acclaim. They were all short-listed for the Giller Prize 
(MacDonald and Anderson-Dargatz in 1996, and Mootoo in 1997), and also for the Amazon.ca First Novel 
Award in 1996. Indeed, Oprah Winfrey, for whom child sexual abuse was a frequent topic of discussion on 
her talk show, included MacDonald’s novel as one of her Book Club selections in 2002. The public stage 
which MacDonald and her novel were given significantly increased its sales and, in my view, provided an 
important opportunity to engage the public with issues of childhood trauma.  
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provides these writers with a language to express traumas that are at once too real and too 
monstrous to comprehend.  
It is important to note that all of the novels discussed in this chapter take up 
postcolonial issues, sharing a concern with colonial violence and racism. Interestingly, 
the novels were all published in 1996. Given that there are few examples in Canadian 
literature of sustained reflections upon childhood sexual abuse, I wonder if the 
publication date is more than a coincidence. It may be that by opening up a discourse to 
expose the many horrific legacies of colonialism, postcolonial studies collaterally 
provided a language for speaking about incest. In its discourse of exile, of retrieving 
repressed histories, and of what Homi Bhabha suggests is the “paradigmatic colonial and 
post-colonial condition”—that is, the “unhomely”—postcolonial theory provides a 
language which shares resonances with forms of domestic colonization such as child 
abuse (13).  Bhabha insists that “To be unhomed is not to be homeless”: “The unhomely 
moment creeps up on you stealthily as your own shadow” (13). The home in all of these 
novels is “unhomely” for its haunted children.  
The focus of this chapter, and what connects all three novels, is precisely the 
unhomely moment of abuse when the victim is psychologically undone in the shock of 
the trauma. These novels suggest that in this moment of trauma, the imagination takes 
over to ameliorate the event. Eugene L. Arva’s concept of the “traumatic imagination” is 
an essential component of what emerges from my reading of these three novels, that is, 
the therapeutically productive entwinement of trauma and the imagination. For Arva, the 
traumatic imagination is “the essential consciousness of survival to which the psyche 
resorts when confronted with the impossibility of remembering limit events” (The 
Traumatic Imagination 5). Arva suggests that the traumatic imagination is “an empathy-
driven consciousness that enables authors and readers to act out and/or work through 
trauma by means of magical realist images” (5). He argues that the representation of the 
traumatic event is thus much more about the experience of the trauma than it is about the 
facts or reality of the event. The fictions I discuss here all work through their traumas by 
way of magical realist images that at once vex and offer up reparation for deeply 
disturbing events. Fiction allows writers and their characters the freedom to imaginatively 
encounter trauma by remediating its force by rewriting it. 
100 
 
 
3.2 “one thing can look like another”: Trauma and 
Representation in Ann-Marie MacDonald’s Fall on Your 
Knees 
 Ann-Marie MacDonald’s Fall on Your Knees has attracted considerable scholarly 
attention, in part, because of its gothic conventions and the renewed interest in 
understanding Canadian colonial history through the lens of the postcolonial gothic, and, 
in part, because of its foregrounding of what is implicit in Canada’s gothic, colonial past 
as it intersects with the postcolonial present: the rejoining of trauma and memory.
49
 What 
the scholarship largely overlooks, however, is what I see as the novel’s chief insight into 
trauma and memory: that trauma is registered and remembered not through language but 
primarily through the senses as mediated representations of the event, that is, traumatic 
imaginings of the real event which simultaneously reveal and conceal their truths. Roger 
Luckhurst observes: 
One of the central ways in which contemporary trauma has been 
conceived is around the symptom of the intrusive or recurrent image, the 
unbidden flashback that abolishes time and reimmerses you in the visual 
field of the inaugurating traumatic instant. There is a profound disjunction 
implied: the visual intrusion recurs because linguistic and memorial 
machineries completely fail to integrate or process the traumatic image. 
Perhaps, then, it is in the image that the psychic registration of trauma 
truly resides. (147) 
 Fall on Your Knees presents memories as visual images by employing film, 
painting, and pictures to arbitrate traumatic encounters. As Candida Rifkind insists, “As 
the characters struggle to represent to themselves mental pictures of traumatic 
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 Indeed, Fall on Your Knees is taken up by two authors in the recent edited collection of essays on 
Canadian literature and the Postcolonial Gothic. See Sugars, Cynthia, and Gerry Turcotte, eds. Unsettled 
Remains: Canadian Literature and the Postcolonial Gothic. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier UP, 2009. See also 
Andrew Smith and William Hughes, Empire and the Gothic (2003) and Alison Rudd, Postcolonial Gothic 
Fictions from the Caribbean, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (2010). 
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experiences, the visual comes to mediate between the subject’s history and its 
representation in the present” (31). Music and performance are similarly advanced as 
languages of trauma through which characters register but never completely apprehend 
traumatic events. The novel seems to suggest that trauma always needs to be mediated 
through something, that it can never be experienced directly. In the moment of trauma, 
then, the novel’s characters aestheticize the event, often literally as art, usually a painting, 
and then later recall the trauma in terms of abandoned art or dormant paintings 
partitioned off in their minds as too difficult to confront directly. The derivation of 
aesthetic is that it is both an aestheticization of the senses, a representation of sensual 
experience, and simultaneously an experience of the senses. As representation and 
experience, the aesthetic can both express the traumatic experience and re-materialize it 
all over again as a means of achieving psychological distance from it. What is at stake in 
this conception of trauma as representation is that trauma is always already a sensory 
composition, a re-presentation of the bewildering and horrific event, a restoration that can 
never achieve its pristine original state. Because of this, and as Frances learns in the 
novel, one thing looks like another, which suggests that while the traumatic encounter is a 
real event, it is experienced as less than real, more as a coded portraiture that returns and 
haunts the subject who encodes but cannot always access the trauma. The effect of this 
aesthetic distance, if you will, is to throw truth and knowability into constant crisis for 
not only the novel’s characters, but also its readers.  
 The novel’s opening frames questions of trauma, memory, and aesthetic 
perception through a series of “pictures” which invite the reader to apprehend the novel 
beyond language—to see its representations in sensory terms. The novel thus opens as a 
“Silent Picture” inaugurating its own haunting with the first line: “They’re all dead now” 
(1). The narrator offers the reader “a picture of the town where they lived. New 
Waterford”(1). The reader is invited to look down at this picture, as if “from the height of 
a church steeple,” ironically suggesting a moral high ground or perhaps a similarly ironic 
echoing of the long Canadian literary tradition of the poet on a height of land.
50
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 One thinks, for example, of Thomas Cary, Charles G.D. Roberts, and Duncan Campbell Scott to name a 
few. 
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way, the narrative seems to invite the reader to look down upon it, to take a bird’s eye 
view and mentally frame it. Rather than a picturesque, bucolic landscape, the narrative 
gaze moves from the mining town—“Company houses. Company town”—over the 
“sighing” sea, to invite the reader to rest her eyes squarely upon a private, domestic scene 
of trauma: “a picture of their house as it was then” (1; emphasis added). The reader is 
asked to imagine the house without being given any indication of the impending traumas 
within its walls, which I understand as an early suggestion of the essential unreadability 
of the traumatic events of this novel. 
 The reader follows this unreadable picture to a “picture” of Materia’s death, head 
in the oven à-la-Sylvia Plath. The narrative, however, obfuscates this scene of suicide by 
signalling a fairy tale instead: it’s a “black and white picture,” with her head “half in half 
out of the oven like the witch in Hansel and Gretel” (2). Not just a picture, there is a 
smell: rotten eggs. The picture registers the trauma through the visual and olfactory 
senses. This “picture” stands in as a metonym for traumatic memory, in this instance, of 
Materia’s suicide, and like traumatic memory, it veils the truth by presenting it yet 
keeping it out of the range of what is fully known. Cathy Caruth theorizes the connection 
between literature and traumatic experience as that which is both known and unknown: 
“If Freud turns to literature to describe traumatic experience, it is because literature, like 
psychoanalysis, is interested in the complex relation between knowing and not knowing. 
And it is at the specific point at which knowing and not knowing intersect that the 
language of literature and the psychoanalytic theory of traumatic experience precisely 
meet” (3). The pictures MacDonald employs similarly lay at a point of knowing and not 
knowing. MacDonald employs the language of literature in sensory terms to represent the 
troubled intersection of fiction, truth, and traumatic encounters. 
MacDonald’s strategy of arbitrating traumatic encounters through aesthetic 
representations is on display, albeit cryptically, as the narrator continues to offer up a 
series of what are called “pictures,” images that represent facts to the reader without 
revealing hidden truths. There is a “picture” of James asleep in the green wingback chair 
(2), which seems innocent enough, but further on in the novel, the reader learns that it is 
in this chair that James sexually abuses his daughter, Frances (375). There is a “picture” 
of Ambrose’s empty crib. What the reader is not told is that Frances, in trying to baptize 
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Ambrose, inadvertently drowns him in the creek. Following a “picture” of Mercedes 
holding her rosary, finger on lips saying, “‘Shshsh’” (2), as if to say, “these pictures are a 
secret,” comes a “moving picture” that “is also a silent one” (3) of Frances at the creek. 
The shift from still to moving pictures is marked by a series of questions which suggest 
the narrator’s/viewer’s lack of comprehension of the scene of Frances at the creek: “What 
is she doing in the middle of the creek, in the middle of the night? And what’s she 
hugging to her chest [. . .] ?” (3). The creek is a paradigmatic scene of trauma for 
Frances, but the reader is only given fragments of the horrors she has just witnessed and 
experienced. The central traumas of the novel are thus all represented as a series of 
pictures that the reader cannot possibly decipher until the novel’s conclusion. These 
pictures function as aestheticized traumatic memories that cannot be encoded into 
language. They represent facts but not the truth of what happened. As such, and as I 
argue, these pictures frame the novel’s concern with how trauma is imagined and 
recreated by its characters. 
The pictures thus work to gesture towards traumas not yet revealed. Joel Baetz 
argues that the pictures in Fall on Your Knees are uncanny ones that have been 
“previously repressed or turned away and that, at a later moment, [return] to full view” 
(71). I want to suggest that these pictures also mimic the workings of traumatic memory, 
both through their sensory recordings of events, and in the narrative structure, which is 
based on the principal of belatedness whereby knowledge of the facts of the traumas are 
witheld.
51
 Caruth contends that belatedness is a grounding principal of traumatic 
experience: “Traumatic experience [. . .] suggests a certain paradox: that the most direct 
seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it; that immediacy, 
paradoxically, may take the form of belatedness” (Unclaimed Experience 91-92). The 
shards of traumatic memory that are presented in this first creek scene cannot be 
understood by the reader or narrator as they require translation from the language of 
trauma to narrative. The “moving picture” asks the reader to “Imagine you can hear the 
creek trickling. Like a girl telling a secret in a language so much like our own” (3). The 
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 Baetz similarly argues that “Fall on Your Knees is itself an uncanny narrative, both structurally and 
thematically” (74). 
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reader is asked to respond through the sense of hearing to the language of trauma which 
is “a secret language so much like our own,” but importantly not the same as our own. 
Yet traumatic language, in its own way, is a more faithful representation of the trauma 
itself. The narrator suggests that if Frances were asked what she was doing at the creek, 
“even if she were to answer, we wouldn’t know what she was saying, because, although 
this is a moving picture, it is also a silent one” (3). Wordless, the traumatic memory 
retains its force without yielding its knowledge. Like the scrapbook in Cure for Death by 
Lightning, these “Silent Pictures” record submerged memories that will surface 
throughout the course of the narrative. 
This three-page opening chapter ends, importantly, with a reference to the only 
surviving picture of Kathleen. The picture is a significant and recurring marker of an 
array of traumatic memories central to the novel. A short chapter entitled “Moving 
Picture” recounts a photographer’s many attempts to secure a picture of his moving 
target, Kathleen, whose uncontrollable laughter, sparked by her lively exchanges with her 
father, James, precludes a good, still shot. The final picture that he manages to take 
memorializes the idyllic relationship between James and his daughter before the rape, 
while at the same time signaling the impending sexual abuse and its tragic consequences: 
pregnancy and the butchering of Kathleen by Materia as she performs an impromptu 
Caesarean section ostensibly to save the twins, who are, of course, a product of that rape: 
“James sneaks up behind the camera and pulls a cross-eyed face at Kathleen. She flops 
forward, hands on her knees, laughing into the camera, ‘Daddy!’—while at the same 
instant Materia appears in the window behind her and waves—snap. Through the lens, 
Materia’s hand fractures into light, framing Kathleen’s blur of hair. Materia must be 
holding something shiny” (80).  
The reader learns on the next page that Materia is holding scissors. The “snap” of 
the camera then echoes the snap of the scissors which Materia uses to cut up her kidneys 
for her steak and kidney pies and which she ultimately uses to cut up Kathleen. The 
scissors also signal Materia’s suicide following Kathleen’s death, and it does so, again, 
through the senses. As Materia literally roasts in the oven, Frances and Mercedes smell 
kidneys and wonder without irony why Materia is baking in the middle of the night (168). 
This picture is indeed a moving one, and not simply because Kathleen cannot stay still. 
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Like trauma, the deployment of the pictures is symptomatic of a reality that cannot be 
captured. The traumas that the picture signifies are not static but shifting as layers of 
memory are added to the narrative in a succession of traumatic flashbacks. Encoded in 
the novel’s opening chapter, this picture visually encapsulates the traumas yet to come 
without revealing them. In its constitutive ambiguity, the picture functions as traumatic 
memory itself, intruding upon the characters and narrative action throughout the novel. In 
an echoing of this understanding, and of Kathleen’s bad case of the giggles, the 
traumatized Frances bursts into hysterical laughter at Materia’s funeral, a laughter which 
James and Mercedes mistake for crying: 
Frances learns something in this moment that will allow her to survive and 
function for the rest of her life. She finds out that one thing can look like 
another. That the facts of a situation don’t necessarily indicate anything 
about the truth of a situation. In this moment, fact and truth become 
separated and commence to wander like twins in a fairy-tale, waiting to be 
reunited by that special someone who possesses the secret of telling them 
apart. (142; emphasis added) 
What Frances learns is what trauma teaches: fact and truth are not interchangeable terms; 
one thing can look like another, and, moreover, one thing does look like another as 
traumatic memories are visually mediated and represented in the borderland of fact and 
fiction. 
The following chapter, “Cave Paintings,” extends the visual nature of the 
traumatic encounter to include its moment of registry. Upon pounding his way through 
the attic door to the scene of Kathleen’s death, James perceives it as a painting: “When 
the attic door finally gave way, James saw this silent portrait: Death and the Young 
Mother. It’s an overdone, tasteless, melodramatic painting. A folk painting from a hot 
culture. Naive. Grotesque. Authentic” (143).
52
 James achieves distance from the scene of 
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 This is likely a reference to the 1861 etching by Rodolphe Bresdin called “Death and the Maiden.” The 
novel is also replete with musical intertexts, recalling here Franz Schubert’s Death and the Maiden and also 
Chilean playwright Ariel Dorfman’s 1990 Death and the Maiden, in which a woman is raped by her 
captors while Schubert’s composition is played. Roman Polanski adapted the play to film in 1994. 
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horror by encoding and aestheticizing it as art. James’s racism, which sparked his 
surprise trip to New York to collect Kathleen, and provoked his rape of her, contributes 
to the rendering of this portrait as primitive; however, the portrait as a “cave painting” 
gestures towards something more primal and originary as it connotes a pre-language of 
schematic drawing. Accordingly, the scene is “not a gauzy, Victorian death scene. No 
fetishized feminine pallor, no agnostic slant of celestial light, no decorously distraught 
husband. The portrait is in livid colour” (143). The “overdone” and “melodramatic” 
character of the portrait corresponds to the excess inherent in trauma: by definition, 
trauma overwhelms with its extravagant horror. As James looks upon Kathleen’s 
“ravaged” body, the sheets “black with blood,” “the Grandmother”—Materia—“looks 
straight out from the picture at the viewer,” James (143).
53
 James as “viewer” distances 
himself from the traumatic encounter and is more like a museum spectator than a 
participant. Bessel A. van der Kolk, psychiatry professor and clinician whose work 
focuses on trauma and posttraumatic stress, confirms that traumatic encounters are 
usually apprehended as sensory representations of the event: 
Numerous commentators on trauma [. . .] keep noting that trauma is 
organized in memory on a perceptual level. [. . .] Clinical experience and 
our reading of a century of observations by clinicians dealing with a 
variety of traumatized populations have led us to postulate that memories 
of the trauma tend, at least initially, to be experienced as fragments of 
sensory components of the event: as visual images; olfactory, auditory, or 
kinaesthetic sensations; or intense waves of feelings that patients usually 
claim to be representations of elements of the original traumatic event. 
(287) 
While perhaps less fragmentary than van der Kolk’s clinical understanding of the 
traumatic encounter, James’s graphic portraiture here reveals trauma to be not so much a 
crisis of representation beyond and outside of language as it is crisis as representation, 
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 Materia’s status as grandmother to the babies is emphasized while James’s status as the father is buried 
and supplanted by his role as “viewer.” 
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and perhaps also representation as crisis, that is, the urgency to represent to make sense 
of things. 
 Cave paintings also recall Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” in book 7 of Republic, 
where the cave is a kind of cinema in which prisoners, chained and able to look only to 
the cave’s back wall, see reflections of the truth as dark shadows from the outside world, 
where the blinding firelight of Truth shines. In Plato’s description, once a prisoner is 
unchained and free from the shadows, he walks out of the cave into the blinding light – 
which is blinding as well as illuminating. Being accustomed to dark shadows, it takes 
time to interpret the light. In both darkness and light, Plato suggests, the senses can be 
tricked. In MacDonald’s reworking of it, traumatic memory is shown to reveal its truths 
both in livid colour and by the light of the dark, by what cannot be seen The narrative 
concedes that the painting, Death and the Young Mother, is not a literal one, “but a 
moment freeze-framed by James’s eye” (144). Not simply an image or a snapshot, this is 
an aesthetic image, a painting that is both blinding and illuminating, blurring fact and 
truth. The aesthetic representation suggests that the scene is always already subject to the 
shaping imagination of the viewer, and that traumatic memory is always already to some 
extent an aesthetic process, which does not make it any less “authentic.” 
The narrator then asks, “What can you do with such a picture? You never want to 
see it again yet you can’t bring yourself to burn it or slash it to dust. You have to keep it” 
(144). The hope chest which lies at the foot of the bed in the attic functions as a memory 
chest throughout the novel, as it does here for James. A voice in his head suggests a 
course of action for the picture: “Put it in the hope chest, James,” put the trauma aside, 
keep it as a picture rather than incorporate it into language and knowledge (144; original 
emphasis). The portrait lies like an heirloom in the chest in space but outside of time: “for 
a second James feels as though that’s what he’s looking at—an old portrait that he hid in 
the hope chest many years ago and just stumbled upon again. This temporary confusion is 
a premonition; it tells him that he will never get over this sight. That it will be as fresh 
fourteen years from now, the colours not quite dry, just as it is today” (144). James’s 
premonition suggests that past and present collapse in the confrontation with the intrusive 
traumatic image. The fresh colours signify a fresh wound even as the portrait lies 
dormant. As Caruth insists, trauma “is always the story of a wound that cries out, that 
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addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available” 
(4). As the narrative makes explicit, James loses access to the “reality or truth” of the 
trauma he has witnessed:  
James goes out of the room, but not far. His legs give way and he 
collapses outside the fallen door, unconscious. He doesn’t hear the first 
cries of the babies inside. The involuntary part of his mind does, though. It 
is just not conveying the message. It is keeping it on a crumpled piece of 
paper on the floor of its cave. It is taking a break, admiring its cave 
painting by the light of the dark. (144). 
The traumatic memory appears to be stowed in James’s unconscious as a repressed rather 
than dissociated memory. James still has access to the crumpled piece of paper, but he is 
“taking a break,” as his unconscious paradoxically admires the painting, which is to say 
his aestheticized traumatic memory, “by the light of the dark,” or by what is revealed by 
what he cannot see.  
The metaphor of the cave painting is extended to what the narrator refers to as the 
“cave mind” or the unconscious. Little Frances, who is five “going on six” (140), 
witnesses the same scene as James, although she does so differently: 
The difference between Frances and James is that, although she sees a 
version of the same horrible picture, Frances is young enough still to be 
under the greater influence of the cave mind. It will never forget. But it 
steals the picture from her voluntary mind—grand theft art—and stows it, 
canvas side to the cave wall. It has decided, “If we are to continue 
functioning, we can’t have this picture lying around.” So Frances sees her 
sister and, unlike her father, will forget almost immediately, but, like her 
father, will not get over it. (146) 
Both James and Frances create their own representation or “version” of the same 
traumatic scene, but in the case of Frances, the traumatic memory is dissociated rather 
than repressed. Unlike James whose memory lies on the cave floor awaiting retrieval, 
Frances’s memory is stolen—“grand theft art”— and hidden from her conscious 
understanding, “canvas side to the cave wall.” References to art are repeatedly 
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emphasized in this passage foregrounding trauma as representation of the event while 
also asserting its capacity to slip away from the subject.  
 This figurative rendering of traumatic memory as a painting hanging in the mind, 
back side to the front so that it cannot be seen, shares the features of inaccessible, 
dissociated memories that can be recovered, as was the case with Sylvia Fraser, at a later 
time in life when the subject is psychologically able to assimilate them. Frances forgets 
“almost immediately,” but her unconscious “cave mind” does not: “By now she has 
already lost her conscious grip on the events of two nights ago, when the babies were 
born. She has shivered them away. The cave mind has entered into a creative 
collaboration with the voluntary mind, and soon the two of them will cocoon memory in 
a spinning wealth of dreams and yarns and finger-paintings. Fact and truth, fact and truth 
. . . ” (150-51; original ellipsis). The weaving of fact and truth recalls Frances’s earlier 
epiphany that “one thing can look like another,” that facts do not represent truth. The 
distinction between fact and truth is much more subtle than the binary one expects with 
traumatic memory, that is, between fact and fiction, what is real versus what is not. 
MacDonald’s nuanced insight into traumatic memory as a tricky portraiture reveals that 
these memories are less about falsity or lies than they are about access to the truth, which 
is woven by “a spinning wealth of dreams and yarns,” as Frances’s traumatic imagination 
collaborates with the facts of the event. 
Similarly, in unearthing her memory of Frances and James in the rocking chair, 
Mercedes, like James, represents the traumatic memory as a repressed, abandoned piece 
of art in her mind: 
She has kept this memory on top of a pile of things at the back of her 
mind. Not buried. Right there where she can see it every time she passes 
the open door. But as long as she keeps it in the back room, she can 
believe that it belongs with the rest of the old junk. As long as she doesn’t 
talk about it, it can remain overlooked by amateurs and experts alike: the 
gilt frame covered with dust, the painting gummed over with neglect—
who would guess what a piece of work lies dormant there. (374) 
Like James’s crumpled piece of paper on the floor of the cave, accessible but not 
accessed, Mercedes’s memory is available to her if she chooses to look at it. This 
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passage—itself a beautiful representation of the workings of the unconscious and 
repressed memory—stages the visual and aesthetic aspects of traumatic memory. 
Mercedes decides to view her long-ignored painting: “It was here in the living-room. The 
painting from the junk pile is called Daddy and Frances in the Rocking-Chair. But there 
never was a rocking-chair, in this room or any other. Just the pale green wingback” (374). 
Fact and truth intersect as Mercedes continues to remember: “She’s sitting on Daddy’s 
lap, sideways, facing me. Rocking. He’s rocking her. But it’s not working, she’s wide 
awake” (375).  The fact is that it is not a rocking chair; the truth is that it is a rocking 
chair.  
 This recursive scene was first narrated in an earlier chapter, a subsection of which 
is entitled “The Rocking Chair” (167). It is the night of Kathleen’s funeral. As Mercedes 
descends the stairs to the rocking-chair scene, she smells kidneys without understanding 
that she is smelling Materia in the oven. The scene of sexual molestation is similarly 
presented yet missed. None of the details of the sexual abuse which are fully narrated on 
pages 375-76 are detailed here. The clues, like the “puppy sounds” James is making, are 
given alternate explanations. The only real hint is when Frances tells Mercedes, “‘It 
doesn’t hurt’” (168). My marginal notes from my first reading of the novel say, “What 
doesn’t hurt?” Suspicious but without sufficient grounds for coming to a conclusion, I 
could only pass over the scene as potential foreshadowing of what was to come. To put it 
another way, I could only read the scene as the characters in the novel read their 
traumatic memories: a cave painting facing the wall, a scrap of paper that is not looked at, 
a dusty old painting in a junk pile—there in front of my eyes as a fact without revealing 
its truth. It takes another two-hundred pages for the truth to be revealed. In its repetitive 
and belated structure, the narrative internalizes the process of traumatic experience. It 
furthermore attempts to represent the dynamics of traumatic experience in its recursive 
structure, in its reticence, and in its suggestion that there is an analogy for traumatic 
memory in the notion of storage and reclamation. 
Like pictures and paintings, music is similarly employed to both provide aesthetic 
distance while at the same time providing a visceral, sensory re-presentation of the 
traumas. MacDonald uses music narratively, as a mediating language of trauma which 
articulates childhood abuse through performance. Trauma as performance is perhaps less 
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radical than it sounds. The traumatic imagination always already re-dramatizes the scene 
of trauma to make it manageable for its victim. Dina Georgis, in a sustained analysis of 
the workings of trauma, specifically through jazz music in the novel, argues that 
“Because music defies discursive representation, it functions as an effective location for 
the unrepresentable character of traumatic history” (215). Music is representation without 
image or as close to leaving image behind as possible. In this sense, music avoids the 
crisis of representation by doing away with representation itself, although music does 
have affective resonances, making it perhaps more visceral in this way. 
In general terms, music shapes the novel and resonates throughout its pages.
54
 
One need only think of its title, a reference to the song, “Oh Holy Night,” itself the ironic 
title of the chapter in which Kathleen and Materia both melodramatically die. In the 
staging of this chapter, one can almost hear the song in the background, as Kathleen, a 
talented singer, is operatically butchered by her mother, who gouges a cross in her belly. 
More than simply thematic, however, music becomes a guiding structural principal for 
the organization of the text. Indeed, as MacDonald (a playwright as well as a novelist) 
attests, “when I was writing this book, I conceived of it as a musical. [. . .] Not just 
because I use music in it but because the whole thing should be and is musical. I wrote it 
in three movements, and there are leitmotifs that recur” (146). The recursive nature of the 
text thus not only mimes the symptoms of traumatic stress; it is also a musical structure, 
based upon repetitions and modulations of the same theme. Moreover, whereas the text 
links visual art with traumatic memory, music becomes explicitly linked to traumas of 
childhood abuse, predominantly in two ways: as an emotional trigger and, perhaps most 
interestingly, as a musical performance of traumatic experiences. 
Beethoven’s “Moonlight Sonata” is repeatedly figured as an emotional and sexual 
trigger for James.
55
 Like the novel itself, the Sonata is structured in three parts. In its first 
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 Trish Salah, for example, analyzes the novel in terms of what she argues is its fugue structure: “If Fall 
on Your Knees is a fugue, it is uncannily so, a double fugue with counter-subject haunting subject”—by 
which she means trauma and desire (246). 
55
 Beethoven dedicated the Moonlight Sonata to his seventeen-year-old student, Countess Giulietta 
Guicciardi, with whom he had been in love. Beethoven was thirty-one when he completed the composition 
in 1801. At the time, such a passion would have not have been considered child abuse; however, their gap 
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instantiation in the novel, the sonata is connected to James’s childhood, his abusive 
father, and the subsequent loss of his mother. Before abandoning James and his mother, 
his father dismantles their beloved piano. The fifteen-year-old James spends the next six 
months putting it back together, but, by then, his mother has died, giving birth to another 
child. The first thing James plays on the reassembled piano is the opening four bars of the 
“Moonlight Sonata.” Before torching the piano, James adjusts the C sharp. The 
“Moonlight Sonata” is written in C sharp minor, although the text does not make this 
explicit. Instead, in scenes that follow, the C sharp is used as a code to signal that James 
will be triggered emotionally and sexually. 
The first instance occurs when James meets Materia, who is “twelve going on 
thirteen” (12). The child, Materia, sneaks up to the piano while James is tuning it and she 
strikes the C sharp: “Had she hit E flat things might never have progressed so far, but she 
hit C sharp” (12). E flat major is the key of Beethoven’s “Eroica” symphony and is 
considered a heroic key. Here, the C sharp connects James to his lost mother, and triggers 
his unheroic sexual attraction to the child, Materia, whom he exoticizes as an evil 
enchantress (13). This scene undergoes a series of modulations as the novel progresses. It 
recurs when, again, James is tuning the piano. This time, Kathleen surprises him and 
“strikes a chord” (60). Thus triggered, and as if re-enacting his own childhood abuse, 
James strikes Kathleen. Immediately remorseful, James “finds the small of her back, 
crushes her to him” (60), following which “A life and a warmth enter his body that he 
hasn’t felt since—that he has rarely felt” (61). The gap of the hyphen is the space of the 
original seduction of Materia. Now James preys upon his own child, “her breath so soft 
and fragrant, milk and honey are beneath your tongue . . .” (61; original emphasis and 
ellipsis). James appears to be shocked by his behaviour and stops himself from further 
abusing Kathleen.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
in ages gestures towards this. The dramatic, haunting melody of the first movement is thematically well 
suited to the passions of James. 
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As the C sharp continues to accrue layers of meaning for James, sound intersects 
with sight as James listens to Mercedes play “Oh My Darlin’ Clementine” on the piano. 
When Mercedes is finished the song, James offers to fix the C sharp, which Mercedes 
concedes is “‘so annoying’” (260).
56
 James then sees the photograph on the piano, 
discussed earlier on, of the laughing Kathleen with Materia in the background. Past and 
present entwine for James in what seems like a traumatic flashback:  
Now is the dim past. Then was the shining present. He hears her laugh. He 
hears the water trickling in the creek and flash goes Materia’s waving 
hand. [. . .] You think you’re safe. Until you see a picture like that. And 
then you know you’ll always be a slave to the present because the present 
is more powerful than the past, no matter how long ago the present 
happened. (260) 
The enmeshing of past and present suggests the immediacy of the traumatic memory, 
which is sparked by both visual and auditory stimuli. As van der Kolk suggests, “the very 
nature of traumatic memory is to be dissociated, and to be stored initially as sensory 
fragments that have no linguistic components” (289). Likewise, James’s traumatic 
memories are stored as visual pictures and auditory sounds that appear to be disconnected 
from language and felt wholly through his senses. 
The scene continues with James now fixed on his picture of the past: “The breath 
assaults James’s lungs and he comes out of the black and white picture back into the 
room of living colour” (260). As James tries to understand which of his daughters is 
responsible for displaying the picture of Kathleen, Frances, in her effort to deflect 
attention from the guilty Mercedes, provokes James with questions about Kathleen, 
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 I checked the sheet music for the song “Oh My Darlin’ Clementine” to ascertain the key in which it was 
written. There is one flat, which means that it is either in F major or D minor. If it were in D minor, the C 
would be raised, and there would be C sharps throughout. Strangely, however, the song appears to be in F 
major, without any C sharps in it. I am not sure what to make of this: it could be a textual error, although 
MacDonald’s strong knowledge of music makes this unlikely. My conjecture is that the song thematically 
connects James to his “darlin,’” Kathleen, which is why the C sharp registers in his mind when he hears the 
song. There is a link through the lyrics as well: “in a cavern in a canyon, excavatin’ for a mine…”; and, of 
course, “you are lost and gone forever…” “dreadful sorry, Clementine”; and also and importantly,  “How I 
missed my Clementine, / till I kissed her little sister.” 
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including this one: “‘Was she a slut?’” (261). Although the text does not reveal James’s 
thoughts, Frances’s question would no doubt trigger memories of the day James found 
Kathleen with her lover, Rose, and his subsequent rape of Kathleen. James’s response is 
to take Frances out to the shed for a beating. This scene of abuse is articulated entirely in 
musical terms, as a sustained performance of traumatic violence: 
In the shed the performance has begun. The upbeat grabs her neck till 
she’s on point, the downbeat thrusts her back against the wall, two eighth-
notes of head on wood, knuckles clatter incidentally. In the half-note rest 
he lights up her pale face with the blue wicks of his eyes, and the lyrics 
kick in con spirito. [. . .] The next two bars are like the first, then we’re 
into the second movement, swing your partner from the wall into the 
workbench, which catches her in the small of the back, grace-note into 
stumble because she bounces, being young. Staccato across the face, then 
she expands her percussive range and becomes a silent tambourine. [. . .] 
We’ve gone all stately; it’s whole notes from here on in. She flies against 
another wall and he follows her trajectory, taking his time now because 
we’re working up to the finale. One more clash of timbers and tissues and 
it’s finally opera, “I’ll cut the tongue right out of your head.” She sticks 
her tongue out at him and tastes blood. Cue finale to the gut. Frances folds 
over till she’s on the floor. Modern dancer. (262-63) 
 As a language of trauma, music is used to mediate the violence without 
diminishing its force through a performance that is almost a therapeutic parody of 
violence while it also contains and frames the incident. In a way, Frances loses her 
humanity in the attack and becomes a “silent tambourine,” a dissociated instrument; 
however, she is not just a silent victim. She becomes an instrument through whom the 
violent “utterances” of her abuser are articulated. By articulating the beating of Frances 
as a performance with an operatic finale, MacDonald accentuates the theatricality of 
traumatic experience as if to suggest that trauma always plays itself out dramatically, here 
backed up by a full symphony of sound. This gestures towards trauma’s excess in that it 
is always, by definition, too much to comprehend and beyond straightforward 
representation; yet the musical performance is a representation. Like the visual 
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apprehensions of trauma expressed through the paintings, Death and the Young Mother 
and Daddy and Frances in the Rocking-Chair, the beating of Frances similarly 
foregrounds itself as a representation or performance of the event rather than the event 
itself, which can only ever be a reconstruction of that which is too horrific to 
comprehend. At the end, Frances collapses not straightforwardly as a terribly abused 
child; she falls into a tableau at the conclusion of the show: a “modern dancer” that stands 
in for Frances’s traumatized body. 
Music and dance become Frances’s creative languages to articulate traumas that 
she cannot otherwise speak aloud. While the narrative withholds its truths about James’s 
incestuous abuse of Frances until near its conclusion, Frances nonetheless cries out, most 
radically in her provocative song and dance performances at Jameel’s speakeasy. 
Frances’s body becomes an uneasy site of ambiguity in the performance of her “Baby 
Burlesque.” In a mockery of what it means to be a good girl, Frances wears her Girl 
Guide uniform to the make-shift bar whereupon she attempts to entertain the men with “a 
solo second-hand foxtrot” and her “spindly kewpie-doll voice” with little success (288). 
She quickly downs three drinks and “cranks the player-piano. The mechanical thumping 
of a hobnail army renders ‘Coming thru’ the Rye’ and Frances wriggles out of her 
uniform and down to her skivvies via the highland fling cum cancan. They start 
watching” (288). The stripping of the Girl Guide uniform troubles notions of childhood 
innocence as Frances acts out sexually beyond her years.
57
 In fact, her rebellious strip-
tease is one of the main clues offered by the text that Frances was sexually abused as a 
child. Readers are not yet privy to the fact that James has been molesting her since the 
night of Kathleen’s funeral. Like a traumatized subject, the reader can only understand 
what Frances is performing belatedly; and like traumatic memory itself, Frances’s song 
and dance routines re-enact her traumatic wounds while obfuscating the full truth of that 
abuse. As Frances begins to prostitute herself to Jameel’s customers for extra money, her 
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 One representative example occurs when Frances decides that she wants to be expelled from school. She 
callously accomplishes this by sexually abusing a boy who wants to become a priest (290-91). That Frances 
is capable of such actions can be understood in terms of her own abuse; however, this is one of many 
scenes that complicates Frances’s status as a victim. As James recognizes, “She’s as beat as she’ll ever be” 
(291). 
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performances at “the speak” become more and more elaborate. The choice of the 
burlesque is an interesting one. The style is flamboyant, exaggerated, theatrical, and 
parodic. Indeed, she seems to parody her own sexual abuse for the amusement of the 
crowd: 
Frances is a bizarre delta diva one night, warbling in her thin soprano, 
“Moonshine Blues” and “Shave ’em Dry.” Declaring, an octave above the 
norm, “‘I can strut my pudding, spread my grease with ease, ’cause I know 
my onions, that’s why I always please.’” The following Saturday will see 
her stripped from the waist up, wearing James’s old horsehair war sporran 
as a wig, singing, “I’m Just Wild about Harry” in pidgin Arabic. She turns 
the freckle on her nose to an exclamation mark with a stroke of eyeliner, 
rouges her cheeks, paints on a cupid’s-bow mouth and dances naked 
behind a home-made fan of seagull feathers, “‘I wish I could shimmy like 
my sister, Kate.’” (292) 
 Frances’s burlesque performance brings to the fore the spectacle of trauma in 
which the victim re-engages to remember and relive the experience indirectly yet 
theatrically. Frances seems to be replaying, night after night, masked versions of her 
traumas in what Caruth calls trauma’s “repetitive seeing” (Unclaimed Experience 92). 
Frances has not yet remembered her childhood traumas, but as Caruth argues, “The 
repetitions of the traumatic event—which remain unavailable to consciousness but 
intrude repeatedly on sight—thus suggest a larger relation to the event that extends 
beyond what can simply be seen or what can be known” (92). Frances’s musical versions 
of her abuse express and expose what she cannot otherwise articulate: “just in case any 
one’s in danger of getting more horny than amused, there’s always a surprise to wilt the 
wicked and stimulate the unsuspecting. For example, she may strip down to a diaper, then 
stick her thumb in her mouth. ‘“Yes my heart belongs to Daddy, so I simply couldn’t be 
ba-ad. . .”’” (293; original ellipsis). Frances here foregrounds the absurdity of child 
sexual abuse. She seems to be saying that she could just as easily be a sexualized baby as 
a sexualized child. She seems to ask if there is any material difference. This example 
shows, however, that there is, because the baby costume prevents titillation whereas the 
child dressed as a Girl Guide seems able to produce it. Candida Rifkind similarly 
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observes that Frances’s burlesque “blurs distinctions between adult and childhood 
sexuality to both titillate and deflate her admirers” (40). Rifkind further argues that the 
body Frances “exposes to the audience is a series of masks that transgress social 
categories and moral boundaries separating genders, nations, adult sexuality and 
childhood innocence, domesticity and public performance” (40). I would add to this that 
Frances’s transgressive performances and costumes also function as traumatic masks that 
operate like the pictures and portraits discussed earlier, that is, as ersatz versions of 
traumatic memories that mediate the real traumatic event.  
 Indeed, traumatic memories are explicitly linked to masks in a scene following 
Frances’s series of childhood traumas, which begins with her inadvertently drowning 
Ambrose in the creek following her witnessing of the dead Kathleen’s ravaged body, and 
culminates in the death of her mother, which also marks the onset of James’s sexual 
molestations of her. Little Frances, who is five “going on six” (140), processes memories 
of this terrible series of events as cloaked representations of what actually happened: 
“‘It’s a good thing Mumma’s gone,’ Frances would say to herself, going over and over in 
her mind all the terrible things she couldn’t quite recall—weaving the threads together 
into an ingenious cloak of motley. ‘Because if Mumma were here, she would know what 
a bad girl I’ve been’” (174; emphasis added). Like many abused children, Frances 
internalizes the traumatic events as the fault of her own, and she does so vis-à-vis strands 
of memory that she shapes into an “ingenious cloak of motley.” Connecting traumatic 
memory to the motley of a court jester or harlequin makes Frances somewhat of a 
“trickster” figure or, perhaps more accurately, the Fool of the novel. Like the wise Fools 
of Shakespeare’s plays, Frances speaks truths that are not known or understood by other 
characters. Leo Taylor observes Frances in her Girl Guide uniform leaving the speak 
wearing her performance make-up and jewellery: “A lot of those men in there, and the 
women too who laugh along, they see her as their clown. The whore part is bad enough, 
but who ever heard of a whore clown?” (350). As whore clown, Frances not only amuses 
and even titillates the crowd; her performance is also both a traumatic return to and a 
scathing parody of her childhood sexual abuse. As a metaphor for the workings of 
traumatic memory, the cloak of motley shields Frances from memories of the night at the 
creek that she will not fully recover until near the novel’s conclusion and with the help of 
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James; however, the cloak of motley has a performative function as it also dramatizes the 
traumas through the whore-clown burlesque performances. Rifkind argues that 
“Frances’s burlesque dancing and prostitution reveal her apprehension of the body as a 
site of a reality that is always an illusion” (40). I want to suggest that by acting as both a 
site (and sight) of reality and illusion at the same time, Frances’s body performs the work 
of traumatic memory for the delectation of her customers. 
The novel sustains its emphasis on the murky truth-status of representations of 
trauma through to its conclusion. The third to last chapter is called “Armistice Day,” 
which is the day James went to New York, found Kathleen with her lover, Rose, and then 
raped her. That Remembrance Day is the day that James rapes Kathleen is significant. 
The event, ironically, has been lost to memory, except perhaps for James, and yet it is the 
trauma that is the source of so many of the traumas that follow: the day becomes a 
memorial day for what cannot be fully remembered. Like traumatic memory, this chapter 
is offered belatedly at the end of the book. This latency is complicated by the fact that 
“Armistice Day” recalls an earlier moment in the text where Lily marches in the 
Armistice Day parade. Music, pageantry, and costume are connected to memory and time 
as the future (child of James and Kathleen, Lily) is presented in the text before the past 
(Kathleen). The effect is to suggest a powerful connection between and intermingling of 
the past, present, and future through permeable traumatic memories. Because the text is 
structured upon a series of traumatic memories that change as they are re-written and re-
presented over time, the reader can never be sure of the reliability of the narrative. In fact, 
in this Remembrance Day chapter, which will ostensibly finally reveal the memory that 
Kathleen was indeed raped by James, truth is thrown into question from the start by its 
epigraph from Ovid’s Metamorphoses: “Of wicked and most cursèd things to speak I now 
commence. / Ye daughters and ye parents, all go, get you far from hence; / Or if ye 
minded be to hear my tale, believe me nought / In this behalf, nor think that such a thing 
was ever wrought” (548). The narrative seems to say, “remember but believe me not.” To 
put it another way, and as the narrator concedes, “Memory is another word for story, and 
nothing is more unreliable” (270).  
Through visual media, music, and performance, Fall on Your Knees offers up a 
series traumatic memories as always and only representations of the original encounter, 
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curtained dramatizations that participate in the creation of what is known without 
revealing full understanding of the event. Caruth posits that in the  
bewildering encounter with trauma [. . .] we can begin to recognize the 
possibility of a history that is no longer straightforwardly referential (that 
is, no longer based on simple models of experience and reference). 
Through the notion of trauma [. . .] we can understand that a rethinking of 
reference is aimed not at eliminating history but at resituating it in our 
understanding, that is, at precisely permitting history to arise where 
immediate understanding may not. (Unclaimed Experience 11; original 
emphasis) 
Fall on Your Knees seems to suggest that what allows history to arise is precisely the 
performative and aesthetic aspects of traumatic memory. 
3.3 “The scent of the cereus with its two edges”: Traumatic 
and Magic Realism in Cereus Blooms at Night 
 Whereas Fall on Your Knees aestheticizes trauma through visual media, music, 
and performance, Cereus Blooms at Night blends realist accounts of trauma with a 
magical realist healing aesthetic as a creative strategy to represent a therapeutic vision of 
transformation for its protagonist, Mala Ramchandin. Magic realist fiction, argues Anne 
C. Hegerfeldt, “insists that the concept of reality cannot be confined to the empirically 
perceivable. Rather, people’s multiple ways of perceiving and constructing their world 
must be acknowledged as real” (3). I argue that Mala constructs what I want to call a 
“therapeutic imaginary” to re-construct her life history of abuse at the hands of her father 
into an imagined space of healing. I suggest that the intersection of real traumatic events 
with what Arva has termed the “traumatic imagination” is necessary in order to capture 
the lived experience of traumatic encounters, which can never exist purely in the realm of 
the real. In the novel, magic realism becomes the language of therapeutic recovery from 
trauma.  
 Not simply a straightforward narration of witness and testimony, then, Mootoo’s 
hybrid form is accomplished through Nurse Tyler’s narration of Mala’s story as he acts as 
creative witness to her imaginative testimony. Arva argues that for Caribbean writers, 
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“landscape, history, and ethnic, social, and political identities could be discovered only 
through writing, and through a language capable of presenting the unpresentable; 
documenting a reality either too beautiful or too terrifying (or mysteriously both) to be 
reflected in a traditional, ‘realistic’ type of narrative” (“Language of Exile” 153). For 
these writers, he postulates a “hybrid writing style perceived as a nexus of magical 
realism, testimonial narrative, and traumatic realism—provisionally called language of 
exile” (154; original emphasis). 
  I want to extend Arva’s theorization of Caribbean writers and his notion of the 
“traumatic imagination” to Cereus Blooms at Night to argue that Mootoo creates a 
narrative of healing precisely through her enmeshment of traumatic testimony (through 
Tyler’s witness) and magic realism. As the narrative shifts back and forth between Mala’s 
past abuses as a child, nicknamed “Pohpoh,” and her present condition at the nursing 
home, The Paradise Alms House, it does so through the novel’s central circulating 
images, all taken from nature: the garden at Hill Side, the cereus, snails, and birds. Acting 
as sensory mediators of memory between past and present, the natural world and 
Mala’s/Pohpoh’s imagination conspire to perform her freedom and heal her traumatic 
wounds. The novel thus shares with Fall on Your Knees an emphasis on the aesthetic and 
performative aspects of trauma. What I hope to add to the existing dialogue about the 
novel is an understanding of the text as a formative example of the central place of 
creativity and the imagination in not just representations of traumatic narratives, but also, 
and importantly, in healing from trauma, which Mootoo seems to suggest is a highly 
creative act. 
Much of the scholarship on Cereus Blooms at Night takes up issues of 
postcolonialism raised by the novel’s enactment of Indian indentured labour in the 
Caribbean and its legacy through the Ramchandin’s, who came to the island as cheap 
labour following the abolition of slavery, and the Thoroughly’s, white missionaries 
connected to a fictionalized version of imperial Britain, “The Shivering Northern 
Wetlands.” Gayatri Gopinath specifically locates the nexus of the novel’s parsing of 
colonial violence in the practice of indentured labour: “Indeed the novel can be read as 
both a response to and repudiation of its various legacies, and it forces a consideration of 
indentureship as central to processes of racial, gender, and sexual subjectification in the 
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Caribbean” (179). Broader approaches to the novel focus on hegemonic regulatory 
systems of colonialism, race, gender, sexuality and class in terms of the extent to which, 
as Proma Tagore puts it, the text “creates new pathways for bringing into being silenced 
or invisibilized subjectivities that revise and disrupt the fixities of these regulatory 
regimes” (50). Still others focus on the novel’s reclamation of a queer space that rejoins 
multiple forms of exiled bodies. By connecting disparate identities and histories, Mootoo, 
according to Vivian M. May, “examines questions of representation, knowledge, and 
power not only to clarify the violence at the heart of practices of knowledge, faith, and 
love but also to claim queer space within the Caribbean and South Asian diasporas” 
(101).
58
 There is thus a scholarly consensus that the novel brings to the fore the 
intersections of multiple forms of colonial, racial, gendered, and sexual violence. The 
link, for example, between the legacy of colonial violence and the years of sexual abuse 
suffered by Mala and her sister, Asha, is frequently a point of discussion by scholars. As 
Coral Ann Howells says, “this novel translates the historical traumas of colonial 
inheritance into domestic terms of dysfunctional families and damaged individual lives” 
(149).  
What has not yet been theorized in the scholarship on the novel is the connection 
between telling the trauma story and Arva’s notion of the “traumatic imagination.”  
Magic realism implicitly questions the binary between what is real and what is not. As 
Herfeldt defines it, magic realism has the dual aim of “exploring the possibilities of 
knowledge while simultaneously showing up its limitations” (7). Traumatic memory 
shares with magic realism the possibility and coincident impossibility of knowledge of 
the event. The profound intersection between the structure of traumatic memory and the 
magic realist mode allows magic realism to function as a primary language in the 
articulation of and healing from traumatic events. As I will show, Mootoo repeatedly 
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 For a related and fascinating discussion of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and sexuality through the 
language of natural history see Kyungwon Hong, Grace. “‘A Shared Queerness’: Colonialism 
Transnationalism, and Sexuality in Shani Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night.” Meridians: Feminism, Race 
Transnationalism 7.1 (2006): 73-103. Web. Humanities International Complete. 4 October 2011. 
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connects Mala’s horrific memories to her imaginative and fantastic visions of 
transformation and freedom.  
 Like the silent pictures that encode the core traumas in the introduction of Fall on 
Your Knees, Mootoo’s Cereus Blooms at Night similarly opens with a veiled 
representation of one of the central traumas of the text: the sexual abuse of Mala 
Ramchandin by her father, Chandin. The narrator, Tyler, arrives in the town of Paradise 
on the island of Lantanacamara to find the townspeople preoccupied by “the scandal on 
Hill Side” and the town itself enveloped by a persistent “menacing cloud” that keeps 
them in darkness (6). What the text obfuscates is that the dark cloud is composed of the 
remains of Mala’s burned down house and its contents, which include Chandin’s long-
dead corpse. The cloud literalizes Mala’s traumatic memories of Chandin’s body as a 
floating shroud over the town while denying the reader full access to its meaning. The 
floating particles that remain of the incestuous house and Chandin’s body leave the town 
and the reader literally and figuratively in the dark. Cereus Blooms at Night thus shares 
an interest with Fall on Your Knees in the extent to which traumatic memories can be 
fully known. Moreover, both novels understand traumatic memory as residing primarily 
in the senses.  
 Whereas the traumas of Fall on Your Knees are mediated visually through 
portraiture and silent movies and aurally through music and performance, the traumas of 
Cereus Blooms at Night are mediated through smell and the natural world. As in Fall on 
Your Knees, language fails in the confrontation with trauma. Mala abandons language 
altogether as she retreats from her father’s house and the patriarchal symbolic order into 
the natural, feminized world of the garden through her senses to create a space of 
transformation and healing. Mala’s therapeutic and imaginative course of freedom 
following her sexual enslavement is rendered both through recovered memories of past 
traumas and magical escapes from them. The “suffocating cloud” (7) which deprives 
Paradise of its sun for three weeks lifts the day Judge Bissey rules that Mala will not be 
tried for the murder of her father: “It is said, incidentally, that on the day of Judge 
Bissey’s ruling, the life-robbing cloud began to break up and shift south over the ocean, 
letting light shine in Paradise once again” (8). The recovery and freedom of Mala is here 
closely linked to light and the life-giving properties of the sun. While from the outset of 
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the novel mystery and darkness surround the events at Hill Side, what becomes clear is 
that Mala’s freedom is connected to the dissipation of the remnants of her father, and is 
encompassed by her final imaginative vision of herself as the child, Pohpoh, flying 
through a clear blue sky. The cloud and its lifting gesture backwards and forwards 
through time, as the narrative structure of the text will, and functions as the first of a 
series of metaphors taken from nature to inscribe both the effects of past traumas and a 
form of magical, therapeutic recovery from them. 
 The narrative is framed by the search for Mala’s missing sister, Asha, and with 
Tyler firmly establishing that his discourse is testimonial: “By setting this story down, I, 
Tyler [. . .] am placing trust in the power of the printed word to reach many people. It is 
my ardent hope that Asha Ramchandin [. . .] will chance upon this book” (3; original 
emphasis). The promise of this search, however, is never fulfilled. The novel similarly 
ends with the search for missing women now extended to Sarah and Lavinia. Neither 
Asha, Sarah, nor Lavinia are ever found. Not just open-ended, the novel also signals 
through its narrator, Tyler, that its status as testimony may be insecure. Tyler follows his 
plea for Asha to respond by qualifying his role as narrator: “Might I add that my own 
intention, as the relater of this story, is not to bring notice to myself or my own plight. 
However, I cannot escape myself, and being a narrator who also existed on the periphery 
of the events, I am bound to be present” (3). Despite the fact that Tyler will struggle to 
keep his own subjectivity out of his recounting of Mala’s story throughout the narrative, 
he nonetheless begins in documentary style.  
 Following the description of the “menacing cloud” (6) over Paradise that keeps it 
in darkness, Tyler relates details of the court proceedings regarding Mala’s case: “Mala 
Ramchandin was never tried in court. Judge Walter Bissey had dismissed the case in 
minutes. Several times he asked the prosecution, ‘I’m sorry. I can’t seem to follow your 
logic. Tell me again, what is the evidence? What is the charge?’” (7). The emphasis on 
testimony and the legal process, including naming the judge, makes the narrative seem 
documentary, yet with no evidence and no apparent charge, what remains mysterious is 
also foregrounded. The “mystery of an unsolved death” for which a Constable saw the 
evidence is noted without revealing that it is Mala’s father whose body has been 
discovered (8). Within the context of the cloud of darkness, the murkiness surrounding 
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the crime, and the claim that Mala is “a crazy lady” (8), Tyler nonetheless starts making 
truth-claims: “I am the only one who ended up knowing the truth, the whole truth, every 
significant and insignificant bit of it. And I am the one who is putting it all to good use by 
recording it here in the hope that any existing relatives of Mala Ramchandin [. . .] might 
come forward and pay the old lady a visit” (7). However, Tyler’s claim that he is the only 
reliable witness to Mala’s story, and that he has furthermore uncovered “the whole truth” 
about Mala’s traumatic past, is both asserted and denied by the text as it hovers on the 
border between the real and the imagined. 
 The fuzzy, disorienting mood created in the novel’s opening is mirrored by 
Mala’s psychological condition when Tyler first meets her at the home in which she is 
placed by Judge Bissey. In what seems to approach a parody of the scene of 
psychoanalysis, Nurse Tyler gathers the newly-admitted Mala’s testimony by literally 
spoon-feeding her until she begins to “talk.” Her animal sounds eventually become 
speech that Tyler can understand: “I began to recognize in her mutterings elements of the 
legendary rumours [. . .] and I started to jot down everything she said, no matter how 
erratic her train of thought appeared to be. [. . .] I soon got the impression that she 
actually began to whisper in my direction, that I had become her witness” (107). Mala’s 
“testimony” is stream-of-consciousness and, like trauma, repetitive: she speaks “with 
great urgency,” “repeating herself sometimes for hours,” and “without punctuation marks 
or subject breaks” (107). Tyler begins to perceive a purpose to her ramblings and to his 
own “listening, and to sifting, cutting and sewing the lot” (107). As the weaver of what 
becomes a magical realist narrative, Tyler is a co-conspirator with Mala in a hybrid 
narrative construction that reflects Mala’s traumatic experiences.  
 There are, however, moments in the text when Tyler’s reliability as a 
narrator/witness is thrown into question. Part of the story that Tyler recounts is the 
childhood experiences of Mala’s father, Chandin. The details he provides about Chandin 
are not gleaned from Mala’s mutterings but from his own childhood memory of a 
conversation he had with his “Smoking Nana.” Smoking Nana’s dialogue with the young 
Tyler slides from her voice—“‘I’ll tell you more. You see, the Reverend set up a 
seminary right here in Lantanacamara, right there in Paradise, and it’s there he went . . . 
’”—directly into what seems to be a third-person, omniscient narration (31; original 
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ellipsis). The quotations marking her dialogue and her colloquial style of speech 
disappear, as the narrator recounts details of Chandin’s childhood life at home with the 
Thoroughlys, his inner thoughts, and what seem to be verbatim conversations between 
Chandin and Reverend Thoroughly that Tyler’s Smoking Nana could not possibly know 
(31-50). Indeed, many parts of this extended section that Tyler ostensibly reports from his 
conversation with Smoking Nana read like indirect interior monologue, raising questions 
about who is narrating, or as Howells asks, “Whose voice tells these histories?” (150). 
Howells similarly observes that “Tyler could not possibly have known” the dialogues he 
reports between other characters (151): “Though he assumes the story-teller’s authority to 
offer his narrative in the hope that Asha will answer, there are so many voices haunting 
the present that Tyler seems to be caught in a space between traumatic narratives of the 
past and more optimistic as yet unrealized narratives for the future” (151). The space that 
Howells postulates is arguably, and perhaps more accurately, the intersection of traumatic 
testimony and magic realism, the discursive modes in which Tyler narrates Mala’s past 
traumas. 
 Through its claims to truth and its corresponding undercutting of objectivity, the 
text thus invites readers to question the reliability of Tyler as a narrator. I want to suggest, 
however, that Tyler’s reliability may not depend, as it traditionally does, on his ability to 
be impartial or to distance himself from the narrative enough to provide an objective 
account. In fact, it may be precisely his closeness to Mala that allows him to relay the 
truth of her story in the only way that can make sense of it, that is, through recourse to the 
imagination and the fantastic. Interestingly, it is through Smoking Nana, not Mala, that 
Tyler first hears of Chandin’s incestuous relationship with Mala (50). Hearsay and gossip 
are part of Tyler’s witness. The story was a formative one for Tyler, who says, “I was 
preoccupied with trying to understand what was natural and what perverse, and who said 
so and why. Chandin Ramchandin played a part in confusing me about these roles, for it 
was a long time before I could differentiate between his perversion and what others called 
mine” (51). Tyler comes to understand that his sense of alterity is shared with Mala, not 
Chandin, and that this informs his capacity to narrate her story: “I fancy the affiliation 
blossoming between Miss Ramchandin and me to be a clue to these musings” (51). Tyler 
offers two justifications for his reliability as a narrator: “I wonder what Nana would think 
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if she knew the positions I was in that enabled me to gain the full story. For there were 
two: one, a shared queerness with Miss Ramchandin, which gave rise to the other, my 
proximity to the very Ramchandin Nana herself had known of” (52). Tyler’s “shared 
queerness” and his closeness to Mala, rather than impartiality and distance, are what 
make his narration possible. This suggests that the traumatic events of Mala’s childhood 
require a different kind of witness and a more flexible narration to recount them. 
 The narrative is structured in five parts, although the first two parts take up 
approximately seventy-five percent of the narrative as a whole. I will focus primarily on 
these first two parts, which shift back and forth between Mala’s current and recent 
present, and her childhood past. The third part is devoted to Mala’s romantic relationship 
with Ambrose (Boyie), the tragic scene of rape and abuse when Chandin discovers the 
lovers, and culminates in the murder of Chandin by Mala. Parts IV and V are very short 
sections which add final details to the plot and bring the reader back to the beginning 
with Tyler pleading for Asha, Sarah, and Lavinia to make contact should they read this 
account. Parts III and IV are told as if through a third-person narrator, seemingly without 
the influence of Mala’s remembering consciousness or Tyler’s self-conscious 
interjections. Part III in particular seems to suggest that the shift in narrative voice is 
linked to Mala’s present-day preoccupation with imaginatively reworking her childhood 
to facilitate her therapeutic recovery. Tyler’s narrative voice seems to shift to third-
person omniscient when he needs to provide information outside of Mala’s 
consciousness, which is entirely focussed on healing. Mala’s therapeutic impulse is not 
clear, however, until further on in the narrative when the reader is able to decipher what 
first appear to be visions of a madwoman.  
 Unlike the first two larger sections which shift between traumatic testimony and 
magic realism, Part III is written in the mode of realism with no traces of magic or the 
therapeutic. Indeed, it is in this section that Mala is uncomfortable with Ambrose calling 
her by her childhood nickname, because “Pohpoh was what her father had lovingly called 
her since she was a baby” (217). Despising the way that Chandin “whispered, ‘Pohpoh, 
my little Pohpoh’” as he abused her, Mala, as a young adult falling in love with Ambrose, 
wants to shed the humiliating past that could threaten her new relationship (217). She 
thus abandons her psychologically dissociated inner child, Pohpoh, in what becomes a 
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thwarted attempt to move on with her life. The narrative is not linear, with Part III 
detailing events that occurred prior to Part II; however, what eventually becomes 
apparent is that following the events in Part III, Mala slips into an altered existence and 
consciousness where she reclaims and rescues her discarded, sexually abused child self, 
Pohpoh, through the imaginative remembering and rewriting her experiences with nature 
as her guide. The narrative performs the blending of identities and mirrors the work of 
psychoanalysis itself, which is compulsively repetitive at first, obsessing always 
backwardly about past details, but also projecting this backward movement into a future 
that at once produces new material to work on (which is always to delay dealing with the 
“real” experience of trauma), but in this new material indicates the possibility of creative 
remembering and thus reparation. The narrative structure thus reflects the documentary 
and imaginative strands that make up Mala’s recuperation of her traumatic past. 
From the outset of the novel, Mala appears as a quirky, mentally unstable older 
woman who seems to occupy a parallel world in nature, a separate sphere that Tyler will 
need to understand and translate. It takes until the end of Part II to fully understand that 
what appears to be madness is actually a practical response to trauma and an effort to heal 
from it. Tyler quickly detects in Mala what he thinks are “symptoms of trauma” (14). He 
also deduces that she is a vegetarian. Indeed, Mala is closely connected to nature from the 
start. She has a “curiously natural smell,” “resembling rich vegetable compost” (12). A 
source of nutrient-providing organic decay, compost becomes one of the central 
metaphors of the text, part of Mala’s garden in which life and decay thrive in equal 
proportion. The “rare night-blooming cereus,” similarly introduced early on, is a gift to 
Mala from two visitors, whom the reader later understands are Ambrose and Otoh (23). 
Like compost, the cereus becomes a symbol of transformation, a “succulent whose leaves 
and trunk were ragged and unsightly until they bloomed” (58). Aside from “crying, 
moaning, wailing, and sighing,” Mala does not speak, but she does appear to 
communicate with the animals in perfect imitations of birds, crickets, and frogs (25). 
Tyler hears Mala utter her first words since her arrival at the Alms House when she 
meows to a cat. The cat runs into her hands and, clutching it to her chest, she says, 
“‘Pohpoh. Pohpoh’” (50). Tyler becomes concerned when he realizes that “when she had 
pressed her cheek against the cat’s body and called the name Pohpoh, it was not a cat that 
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she was calling” (50). What looks like madness is rather an enactment of protection and 
healing. The narrative has not yet revealed (as it is not yet apparent to Tyler) that Pohpoh 
is Mala’s childhood nickname. The reader is suspended, as Mala seems to be, in a space 
where the real and imagined are entwined. In fact, it is in this creative space that Mala is 
performing therapy upon herself, imaginatively cradling the child, Pohpoh, who was so 
radically unloved in the past. 
As the narrative slips back into Mala’s childhood, the centrality of the natural 
world to her present and past ways of understanding and coping with her traumas is 
repeatedly emphasized, beginning with the original garden at Hill Side. The garden is 
created by Mala’s mother, Sarah, with help from her Aunt Lavinia, who “loved the 
freedom and wildness in Sarah’s garden, so unlike her mother’s well-ordered, colour-
coordinated beds” (57). The contrast between the gardens highlights that Sarah’s is an 
anti-colonial space of freedom that includes sexual freedom for the two women. Lavinia 
brings clippings and plants from her mother’s English garden to Sarah’s paradisal one, 
and for Pohpoh and Asha, she brings each a cereus plant, telling them that they will 
bloom once a year, at night. When Pohpoh wants the shell of a snail attached to the plant, 
Lavinia encourages her to wait for the shell until the snail dies naturally. She tells Pohpoh 
a “secret”: “‘Protect a living snail and when it dies, it doesn’t forget. Snails, like most 
things in nature, have long memories’” (58). The soul of the snail, says Lavinia, will 
return to its home, bigger and stronger than before. The snail will offer Pohpoh 
protection, providing that she protects it first. She encourages Pohpoh to display the snail 
shells in the garden so that their souls might easily find their homes, telling her that if she 
does, “‘you, my sweet Pohpoh, and your Mama and Asha, and everyone whom you love 
will be ensured the fullest protection of the benevolent forces in the universe’” (58). Both 
the transformational cereus and the protecting snail shells are formative in shaping 
Mala’s anthropomorphic view of the natural world in which she will ultimately find 
refuge. 
While the garden is established as a magical place of freedom and safety for the 
women and girls, the house becomes its opposite: a patriarchal and violent site of 
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vulnerability and abuse.
59
 Chandin begins to sexually abuse both Pohpoh and Asha 
almost immediately following the botched attempt by Lavinia and Sarah to flee with the 
girls. Without Sarah and Lavinia to protect them, Pohpoh and Asha become Chandin’s 
nightly victims.
60
 The narrative’s pairing of the protective garden with the unsafe house 
marks the domestic space as an uncanny one where home is unhomely in both Freud’s 
sense and Homi Bhabha’s.
61
 While in a “fitful” sleep, Chandin “mistakes” Pohpoh for 
Sarah and begins to touch her. He wakes up fully, however, and “Glaring and breathing 
heavily like a mad dog, he pinned her hands to the bed and forced her legs apart” (70). 
The shift from traumatic to magic realism follows as Pohpoh’s traumatic imagination 
makes a therapeutic intervention: “Soft-edged shadows danced on the wall: a dog with 
drooping ears but no sound to accompany its opening and closing mouth, a rabbit with 
long ears, a butterfly gracefully beating the wall with its wings as it ascended and then 
transformed into a giraffe’s head on a long neck” (71). As Asha and Pohpoh huddle 
together in bed waiting for a drunk Chandin to call out for one of them to service him 
sexually, Pohpoh, “with arms that were magical and elegant” makes “creatures dance and 
transform gracefully” to comfort Asha and herself (71). When Chandin calls out for 
Asha, Pohpoh takes the abuse for her, “As if it were nothing at all” (72). Pohpoh is a 
                                                 
59
 I respectfully disagree with Sarah Phillips Casteel who views the garden as an unhealthy space of abuse: 
“Instead of bringing about renewal, in Mootoo the garden is the site of father-daughter incest and 
obstruction of a healthy sexual relationship between Mala and Ambrose” (21). It is the house, not the 
garden, where the abuse occurs, and it is in the garden that Mala will find refuge following the death of her 
father. 
60
 Although outside of my focus here, Gopinath persuasively argues that through Chandin’s family and 
personal history, the novel seeks to connect the traumas of incest to those of indentureship. She understands 
incest to represent “the implosion of the heterosexual nuclear family as legislated under the colonial regime 
of indentureship. It also echoes earlier histories of gendered violence on which the heterosexual family unit 
under colonialism is predicated. This ‘other’ home space, then, shadows the sanitized missionary home and 
lays bare all that colonialism both produces and seeks to disavow” (183). 
61
 As Howells suggests, “Mala is left alone with her father in a house that could only be described as 
‘unhomely,’ as Ramchandin recreates in his distorted domestic relations a Caribbean history of 
enslavement and where the psychological legacy of colonialism is refigured as sexual violence in the 
family” (154). 
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figure of protection and transformation for Asha, but without the ability to protect herself, 
she becomes trapped in her father’s house as his sexual and domestic slave.  
Thus, whereas scenes of trauma are filtered through the mediating forces of visual 
memories in Fall on Your Knees, in Cereus Blooms at Night they are represented directly 
in the mode of realism; healing, however, is mediated through the imagination in the 
mode of magic realism. The other mediating force in the novel is Tyler, who mediates the 
entire narrative, with Mala as a silent witness. This suggests that representation of trauma 
is always a mediated one. In Cereus, the mediated testimonial realism of the scenes of 
sexual violence are later remediated through nature and the senses, often in the mode of 
magic realism as the adult Mala retreats into her garden and her memories.  
 Mala’s childhood understanding of nature as protective through her mother’s 
garden and Lavinia’s story of the snails is narrated alongside stories of her finding 
affinities with traumatized animals. The interconnections between the human and natural 
world that Pohpoh perceives as a child make her adult retreat into the garden appear to be 
a natural regression and a logical response to the traumas she has suffered. The narrative, 
however, unsettles this straightforward connection through its lack of linearity and 
suspension of clarity as the reader is left to decode Mala’s life through the shifting 
narrative. As Mala, seemingly crazy, wanders the grounds of the Alms House lost in a 
world of her own, Tyler presents details of Pohpoh’s childhood without making it entirely 
clear that Mala and Pohpoh are the same person. Nature is what ultimately yields the 
connection between the adult Mala and the child, Pohpoh.  
 The gardener at the Alms House, Hector, suggests to Tyler that gardening might 
be good for Mala. He offers up a clipping for her, but Tyler has come to understand that 
Mala “does not like things in nature to be hurt” (74). As a child, she learns from Boyie 
that “plants respond to gentleness” and “could show signs of trauma” (97). Pohpoh 
understands that animals, too, can be traumatized. In a restaging of her own abuse and 
isolation, Pohpoh separates an ant from a line of marching ants by encircling it with 
chalk. The other ants momentarily stop but then form a new path by going around the line 
of chalk together: “The ant in the circle stood completely still. Pohpoh and Asha watched 
in silence” (95). The inaction and silence of Pohpoh and Asha mirror the behaviour of the 
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townspeople, who seem to acknowledge but do nothing to stop Chandin’s abuse of the 
girls who are as enclosed and frozen as the ant.  
 A similar scene is enacted when boys at school are experimenting with the idea 
that nature can be traumatized by torturing a praying mantis with a candle flame: “The 
instant the flame touched a back leg, the mantis’ movements stopped abruptly. It became 
as rigid as if it had disappeared. Pohpoh bit her lower lip. She stood perfectly still” (98). 
In the frozen moment of entrapment and terror, the ant, the mantis, and Pohpoh share the 
same traumatic response. Following this, Pohpoh insists that Boyie help her collect all of 
the snails from the playground to put them out of reach of the bullying boys. This act of 
protection is counterpointed by the fact that the vulnerable Pohpoh must return home to 
her father’s house. Pohpoh turns to nature and her imagination to comfort herself as she 
rushes home:  
Sometimes Pohpoh imagined that if she could gather up enough speed, she 
would be able to take off, flying above all the walls and gardens, above the 
topmost branches of the tallest trees around and even farther—a frigate 
bird soaring with other frigates until her town below was swallowed up, 
consumed in an unidentifiable fleck of island adrift like a speck of dust in 
a vast turquoise seascape. (103-104) 
Mala’s abiding image of escape and freedom, “The Bird” (117) also becomes the 
derogatory name Ambrose’s wife, Elsie, calls her because she thinks “She is as mad as a 
brainless bird. Crazy” (115). Through the image of the bird, however, the reader can now 
begin to understand the significance of the adult Mala’s earlier words at the Alms House: 
“A bird flew overhead. She laughed and waved. ‘Poh poh pohpoh,’ she called softly’” 
(80). Far from being crazy, Mala is in fact healing by imagining herself as the child, 
Pohpoh, flying above the daily abuse she suffered. 
 The straightforwardness with which Mala’s abuse is documented makes it easy to 
understand that when she retreats entirely into her garden that she is suffering symptoms 
of severe trauma; however, the connection between what seems like magical thinking and 
the therapeutic impulse of Mala’s isolation takes more time as Tyler continues to weave 
Mala’s story into narrative form. As Tyler shifts from Mala’s childhood to her experience 
living what looks to be the life of a mentally ill recluse, he reminds the reader that his 
132 
 
function as witness to Mala’s testimony is to fill in the gaps of her memories, much like a 
survivor with traumatic amnesia would. Not just a witness to Mala, Tyler is also a 
reporter who relies on the testimony of others, such as Otoh and Ambrose: “From both 
him and his father I was able to fill in gaps and make sense of things she mumbled” 
(110). Tyler sees through Mala’s unusual behaviour and propensity to imitate animals 
rather than speak: “To everyone else, Miss Ramchandin appeared to have a limited 
vocabulary or at least to have become too simple-minded to do more than imitate. 
However, I knew for a fact she was able to speak and had volumes of tales and thoughts 
in her head” (106). As if “fashioning a single garment out of myriad parts . . .” Tyler 
makes sense of the traumatic fragments of Mala’s life through the weave of his narrative, 
“fashioning” into prose both Mala’s incomprehensible speech and equally unfathomable 
life in her wild and mouldering garden (113; original emphasis and ellipsis).  
Indeed, because of the appearance of Mala’s garden, she becomes the subject of 
gossip and cautionary tales told by parents to scare their children into obedience (122). 
What seems to be neglect and madness in the “impenetrable sea of brambles and stinging 
nettles that barred a view of her house,” is rather Mala’s radical reconstruction of her 
world as a therapeutic response to her past traumas. Accordingly, her yard is “overrun 
with periwinkle snails, glossy mucous trails crisscrossing the milky brown clay” (123). 
She has snail shells pressed in neat lines “three rows deep” as a protective barricade to 
her property (122). There is even a snail cemetery where they go to die (123). Calling it a 
“sheltered feminine space,” the garden, according to Howells, is “constructed as a space 
of imagination where the natural world offers a radical alternative to the dark enclosed 
house of patriarchal tyranny and incestuous abuse” (155). Mala’s garden is in many ways 
an argument for safety and freedom. Part of the rhetoric of her garden is a non-
interventionary approach to nature: “She did not intervene in nature’s business” (137). 
Moreover, the garden encroaches upon the house, slowly transforming it to make it part 
of the natural world: “a grapefruit tree and several pepper plants had sprouted in the dirt 
and rust of the roof” (124). The roots of Mala’s many cereus plants also become part of 
the house as they “like desperate grasping fingers, had bored through the damp wood of 
the back wall of the house. It was no longer the wall that supported the succulent but 
rather the other way around” (124). The narrative reveals further on that this wall is one 
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of the walls enclosing Chandin’s rotting corpse. As nature thus both intrudes upon and 
supports the house, it also offers protection (as the snails do) to Mala from Chandin’s 
body.  
 Mala’s many years of sexual abuse and domestic confinement have made her 
practiced in using the natural world not only as protection, but also as an alternative 
epistemological framework for understanding herself. Mala’s capacity to alter her 
consciousness is in line with what Herman, through her research and clinical 
observations, has perceived in survivors of childhood sexual abuse, that is, remarkably 
flexible imaginative capacities as they attempt to cope with their traumas: “The 
pathological environment of childhood abuse forces the development of extraordinary 
capacities, both creative and destructive. It fosters the development of abnormal states of 
consciousness in which the ordinary relations of body and mind, reality and imagination, 
knowledge and memory, no longer hold” (96). Mala does indeed develop “extraordinary 
capacities” and alters her state of consciousness to become like an animal, in the first 
instance by liberating herself from language. Her process is described as almost a 
traumatic break where images fill in the gaps of abandoned language: 
In the phase just before Mala stopped using words, lexically shaped 
thoughts would sprawl across her mind, fractured here and there. The 
cracks would be filled with images. Soon the inverse happened. A 
sentence would be constructed primarily of images punctuated by only one 
or two verbalizations: a noun tentatively uttered in recognition, a 
descriptive word confirming a feeling or observation. (136) 
 Ridding herself of words, Mala becomes an embodied creature of the senses, in 
touch with her surroundings and herself in ways that her previous need to detach from her 
abuse made impossible. The flapping wings of a gull “titillated her soul and awakened 
her toes and knobby knees, the palms of her withered hands, deep inside her womb, her 
vagina, lungs, stomach and heart. Every muscle of her body swelled, tingled, cringed or 
went numb in response to her surroundings—every fibre was sensitized in a way that 
words were unable to match or enhance” (136). May observes that in condemning “the 
violent, eroticized domination of both incest and colonialism as twinned sites of 
penetration and conquest,” Mootoo, through Mala’s garden, “crafts a vision of a deeply 
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embodied, non-hierarchical relation between plant, animal, land, and human” (106). Mala 
abandons the symbolic order of language in a radical renunciation of her identity to find, 
as Howells puts it, “release from traumatic memory through her communion with nature” 
(156). 
 Intimately connected, then, to Mala’s past traumas is her disavowal of all things 
human, which extends to her domestic activities, personal habits, hygiene, and the house 
itself. Her repudiation of all the trappings of domesticity seems to afford her a new sense 
of power. She sleeps when she is tired, regardless of whether it is day or night. She eats 
when she is hungry, and “voided when and where the impulse knocked. She 
manoeuvered her half-acre world intuitively, withdrawing, smiling, laughing, fighting, 
crying, sulking” (137). Similarly left to its own devices, Mala’s unkempt house becomes 
an anti-domestic space of refuge and refuse. She builds a partition “several feet thick,” a 
“network of armchairs, rockers, side tables, dining table and high-back chairs,” which 
functions as a blockade between the kitchen and the rest of the house, at the centre of 
which is Chandin’s long-dead corpse (138).
62
 Mala’s interior design emphasizes psychic 
safety and her commitment to a philosophy of non-interference: “The whole thing 
smelled of time and dirt” (138).  
 Even decay and death become emblematic of Mala’s healing and transformation.  
As the narration dips deeper into the recesses of Mala’s house, what could be seen as a 
gothic nightmare is overlaid with connotations of healing and metamorphosis as trauma 
and magic realism continue to intersect in a joint rehearsal of and departure from her 
traumas. Mala collects from her garden the corpses of many varieties of dead insects in a 
bucket which she brings through the protective barricade and into the room where, 
although not yet revealed to the reader, the corpse of Chandin lays: “She paid no attention 
to the odour rising out of the bucket. The scent of decay was not offensive to her. It was 
                                                 
62
 The pile of furniture helps to clarify Mala’s intention in the nursing home earlier on in the narrative 
when she replicates the barricade of furniture in her room. As Gopinath observes, “Signaling her refusal of 
the institutional strictures of the nursing home, Mala builds and rebuilds a wall in her room with its sparse 
furniture. What looks like the mind-numbing behavior of senility is of course a continuation of her life’s 
work: the invention of new architectures of being and the erection of a counterdomestic space in the very 
heart of the home and nation” (186). 
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the aroma of life refusing to end. It was the aroma of transformation” (138; emphasis 
added). The smell of dead insects is also the smell of Chandin’s decaying body, through 
which Mala’s senses transform the smell of death into life. This insight, however, is only 
possible on a second reading of the text, when one knows what lies buried at the heart of 
the house. Alongside the corpse is a wall of dead insects pinned down by Mala to feed the 
living. As she negotiates the wall with her new store of carcasses, insects that have fallen 
off crunch beneath her feet: “They were fodder for a vibrating carpet of moths, 
centipedes, millipedes, cockroaches and unnamed insects that found refuge in Mala’s 
surroundings. Death feeding life” (139). Mala leaves the room, enjoying “the smell of 
rotting, water-logged wood” as her house has decayed to the point where rain falls in over 
the stairs. Like a green bin, Mala’s house has become a compost heap of transformational 
decay with Chandin’s mouldering corpse feeding Mala’s psychological rebirth. 
 Despite Mala’s attempt to reframe her traumatic story by revising her personal 
space, the house preserves its past which surfaces as intrusive traumatic memories for 
Mala. In the scene which follows Mala’s descent into the basement to Chandin’s remains 
with her bucket of corpses, nature and architecture conspire to create a “perfect imitation 
of another moment, long ago, just after a heavy rainfall” (141). The combination of rain 
and sun catching on the iron roof produces a “beam of silver light” (141) exactly as it did 
the day that Mala’s mother, Sarah, and her Aunt Lavinia run away leaving the girls with 
Chandin. On that day, Pohpoh turns away from her fleeing mother and sees that “the sun 
had caught on the jagged edge of the porch’s iron roof and the spot dazzled like a 
blinding star” (68). Pohpoh then hears only the sound of yelling, Asha calling for her, and 
the buggy as it leaves with Sarah and Lavinia. Pohpoh registers the trauma entirely 
through her senses, as she will as an adult when the traumatic memories return when she 
is triggered by rainfall and light. 
 As the adult Mala repeatedly sees the same silver beam of light at around the 
same time in the morning, “Time would collapse. Every inhaled breath was a panicked 
tremble sustained and each exhale a heavy sob” (142). Breathless with a pounding heart, 
Mala seems to have panic attacks in the moment the traumatic memory returns. She uses 
her home-made, fiery hot pepper sauce as an antidote to her memory. As she screams 
aloud “‘Doh leave me,’” she pours the sauce into her mouth without swallowing, 
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“keeping the fire on her tongue, by then so blistered that parts of the top layer had already 
disintegrated and other areas had curled back like rose petals dipped in acid” (143). This 
extended scene of self-torture culminates in Mala’s collapse and marks her wounded 
mouth as a principal site of trauma. She seems to be dramatically re-enacting her 
childhood abuse in a performance of pain and suffocation as she gasps for breath through 
her burning mouth and nostrils. Indeed, the whole section, beginning with Mala’s decent 
into the basement housing Chandin and culminating in this scene of horror can be read as 
a dramatization of her sexual abuse and her survival: “Her flesh had come undone. But 
every tingling blister and eruption in her mouth and lips was a welcome sign that she had 
survived. She was alive” (144). Mala, like Frances in Fall on Your Knees, performs her 
past traumas as intrusive memories return, while emphasizing her status as a survivor. 
 The graphic realism of the hot pepper sauce scene is immediately followed by a 
more magical scene of cereus blooming at night as the narrative entwines elements of 
realism and magic to depict Mala’s story of trauma and healing. The shifting emphasis 
between what is real and what is not real, on the one hand, keeps truth at bay, while on 
the other, marks the liminal space between the two as the territory of real trauma and its 
imaginative place of articulation. Thus, “one of the brightest moonlit nights Mala had 
ever witnessed” (144) coincides with the long-awaited blooming of her cereus plants, 
whose blossoms perfume the entire neighbourhood and intoxicate the townspeople who 
stroll on a lover’s walk to El Dorado park (146). Mala watches as sixty-two cereus buds 
open, “trembling as they unfolded against the wall, a choreography of petal and sepal 
opening together, sending dizzying scent high and wide into the air. The moonlight 
reflected off the blossoms’ pure whiteness and cast a glow over the yard. Mala basked” 
(144). The moon and the white blossoms both connote a pure, feminine transformational 
power at work in Mala’s garden, while the scent of the cereus exceeds its limits, 
becoming a potent symbol of sexuality. The scent of the cereus inspires lovers, as couples 
are “compelled to stop in front of Mala’s house to caress and steal probing kisses,” and 
attracts thousands of moths and “crazed bats” which arrive to “suckle the blossoms” 
(148).  
 A powerful symbol of transformation, the cereus and its scent represent Mala’s 
attempt to reframe her father and his house into something feminine and beautiful. At the 
137 
 
same time, however, the voracious moths are attacking the cereus blossoms violently 
enough to bruise them. Mala’s past sexual abuse is further connoted by the descent of the 
moths upon the wall of cereus as they “[brush] their hairy bodies against the blossoms” 
(148). In the early hours of the morning, “every moth was thirstily lapping sweet nectar, 
bruising and yellowing its body against the large stamens that waved from the flowers” 
(148). The sexual imagery is as heavy as the smell of the blossoms that “drenched the air 
and flowed across town” (149). The scene ends in what seems to be a throw-away line: 
“The scent was indeed more pleasant than the stink that usually rose from behind the 
wall” (149). The narrative continues to conceal that the wall of cereus also walls 
Chandin’s reeking body. Significantly, some of the moths emerge from the walls of 
Mala’s house, which suggests they are coming from Chandin’s body. Further on in the 
narrative, when Chandin’s body is actually revealed, it is covered with moths: 
“Thousands of tiny white moths had so tightly packed themselves side by side that the 
tiny hooks on the edges of their wings had locked together, linking them to form a heavy 
sheet that was slowly devouring the corpse underneath” (198). Chandin’s past as a 
devouring father is reworked as the moths now devour him in a repetition of the earlier 
encounter with his corpse where death feeds life.  
 The cereus is also closely connected to what I have been calling Mala’s 
“therapeutic imaginary” through which her memories and imagination creatively join to 
heal the wounds of her past by rewriting her story to include the rescue of Pohpoh. As 
Mala continues to sit in her garden following the magical night of blossoms, she slips into 
her imagination and past to Pohpoh as an abused child and her dream of rescuing her: 
“Long into the morning Mala remained in the yard. The sun had warmed her arms and 
legs, chilled through the night. Every so often a breeze nudged her rocking chair. She 
kept her eyes closed. Fortified by the night’s display she wove memories. She 
remembered a little and imagined a great deal . . .” (152; original ellipsis). The narrative 
acknowledges the untrustworthiness of Mala’s memories by directly connecting memory 
to the imagination, while at the same time asserting the primacy of this type of 
remembering through Mala’s garden, which becomes a safe space of creative 
commemoration. The blooming cereus plants with their heavy smell spark the succession 
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of memories which follow and help to make a clear connection between memory and the 
senses, particularly smell.  
 The memories that Mala begins to have are traumatic ones of a shivering Pohpoh 
longing for her mother, and trying to stay psychologically strong so that she might protect 
her sister, Asha: “It had become Pohpoh’s mission from the first day her father put his 
mouth on her little body to prevent Asha from experiencing the pain of his touch. For the 
most part she had succeeded. Her stone-blank eyes concentrated on the blackness of the 
night outside her window” (153). Echoing the previous scene with the hot pepper sauce 
scorching Mala’s mouth, the emphasis here is again on the mouth (Chandin’s) and the 
pain of his touch. Close to the word “moth,” “mouth” also gestures back to the devouring 
moths on the cereus blossoms. Both a traumatic and magical event, the moths descending 
upon the cereus seem to allow Mala imaginatively to return to more painful memories of 
abuse. As Mala creatively remembers, she imagines rescuing Pohpoh from Chandin’s 
house:  
Mala wished that she could go back in time and be a friend to this Pohpoh. 
She would storm into the house and, with one flick of her wrist, banish the 
father into a pit of pain and suffering from which there would be no 
escape. With piercing eyes she would pull the walls of that house down, 
down, down, and she would gather the two children to her breast and hug 
them tightly, rock and quiet them, and kiss their faces until they giggled 
wildly. (153) 
Much like Sylvia Fraser’s insight that she abandoned her original child personality in an 
“untended grave,” Mala calls her childhood self, “this Pohpoh”—her dissociated, 
abandoned child (BS 129). Mala’s imaginative reclaiming and rescuing of Pohpoh is 
fundamental to her healing process. 
 In this extended scene of remembrance, magic realism is at its height as Mala’s 
present and past begin to collapse when Otoh arrives looking just like his father, Mala’s 
former lover, wearing his clothes and carrying a gramophone so that he and Mala might 
dance. Mala believes she is seeing Ambrose as the narrative goes back and forth between 
this dream-like scene with Otoh, and Mala’s revisionist memories of Pohpoh’s escape 
and rescue. Mala’s present and past are suspended in a space that is neither fact nor 
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fiction but both at once. Mala remembers/imagines that Pohpoh escapes out of a window 
of her father’s house to sneak into a “target” family home, “a happy family, a fairy-tale 
family in which the father was a benevolent king” (168). The house fuels Mala’s (and 
Pohpoh’s) therapeutic imaginary as Pohpoh envisions herself protecting the family baby: 
“Pohpoh imagined herself invisible, sitting there and thwarting monsters and demons 
who tried to lay a finger on the littler baby in whose room she found herself” (169). 
 Before arriving at the home of her ideal family, Pohpoh must go through her 
mother’s (now Mala’s) garden. The slippage between past and present is signaled in the 
“uncanny communion with the fruit trees” and in the cereus plant with “its large white 
and crimson flowers, gleaming like stars” (163). Mirroring Mala’s magical evening the 
night before, the “cereus blossoms spewed heavy perfume in the air, luring the thousands 
of moths” (163). Mala’s double consciousness in her present and past garden is literalized 
by the cereus: “The scent of the cereus with its two edges—one a vanilla-like sweetness, 
the other a curdling—so permeated the air that she could taste it on her tongue” (163-64). 
Sweetness and decay permeate Mala’s house and garden, becoming emblematic smells 
that signify beyond Mala’s personal sphere to the larger discursive mode of the 
narrative—the double edge of trauma and the imagination.  
Pohpoh’s fantasy of a happy family similarly mixes trauma with a 
transformational imaginary. As Pohpoh nears the front door to exit the house, the 
“triumph” she feels abates when she encounters her own image in a mirror. She sees a 
“tiny, ragged girl” (170). She loses confidence because of her sunken eyes: “Pohpoh 
wondered which was her true self—the timid, gaunt, unremarkable girl staring at her, or 
the one who dared to spend nights doing what no one else ever dared to do. The image of 
her father about to lower himself on her body charged at her suddenly, complete with 
smells and nauseating tastes” (170-71). An intrusive traumatic image appears at the 
moment of psychic splitting, and, again, the emphasis is on the senses: smell and taste. 
Pohpoh carries on, forgets the mirror, and leaves feeling triumphant and avenged (171). 
The narrative slides back to Mala in the present: “A smile of triumph lit up Mala’s face. 
She had relived this scenario so often that even she did not remember how much of it 
actually took place—whether it took place in the day or night, whether she was 
accompanied by Asha, whether she actually entered a house, whether she was ever 
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caught” (171). Throwing the truth-status of this scene of remembrance into question 
suggests that the reality of the event is less important than the therapeutic reworking of it. 
For Mala, reality is connected to trauma and fantasy is connected to healing.  
Following the scene where Mala leads Otoh (whom she believes to be Ambrose) 
to Chandin’s body, reality presses in upon her as a terrified Otoh runs away and makes 
public the secret of her father’s corpse.  Feeling sad and desperate, Mala looks at her 
bottles of hot pepper sauce: “The pain of a teaspoon of the fiery sauce on her tongue 
would surely dull the despair that threatened to swallow her up. It all seemed so real” 
(185). Mala cannot bear what is real, so she retreats into her fantasy of saving Pohpoh: 
“She decided that if trouble was indeed on its way her first duty was to save and care for 
Pohpoh. Hardly anyone, in her estimation, ever cared for Pohpoh. Now that she was 
grown up, she herself would take care of little Pohpoh” (185). Tucked away in her 
memory garden, and camouflaged by her mudra tree, Mala hears the police arrive and 
closes her eyes: “Now where was she, she wondered, before Ambrose—it was Ambrose, 
wasn’t it?—entered her yard. Ah yes! Pohpoh had just exited the strangers’ house 
successfully and was out in the yard” (186). The police are tearing down Mala’s fence 
and trying to talk to her, but she ignores all the sounds and thinks of Pohpoh: “‘Mala will 
take care of you, Pohpoh. No one will ever touch you again like that. I will never let 
anyone put their terrible hands on you again. I, Mala Ramchandin, will set you, Pohpoh 
Ramchandin, free, free, free, like a bird’” (186-87). In the very real context of the police 
about to discover Chandin’s remains, Mala wills herself to stay in her healing fantasy of 
freedom for Pohpoh. 
The trauma of the present scene with the police collapses with the traumas of the 
past through Mala’s creative remembrance as it slides and slips into Pohpoh’s 
remembrance. In a lovely shifting between the two spheres, the narrative dances on a 
tightrope between past and present. As Mala’s awaits her imminent capture, she 
remembers Pohpoh on the evening of her escape, terrified that her father is about to catch 
her outside: “Fear was breaking her, was unprying her memory. She was reminded of 
what she usually ignored or commanded herself to forget: her legs being ripped apart, 
something entering her from down there, entering and then scooping her insides out. Her 
body remembered” (188). Immediately following this, “Mala remembered. She heard the 
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voices of the police. She reconfigured what they said to match her story of how she saved 
Pohpoh that day” (188; emphasis added). Mala’s therapeutic, revisionist consciousness 
then slides back: “Pohpoh, remembering her father’s invasion, put her hand over her 
mouth and nose to stifle her panic and the nauseating smell of fear that rumbled from her 
insides. Pressed against the bush, she bit the inside of her lip and willed herself to think” 
(188). And then back again to the present: “Mala bit the inside of her lip and willed 
herself to think” (188). The foregrounding of past traumas through their sensory 
apprehension gives them an urgency in the present that Mala reshapes as she re-enacts the 
horror of the past to include a dream of freedom.   
The past completely collapses into the present as Mala imagines Pohpoh running 
to her. What appears to everyone to be Mala’s madness is rather her healing. She is 
caring for the abused child that no one protected or loved. When Pohpoh arrives at 
Mala’s fence, she “scaled it with magical speed. Instead of landing in the stinging nettles 
she was caught by a soothing mess of aloe vera” (189). Mala translates her own burned 
tongue to Pohpoh’s burned body, which she heals with aloe vera. Ironically, as the 
captured Mala leads police to Chandin’s long-hidden body, she continues to 
imaginatively protect and free Pohpoh. The traumas of this extended section are resolved 
magically and therapeutically with Mala encouraging Pohpoh to run away from the house 
and to fly: “‘Yes, Pohpoh, you take off and fly child, fly!’” (200). Mala’s dream of 
protection is fully realized as Pohpoh does indeed take flight:  
She did three more breast strokes and soared high before gliding again, 
basking in the cloudless sky. She practised making perfect, broad circles, 
like a frigate bird splayed out against the sky in an elegant V. Down 
below, her island was soon lost among others, all as shapeless as specks of 
dust adrift on a vast turquoise sea. (200-201) 
 Cereus Blooms at Night is in many ways an extended reflection upon the 
importance of creativity and the imagination to healing from the trauma of childhood 
sexual abuse. Whereas life writers such as Sylvia Fraser face critical scrutiny and 
skepticism regarding the truth-status of their pasts and are burdened with an imperative to 
tell the truth beyond a reasonable doubt, Mootoo seems to suggest that truth may be far 
less important than healing, and, perhaps more profoundly, that healing from severe 
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traumas may, in fact, require the imagination, fantasy, and even some magic. Quoting 
Jack Hodgins, Hegerfeldt connects lies to the truth through magic realism: “Ceaselessly 
drawing attention to its own constructedness without thereby invalidating itself, magic 
realist fiction self-consciously presents itself as ‘lies that tell the truth’” (7).
63
 Pohpoh 
flying through the air like a frigate bird tells the truth of Mala’s therapeutic journey of 
transformation and healing. Trauma and magic realism are woven together, the novel 
implies, because they must be to tell the truth of what healing from trauma ultimately is: 
an act of the imagination. 
3.4 Stockings and Stalkings: Representing Trauma in Gail 
Anderson-Dargatz’s The Cure for Death by Lightning 
I have been arguing in this dissertation that the narration of traumatic experience 
presses up against the boundaries of genre in the effort to find a way to articulate 
memories of childhood sexual abuse beyond the limits of straightforwardly factual 
testimony or fictional realism. In this chapter, I have suggested that both Fall on Your 
Knees and Cereus Blooms at Night employ magical realist representations of traumatic 
events as creative means by which characters negotiate traumatic memories. In Gail 
Anderson-Dargatz’s The Cure for Death by Lightning, trauma similarly finds expression 
through what Arva has termed the “traumatic imagination.” It does so, I argue, in two 
principal ways: first, through the scrapbook which Beth’s mother, Maud, writes; and 
second, through Beth’s traumatic imagination through which she mediates her sexual 
abuse. In what follows, then, I will demonstrate, as I trouble, the ways in which sexual 
traumas are arbitrated through and find expression in the scrapbook, animals in general, 
and the Native mythological figure of Coyote in particular. I further argue that the text 
weaves together not one, but two stories of sexual abuse. My reading will show that it is 
not just Beth who is a victim of incest but also her mother, an important line of argument 
for understanding Maud’s scrapbook and one that has not been given sustained 
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consideration by other scholars.
64
 The scrapbook and the autobiography which Beth 
writes as an adult inscribe a family history of sexual abuse and function as principal 
methods of healing for both mother and daughter. I will also explore Beth’s lightning arm 
and the field of flax as magical metaphors of protection and healing not unlike the cereus 
plant in Cereus Blooms at Night. Both the scrapbook and the figure of Coyote obfuscate 
and simultaneously perform sexual traumas. The scrapbook both inscribes and represses 
memory while the Coyote represents the horrific return of the repressed. Indeed, it is 
primarily in the Coyote figure that the magical and traumatic meet.  
 The novel opens in the autobiographical mode and with the scrapbook—a 
generically feminine form of writing—on the page that contains the cure for death by 
lightning, the recipe for Beth’s father’s favourite oatcakes, and the tortoiseshell butterfly 
with the torn wing. The focus seems to be on healing remedies, nurturing food, and a 
straightforwardly innocuous metaphor of triumph over adversity. As Beth’s mother tells 
her, the butterfly can still fly: “‘It’s a reminder to keep going’” (1). Despite its 
presentation as a seemingly safe, feminine form of writing, the scrapbook exceeds its 
generic boundaries in its encryption of repressed family traumas metaphorized, in part, by 
the butterfly with the torn wing. Beth says that her mother “didn’t keep the book as a 
diary. [. . .] But she wrote brief thoughts along the margins or at the bottom of a page, as 
footnotes to the recipes and remedies, the cartoons and clippings—footnotes to the events 
of the day” (2). Beth’s mother is now dead, and Beth is using her scrapbook to help her 
write her own story, set during the Second World War, when she was fifteen, and “the 
world fell apart and began to come together again. Much of it will be hard to believe, I 
know. But the evidence for everything I’m about to tell you is there, in the pages of my 
mother’s scrapbook” (2). By emphasizing the scrapbook’s status as evidence, Beth hints 
at the sexual crimes that her story will document and suggests that her mother was aware 
of them. This is an important early signal that the scrapbook needs to be read beyond its 
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literal presentation of recipes and news clippings. As Beth insists, “The scrapbook was 
my mother’s way of setting down the days so they wouldn’t be forgotten. This story is 
my way. No one can tell me these events didn’t happen, or that it was all a girl’s fantasy. 
The reminders are there, in that scrapbook, and I remember them all” (2).  
In a conference paper entitled “Scrapbooking: The Artifice of Memory in the 
Fiction of Gail Anderson-Dargatz,” Cynthia Sugars argues that the scrapbook “is in fact a 
barrier to communication in the novel.” When alive, Beth’s mother does not give Beth 
access to the book. Furthermore, Sugars troubles Beth’s claim to truth-telling in the 
previously quoted passage: “The slippage here from reminders to remembering of 
reminders is important, as if to say that Beth ‘remembers the reminders’ and not the 
memories themselves” (original emphasis). Beth’s emphasis on evidence, truth, and the 
reliability of her memory are early clues that her autobiography will, in fact, be a sexual 
abuse survivor story, as is her insistence that there is no fantasy involved in her 
recollections. Beth participates in a survivor discourse similar to Fraser’s which testifies 
that, “this is the truth as I remember it.” Yet, as the narrative progresses, it becomes clear 
that there is nothing straightforward about the story Beth remembers and tells.  
That the scrapbook reminds Beth of the truth also suggests what I will go on to 
prove, which is that Beth’s mother knew about her abuse and encrypted it into the 
scrapbook as evidence of her knowledge. The cure for death by lightning and the 
butterfly are connected further on in the narrative to both Maud’s and Beth’s traumas and 
therapeutic journeys. Their sexual abuse is thus embedded on the first page of the 
autobiography, but it will be some time before it is revealed. For Coral Ann Howells, the 
scrapbook rests in the tradition of domestic pioneer narratives, such as Catharine Parr 
Traill’s The Backwoods of Canada (1836), where women’s gossip, recipes, farm work, 
and family events are recorded: “Her mother’s account conforms to the conventional 
limits of the feminine role, so that it is full of gaps and silences following a conscious 
strategy of editing out a great many unspeakable things that happen very close to home” 
(171). I will argue that, in fact, Maud’s account edits in the unspeakable traumas of the 
text. 
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 The colour of the scrapbook is significant: “The cover was red, one of the few bits 
of red my father allowed in the house” (2).
65
 The reader is not told why Beth’s father 
allows the red cover, but the concession underscores John’s underestimation of the 
scrapbook’s power. The red cover connotes the sexual and dangerous aspects of the 
scrapbook that go unnoticed by John, and marks it as an object of desire. Red is also 
clearly associated with Beth, who, like Little Red Riding Hood, becomes a figure of both 
sexual awakening and victimization. Indeed, it appears that Beth is being stalked from the 
outset of the first chapter, which opens firmly in the gothic mode: “When it came looking 
for me I was in the hollow stump by Turtle Creek” (3). Beth listens “to the sound of it 
rushing, crashing through the bush, coming for me” (3). The threat of violence is 
juxtaposed with the “illicit treasures” which Beth hides at her secret spot and which 
reflect her coming of age as a woman. She stores, along with lipstick, perfume, and nail 
polish, a scrap of red velvet that Bertha Moses gave her at her stump by the creek (3). 
These items of femininity and sexuality are all prohibited by her father. She hears the 
rushing sound, and then pulls out her piece of red velvet, rubbing “it down the inside of 
[her] bare leg. [She] imagined [she] was touched that way, by a city man—no farmer’s 
hands were like velvet—a man who worked in an office with clean papers, whose 
polished heels clicked along the pavement, and whose hands never dug into manure” (4). 
 Beth’s reference to “farmer’s hands” is an example of what a reflecting memory 
can do. Beth’s father is a farmer with “farmer’s hands”; although he has not yet touched 
her sexually with them, Beth writes in this inference to foreshadow future events. Her 
present knowledge of events influences how she writes her past. This is one of Nicola 
King’s chief criticisms of Sylvia Fraser’s memoir. Here, Anderson-Dargatz fictionalizes 
this very process through her repeated use of foreshadowing and literary devices to 
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symbolize both traumas and Beth’s experience of them.
66
 Beth leans against the stump 
with her dress hiked up “like a whore” and wishes for nylons and red shoes. The 
reliability of this memory is similarly questionable because nylons will later become 
emblematic of her father’s molestation of her and also of her mother’s own abuse. This 
opening chapter is a carefully crafted set of metaphors of Beth’s upcoming abuse by her 
father, who is significantly repeatedly linked to the Coyote and the rushing sound that 
Beth hears. Like the scrapbook on the opening page prefacing this chapter, traumatic 
memories are cryptically encoded in Beth’s narrative account but unrevealed to the 
reader. 
Beth’s mother’s awareness of and culpability in the traumas Beth endures is 
registered in her scrapbook, which acts as a silent witness to what becomes a series of 
traumas for Beth. When Beth enters the house, she finds her mother “sitting at the kitchen 
table, writing on one of the pages of her scrapbook, mumbling to [Beth’s] dead 
grandmother” (86). Maud closes the scrapbook as soon as Beth walks in. What could be a 
mediating vehicle or even a springboard to communication, the scrapbook instead walls 
off Beth from the female community of her mother and the spectre of her grandmother. 
The scrapbook functions as a repository for Maud’s traumatic memories, but Beth is not 
given access to what she has added. Maud appears to find consolation in her scrapbook 
and in conversations with her dead mother in moments of trauma. As Beth’s mother, 
Maud’s job is ostensibly to protect her, yet she repeatedly fails in this capacity. As 
wretched as John’s behaviour is, Maud’s behaviour seems on the surface to be almost 
equally heinous; however, one can find in the gaps and what is not spoken the possible 
reason for Maud’s complicity.  
Maud is herself a traumatized subject, in clear evidence in scenes where, unable 
to cope with Beth’s traumas, she disconnects from reality into her own world of her 
scrapbook and imagined conversations with her dead mother: “My mother was no help, 
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no help at all. She sat in her rocking chair, rocking and rocking, hanging on to her 
scrapbook, staring off at nothing” (206). As Beth perceives early on in the novel, “My 
father looked like a hunkered monster; my mother’s face was that of a ghost” (34). The 
main clue to what is haunting Maud is represented significantly as an image—a 
photograph of her with her parents which Beth describes: 
My grandmother was dressed in dark and lacy Victorian garb and looked 
very old and tired, but my grandfather, an engineer, looked quite dapper. 
He was smiling and had his hand around my mother’s waist. Neither my 
grandmother nor my mother was smiling. About the time my mother 
became a woman, my grandmother took sick with an unexplained series of 
niggling illnesses, stomach complaints and headaches, weakness and 
malaise. My mother became the woman of the house then, making the 
meals and tending her mother and looking after her two younger sisters. 
As my grandmother became increasingly bedridden, my mother also 
became her father’s escort to plays and concerts. She became his favourite 
of the three daughters. He bought her silk stockings, boxes of candy, and 
called her dear. (17; emphasis added) 
At this early stage in the narrative, the picture is circumstantial rather than clear 
evidence of an incestuous relationship between Maud and her father. In the context of the 
rest of the novel, however, the photograph stands as a compelling argument for a family 
legacy of sexual abuse, particularly when one considers the significance of the silk 
stockings, a key piece of evidence, which Maud eventually edits into her scrapbook. I 
want to suggest that the scrapbook is thus a hysterical text, by which I mean a text that 
represses its traumas while it also converts them into expression, here of both Maud’s and 
Beth’s sexual abuse. Maud uses her scrapbook to encode and hide what I argue is a cycle 
of incestuous abuse. The scrapbook provides a series of enigmatic clues or objects that 
must be read in relation to each other and to the violence in the novel in order to 
understand their significance. The scrapbook suggests that in order to “hear” stories of 
sexual abuse, one must attend to different kinds of testimony and different kinds of 
evidence. 
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On the morning following the extended scene of trauma for Beth, Maud awakes 
Beth with a “butterfly kiss” (87). Recalling the first page of the scrapbook and the 
opening of this novel, the butterfly is further reproduced by Maud in the form of a gift to 
Beth. She produces a butterfly from behind her back: “It was made from petals of scarlet 
flax and my mother’s fingers breathed life into it. This was a child’s game; it made me 
angry” (87). Here, the butterfly with the torn wing from the scrapbook becomes a red 
one, given life by Maud herself. The red is a subtle suggestion of Maud’s understanding 
of Beth’s traumas. Furthermore, that she performs a “child’s game” links this scene to the 
one where she makes Beth child’s food (bread, cream, and sugar) after John rips off 
Beth’s dress. When Beth is describing the photograph of Maud and her parents, she says 
that it was “about the time that my mother became a woman” that her grandmother 
became bedridden and she became the woman of the house. By comforting Beth with 
child’s food and a child’s game, Maud may be trying to keep her as a child so that she 
does not have to become a woman and “her father’s escort” as she herself was. The 
butterfly with the torn wing that continues to fly in the scrapbook and in the gift 
symbolizes, in the first instance, Maud’s hidden traumas and her dream of healing. While 
she ultimately fails to protect Beth from John, Maud does reveal her understanding of 
Beth’s traumas, along with what seems to be her own guilt for being, like her scrapbook, 
a silent witness to them. 
 The only times that Maud appears to speak about her traumas is in her 
unintelligible mutterings to her dead mother, whom she seems to be haunted by, and 
whose ghost appears to be manifest in the text, as when Beth says, “My dead 
grandmother had taken over the rocker; it went on rocking all through dinner” (224). 
Indeed, Beth’s grandmother’s spectral presence is one of the most telling clues to suggest 
that Maud herself was sexually abused by her father. Following John’s rape of Beth, she 
leaves her room, and although still in a dissociative state, she sees her grandmother’s 
ghost: “I followed my body, because I couldn’t do otherwise, through the parlor and past 
my father, who slept in his chair by the gramophone as if he’d never entered my room. 
Over him, her face reflecting the dim light from my bedroom window, my grandmother 
watched him grimly” (184-85). Her silent spectre points to a family legacy of silent 
witness of sexual abuse.  
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 Furthermore, the fact that Beth finds her mother at her bedroom door implies that 
Maud was awake through the assault. Mother and grandmother are thus both implicated 
as present but wordless witnesses in what can only be understood as a long history of 
similar silences. It is important to acknowledge that the text does not make clear the truth 
about Maud’s witness to the rape of her daughter; it rather weaves Maud’s and her own 
mother’s presences into the scene as a possibility, reflecting Beth’s understanding that 
she must have known, just as Maud’s own mother must have known. Maud does, 
however, record a memento of the day into her scrapbook. Beth has given her some blue 
flax flowers to placate her anger at Beth for ignoring her chores the next day. Maud 
presses these symbols of healing (which I discuss in an upcoming section) into her book 
as “‘Something to remember the day by, though Lord knows why I want to remember it’” 
(195). Blue flax represents Beth’s refuge from trauma, whereas Maud’s incorporation of 
this therapeutic symbol into her scrapbook memorializes it. 
Maud’s scrapbook performs the same work of writing (albeit a wordless form) 
and healing from trauma as the novel does for Beth. Perhaps the clearest encryption of 
the family history of sexual abuse is symbolized by the nylons which Beth’s father buys 
her following his rape of her and which Maud ultimately adds to her scrapbook. The 
reader learns early in the novel that John will not allow Maud to buy herself nylons (27). 
Maud becomes furious when she learns that John has bought them for a “delighted and 
mortified” Beth (198). Maud begins muttering to her dead mother while clutching her 
scrapbook and rocking in her chair (199). The scrapbook is always foregrounded in 
moments of distress for Maud, who remains traumatized for some time after learning 
about the nylons, “rocking and rocking, hanging on to her scrapbook, staring off at 
nothing” (206). Beth tries to console her with a cup of coffee, “But [her] mother looked 
through [her], like a stubborn child punishing the parent that punished her” (206). Maud, 
not Beth, is acting the part of the traumatized child, which suggests that the nylons and 
Beth’s trauma have re-traumatized Maud to the extent that she is re-enacting scenes of 
her past.  
Maud finally confesses to Beth: “‘My father gave me stockings too—silk 
stockings—while my mother went without’” (207). A symbolic gesture rather than 
spoken words expresses a shared traumatic experience of incestuous abuse, which Beth 
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ultimately registers as betrayal: “At first I wasn’t sure what she meant, and then I didn’t 
want to think about it, because if she meant what I thought she meant then she knew” 
(207). That Beth does not want “to think about it” harkens back to her mother not 
wanting to talk about it, which might explain why Beth belatedly reveals the entry of the 
nylons into her mother’s scrapbook. When she finally discloses the entry, she does so 
almost as an aside by incorporating it into the end of a much broader list of “reminders of 
the bad days” that she is quickly flipping past:  
a newspaper story about a child who had gone missing on the reserve, the 
widow Roddy’s death notice, and a little square cut from a pair of nylons 
and glued to a page. I stopped on the photograph of Ginger Rogers, and on 
the space between the cure for death by lightning and the butterfly with its 
wing torn away, where my mother had written my name and the date 
lightning had left my arm something close to useless. (219) 
By stopping on the photograph of Ginger Rogers, Beth is essentially asking the 
reader to put her focus here rather than on the square cut from the precious nylons which 
represent Maud’s understanding of Beth’s abuse and her own shared history of it. The 
gap in the scrapbook that Beth admits belatedly and miscellaneously is the traumatic gap 
of a family legacy of child sexual abuse. The proximity of Beth’s acknowledgement of 
the nylons to what she here privileges—the butterfly and lightning arm symbolizing 
transformation and healing—suggests that the novel she is writing is chiefly concerned 
with her therapeutic journey and her desire to leave her traumas in the margins of her 
mother’s scrapbook. Billy reminds Beth that her mother’s scrapbook is her “‘private 
place’” and, more importantly, he suggests its purpose: “‘Everybody needs a place to sort 
things out (fuck). You’ve got to know (shit) nobody’s going to snoop around in it’” 
(220). Maud’s scrapbook is her therapeutic place to externalize and thus contain her 
traumatic experiences; the novel is Beth’s. 
Whereas the butterfly on the first page of the scrapbook is connected to Maud and 
her healing, the cure for death by lightning that occupies the same page reflects Beth’s 
therapeutic journey. Moreover, like Cereus Blooms at Night, traumatic and magic realism 
intersect in Beth’s lightning arm as a means of both articulating and healing Beth’s 
traumas. In fact, Beth’s lightning arm becomes magically associated with trauma and 
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protection, performing similar work to the scrapbook for Maud as both silent witness and 
a form of defense. On the heels of Maud’s ineffective attempts to comfort Beth from her 
night of trauma, Beth is again violated as the narrative sustains its recounting of the 
relentless sexual victimization of her. This time, a group of Beth’s classmates, led by 
Robert Parker, taunt her with names like “‘Dirty Beth,” and call her mother a witch and 
her father crazy (89). As they do so, Beth’s lightning arm suddenly goes dead, a silent 
marker of the escalating trauma. The children carry Beth to an abandoned house and strip 
her of her clothing, calling her a “‘Slut, slut, slut!’” (90). When they finally let her go, 
Beth runs home feeling, as always, mysteriously stalked: “The thing that had followed 
me that morning hopped up onto the road. I heard it first, scuffing behind me, and when I 
turned I saw its footprints, a man’s footprints” (90). Seemingly without refuge, Beth 
retreats to her bedroom and her imagination:  
it seemed if I were to stay very still everything would stop. I lay down and 
held myself rigid on the bed and closed my eyes. After some time like 
that, the hand on my lightning arm began to expand, spread out like a 
balloon, take on proportions much too big for my arm, big enough to hit 
back. I opened my eyes and looked down my arm and was surprised to see 
just an ordinary hand. I stared up at the blue forget-me-nots on the 
headboard of my bed and put myself there, in a stream full of them. (91) 
Along with the soothing blue flowers in which Beth finds solace, her lightning 
arm imaginatively expands to protect her from her assaulters, much like the adult Mala 
magically rescues the abused child, Pohpoh, in Cereus Blooms at Night. Unlike Mala, 
who manages to stay in her inventively transformed world, Beth’s comfort is short-lived 
as her mother imposes upon her for details of what happened to her: “She called my name 
and shook me, but I stared through her at the headboard. She called my name louder and 
slapped my face. She said, ‘Oh God,’ and left my room” (91). Beth finds “a new peace” 
in not responding to her ineffectual mother, whose “Oh God” connotes both an awareness 
that something terrible has happened and a refusal to speak what that might be aloud. The 
fact that Maud has registered something about Beth’s traumatized condition is further 
evidenced by her scrapbook, upon which Beth finds a pair of scissors, indicating that her 
mother had added to it (92).  
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Beth is nearly catatonic, “staring at the scrapbook, petting the black kitten, 
stuffing bread in [her] mouth” when her father yells at her: “‘What the hell’s the matter 
with you?’” (92). Repeatedly forced out of the refuge of her dissociation, Beth runs out of 
the house into the field of violet flax, the flower of which looks very much like the 
forget-me-nots which adorn her headboard. Again, Beth’s attempt at solace is thwarted 
by a tumultuous storm which sends her running back to the house. When all of Beth’s 
real attempts to comfort herself fail, the narrative takes a magical turn and literally 
transforms her world to violet flax: 
I pressed my face against the window and saw a rain begin to fall, so 
gently the raindrops seemed to float. Then I saw they weren’t raindrops, 
they were flowers, violet flax, fluttering to the ground. In no time at all the 
rain covered the earth in flowers. I opened my window and crawled out 
onto the purple carpet, took my shoes off and paddled around in pools of 
flax. The fragrance was intoxicating. The clouds moved on, and still the 
violet flax drifted down from a blue sky. (92-93) 
Hegerfeldt suggests that “literalization is behind much of magic realism’s magic, 
for many of the apparently fantastic events are based on a making-real of figures of 
speech, mental concepts, or psychological mechanisms” (56). Here, Beth’s psychological 
defense mechanism of dissociating into the flowers of her headboard and field of flax is 
literalized into a therapeutic imaginary of healing pools of flax in a transformed world of 
blue. Connoting healing and relaxation, the “intoxicating” scent of the flax perfumes the 
air just as the cereus blossoms do in Mootoo’s novel. And, like the cereus blossoms, the 
flax metamorphoses Beth’s world to one that is beautiful and far removed from the pain 
she feels: “With blue flax in my cupped hands, blue flax on my hair, my face, my dress, I 
looked over a world that was blue and as strange as a dream. The shame of nakedness in 
front of the kids at school seemed so far from this blue world” (94).  
Even John’s rusty truck becomes a symbol of renewal: “Petals littered the window 
of the truck, covered over the rust, and gave the Ford a moment of new life” (94). As 
Beth watches Filthy Billy surveying the damage, she, like Mala, imagines that she can 
fly: “It occurred to me that if I ran down that hill, I could fly. I spread my arms and it felt 
like that: the air carried me” (95). Like Mala’s, Beth’s healing is an act of the 
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imagination. Moreover, the animals themselves are transformed from victims of abuse (as 
they have been throughout the novel) to symbols of metamorphosis and healing. Covered 
in flax, the sheep are now blue: “They were a strange sight, sheep out of dreams. The 
blue flax had clung to their coats along with everything else. I sunk my hands into their 
blue wool and rubbed next to their skin, where the lanolin lay, to smooth away the 
dryness of my hands” (100). However, unlike the world of Cereus Blooms at Night which 
asserts the transformative power of the imagination, this blue scene of healing stands 
alone and unrepeated in The Cure for Death by Lightning, and, given its relatively early 
placement in the narrative, suggests in this text a fleeting quality to the power of the 
therapeutic imagination to transform an otherwise traumatizing world. In Anderson-
Dargatz, if there is a cure, it comes much more from the healing power of writing. 
 One of the primary means through which Beth imaginatively rewrites her traumas 
is through the many animals that populate the novel. The stalking of Beth is gothically 
doubled by the violent death of her classmate, Sarah Kemp, who was ostensibly attacked 
by a bear. Beth’s brother, Dan, describes the bear’s attack on Sarah Kemp in sexual 
terms. He says that she was “‘pulled apart from the crotch up’” and that the tops of her 
legs and breasts were eaten off (24). Throughout the narrative, animals are connected to 
sex in graphic and disturbing ways. The old tom cat humping the heads of two little 
kittens acts as a precursor to the narration of the first trauma Beth describes, while it 
looks forward to future human acts of sexual abuse. Beth hides the new litter of kittens 
“from [her] father and the old white tom and his appetites,” thus connecting the sexually 
predatory old cat with her father (38). She is unsuccessful, however, and finds in her 
parents’ chamber pail “the dark bodies of the new litter of kittens [she had] played with 
that morning” (42). Beth’s father tells her to “‘Bury those cats, will you?’ as if he didn’t 
know what he’d done, as if it were just another chore for [her] to do” (42). The first 
instance of traumatic dissociation is narrated as Beth looks at the bucket of dead kittens: 
“Then I removed myself and watched my hands take up a shovel, make a hole in the 
manure pile, and empty the foul water and the bodies of the dead kittens into it. Their 
bodies slid from the bucket like fish. I covered them over with manure, then followed 
myself to the barn, like a child following her mother” (43). Echoing the earlier sexualized 
passage of the farmer’s hands in manure, here Beth is the abject and traumatized subject 
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following a significantly invisible mother. The metaphors of this entire extended scene of 
trauma, beginning with the killing of the kittens and culminating in an act of sexual 
violence against Beth, are repeated in a sequence of events that include and surround the 
torture of Gertrude the cow, as John’s sexual violence and sadism continue to escalate.
67
  
Beth’s forced collusion into the brutalization of Gertrude the cow by her father 
can be read as an extended metaphorical displacement of Beth’s own sexual abuse. 
Because Gertrude had not become pregnant, she could not be used as a milk cow and 
must be sold as beef. John reasons that if he were to remove her ovaries, she would gain 
weight and garner a higher sale price at market. The scene is so completely over-the-top 
in its gratuitous and graphic violence that I hesitate to quote from it. I do so only briefly 
and to make the point that sexual traumas are repeatedly foreshadowed by and imagined 
through animals in the novel.
68
 The use of animals here perhaps simplistically links 
sexual assault to the animal or degenerative aspects of humans. The “operation” that John 
performs on Gertrude becomes an act of sexual violence. As Beth holds up the tethered 
cow’s head, John carves into its hide without anesthetic: “His face shone and he sweated 
in excitement. The cow bawled and bawled” (84). At this early stage of the surgery, 
Beth’s mother is still there to help; however, the scene is too much for her, and she goes 
back to the house, leaving Beth alone to help her father torture the cow.  
What follows is a metaphorical rape. John has his entire arm inserted into the 
cavity he has carved into the struggling cow, searching for her ovaries in an agonizing 
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 Repetition is at once a hallmark of traumatic experience and a reminder that the story Beth is writing has 
the full benefit of retrospection, including the ability to repeat key symbols in the representation of what 
cannot be the truth that Beth claims on the first page, but can only be a storied and literary version of her 
childhood traumas. The eponymous cure for death by lightning that mysteriously opens the novel is thus 
again evoked, this time in connection to Beth’s traumatic experience in the events leading up to Gertrude 
the cow’s abuse. Beth’s mother literally feels lightning in the air as she runs her hands through her son’s 
shocked hair, yet she sends Beth out into what is sure to be a storm so that she might bring in the cows. The 
lightning “sparked bluish white, like a snake all knotted up, evolving and transforming,” as Beth watches 
moments before she is struck (79). The lightning strikes Beth from the ground and comes up through her 
arm, leaving it numb. Her “lightning arm” hangs inert like a repressed memory for now; moreover, like a 
repressed memory, it will hysterically take on a life of its own in moments of trauma and even work to 
protect Beth.  
68
 Indeed, it is scenes like this one that seem to argue against the healing discourse of the text. All of the 
scenes of abuse are traumatizing to read, but this one stands out as one of the worst. 
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process that takes the whole night to complete. When he finally finds the ovaries, he puts 
them into a bowl for Beth to look at and says, “‘You have these. [. . .] This is what makes 
you female’” (85). The suggestion that Beth is defined only by her reproductive organs, 
and that John will have no more trouble taking from Beth what makes her female than he 
does literally taking the ovaries from a cow, reinforces the misogynistic and 
dehumanizing aspects of sexual assault. It also seems to suggest that Beth has more 
connection to the animal than does John. Further on in the novel, Beth discovers Dan 
having sexual intercourse with one of their cows (206). The repeated sexualization of 
animals alongside recurring scenes of sexual violence against Beth suggest a troubling 
affinity between women and animals, and render Beth, like Gertrude, as a form of meat to 
be consumed.  
 The evisceration of Gertrude is horrific to read, but there are larger issues with the 
ways in which the novel represents its traumatic imaginary, particularly in its use of the 
Native figure of Coyote. While Anderson-Dargatz’s novel shares with MacDonald’s and 
Mootoo’s novels a hybridized structural form that combines the Gothic
69
 with magic 
realism to creatively write its traumas, it does so, in my view, much more 
problematically.  Like the Native mythological figure of Coyote that the novel 
appropriates to displace Beth’s sexual traumas, the text itself is a shape-shifter: 
specifically, in the switching between the subtle, scripto-therapeutic healing narrative (the 
autobiographical novel which Beth writes, as well as her mother’s scrapbook) and the 
masculinised, grotesque, and traumatizing narrative of abuse (primarily represented 
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 Anderson-Dargatz employs a postmodern version of the traditional female gothic plot of patriarchal 
tyranny and female imprisonment. Ellen Moers coined the term “female gothic” in 1976 to describe what 
seemed to be an interest in the monstrous in literature written by women during the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. (See Literary Women. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976.)The subtle feminism of 
the traditional female gothic and the restoration of the family, often through the discovery of a lost mother 
or by her intervention, are also installed in the novel by Anderson-Dargatz. While in some ways the novel 
can be viewed as Beth’s adult longing for her lost mother, whom she recovers through her scrapbook and 
through writing her own autobiography, her mother does not intervene to save her from her abusive father. 
The conclusion, moreover, is traditionally gothic and, according to Marlene Goldman, “familiar, 
conservative, and masochistic” (62). Goldman’s objection to the ending’s reinstatement of the 
heteronormative, patriarchal family system is germane to other criticisms of the novel from feminist and 
Native perspectives. 
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through the Coyote figure). The sexual traumas that Beth cannot speak and Maud refuses 
to hear nonetheless find written expression in the narrative through the scrapbook, in the 
case of Maud, and through Coyote as Beth writes her traumas onto this figure. On the one 
hand, the two competing narratives of graphic horror and healing recreate the experience 
of what it might be like to look back upon those traumas and write a narrative of healing 
and survival, but, on the other, the two strands of the novel are so completely at odds with 
each other that it sometimes feels like one is reading two novels: the gothic horror that 
Beth writes and the much more nuanced scrapbook compiled by Beth’s mother, Maud, 
and re-written within the novel by Beth. 
 What I am most troubled by, however, is the novel’s attribution of sexual abuse to 
the Native Coyote figure rather than to the perpetrator, Beth’s father.
70
 Animals are 
generally abused throughout the novel, and the Coyote is particularly abused in its 
housing of all of the evils of the text, especially sexual ones. Coyote functions as 
monolithically evil and even seems to sensationalize Native “trickster” stories by 
reducing them to a simplified, consumable form. Kristina Fagan suggests that “some 
depictions of the trickster are popular largely because they serve a certain critical fashion, 
one that emphasizes the constructedness and unknowability of the world. The trickster is 
read as a metaphor of postmodernism, challenging stable categories and forms” (“What’s 
the Trouble with the Trickster?” 6). Anderson-Dargatz similarly employs the “trickster” 
figure to encapsulate the vexed access to knowledge that comes with trauma and, in so 
doing, displaces the Native roots of Coyote tales. In the misappropriation of Native 
legend to function as a trope for the horror of sexual abuse, Anderson-Dargatz’s Coyote 
bears more resemblance to the wolf in “Little Red Riding Hood” or to “Killer Bob” as he 
possesses and monstrously transforms Leland Palmer in David Lynch’s Twin Peaks than 
to the much more ambiguous Native understandings of Coyote. 
 Magic realism depends on two ways of knowing the world; thus, as Anca Ralucca 
Radu suggests, “the novel is very particular about presenting two versions of every 
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 See especially Linda Morra’s article on the anti-trickster and the two articles I cite by Heidi Slettedahl 
Macpherson who queries Anderson-Dargatz’s approach to the Coyote figure from the perspectives of both 
feminism and Native mythology. 
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violent event which occurs” (127). The official version usually involves real animals or 
people, such as the bear who is blamed for killing Sarah Kemp, while at the same time 
Bertha Moses’s pregnant daughter insists on the more fantastical view that, “‘That was a 
man that done the killing. Coyote come and took him over’” (72) or the elusive, “bushed” 
figure of Coyote Jack, who ostensibly shape-shifts into a coyote and stalks Beth, but also 
functions as a real man, an almost pitiful outcast who takes his own life to rid himself of 
Coyote’s possession of him (274-75). The unofficial version of violent events seems to 
inevitably involve the invocation of the Native myth of the Coyote, although even with 
Coyote there is an official version. As Heidi Slettedahl Macpherson observes, “Coyote is 
both a shape-shifting spirit who controls damaged men’s behaviour, and a real animal 
who kills the helpless and the vulnerable, animal and human alike” (2005: 94). In its 
multiple ways of understanding the world, the discourse of magic realism thus functions 
to interrogate reality.  
 The discourse of trauma similarly disrupts a straightforward understanding of 
what is never a monolithic psychological reality. In this light, the novel’s appropriation of 
the Coyote figure to mediate the incestuous abuse of Beth by her father appears to be an 
imaginative and fitting way to represent what is otherwise silenced in the narrative. 
Hegerfeldt suggests that with magic realism, “In supernaturalizing cruel events, the texts 
express a stunned incredulity about the state of the world, implying that the idea of such 
things actually happening exceeds—or should exceed—the human imagination” (61). 
Accordingly, Howells observes that the “decorums of domestic realism” embodied by the 
scrapbook,  
do not provide an adequate framework for Beth to speak about all the 
other dimensions of her emotional and imaginative experience, most 
specifically her sexual experience. [. . .] Beth has to turn to Bertha’s 
Aboriginal stories about Coyote to find a language for sexual trauma, 
where the Native Trickster figure becomes a metaphor for her recurring 
nightmare of incestuous abuse and panic fear of male violence. (170) 
Indeed, if one were to read the novel uncritically and out of context of the 
scholarly debates surrounding both the appropriation of Native mythology by non-Native 
writers and what has become an almost vexed use of the “trickster” figure generally, one 
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might make a good argument for Anderson-Dargatz’s use of the Coyote as a figure of the 
traumatic imagination—a means of articulating otherwise unspeakable sexual traumas 
that exceed the imagination. Like trauma, the truth about Coyote in the text is not fully 
known. As Macpherson says, “given his trickster nature, perhaps this lack of clarity is 
formally appropriate” (2004: 176). This unknowability is also related to the larger 
questions of truth in the text and to the ways in which trauma, (as represented through 
Coyote) obfuscates truth. The use of Coyote also has an internal narrative logic within the 
world of the novel, as Beth is steeped in tales of Coyote through her connection to Bertha 
Moses, who functions as a Native storyteller and also as a marginalized Indigenous 
woman with a clan of disturbingly freakish daughters, some of whom have webbed 
fingers and eyes that do not match in colour.  
Bertha insists from the start of the narrative that John’s unpredictable and violent 
behaviour is caused not by the wound he suffered during the First World War nor by his 
more recent scuffle with a bear but by what Bertha perceives as is his possession (along 
with Coyote Jack’s) by Coyote: “‘I think what’s got hold of Coyote Jack’s got hold of 
your John’” (15). Further on in the narrative, Bertha explains the Coyote myth in 
Christian terms as demonic possession: “‘he slips off and goes walking until he finds 
somebody to have some fun with, eh? He takes that somebody over, see? Possesses him, 
like them demons in the Bible. Coyote has an awful thirst. Can’t satisfy him nohow, 
that’s what makes him so bad’” (72). This mixing of Christian myths with Native ones 
reflects the cross-cultural aspects of the text as white settlers intermingle with the Salish 
Indigenous community. Linda Morra, however, troubles such an easy reading by arguing 
that while Diana Brydon makes a case for resisting notions of cultural authenticity or 
purity by way of “some cultural mixing,” “aesthetic depictions must at least be driven by 
an ethical imperative of accountability, by greater familiarity with Indigenous 
epistemologies,” and that “the use of tricksters in an unspecific context or in a manner 
that belies their original purpose contradicts the very resurgence and uses of culturally 
specific tricksters in the first place—the retelling of narratives meant to allow for the 
reassertion of agency and for the restoration of Indigenous national identities” (89). 
 Herein lies the heart of the problem with Anderson-Dargatz’s employment of the 
Coyote to house all of the evils of Beth’s sexual abuse: in her misappropriation of the 
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Coyote as a figure of traumatic possession out of tune with Indigenous narratives, she 
unwittingly chips away at both Indigenous agency and identities. Anderson-Dargatz’s 
Coyote comes to represent an excuse for John’s incestuous sexual abuse, thereby 
contaminating a Native figure with the heinous crimes of a white man. Not only troubling 
from the perspective of Native mythology, the Coyote possession, according to 
Macpherson, is even more troubling from a feminist one: “To explain repeated and 
prolonged sexual abuse away as Coyote possession is to reiterate the worst aspect of an 
anti-feminist stance: that men cannot control the ‘beast’ within. Thus, if it is difficult to 
square Anderson-Dargatz’s construction of Coyote with First Nations stories, it is even 
more difficult to reconcile her exploration of sexual abuse with feminism” (2004: 180-
81).  
 In the scenes leading up to John’s rape of Beth, both real and mythical coyotes are 
repeatedly invoked. As Beth and Maud make their way home after a trip into town, “The 
wild dog watched us—I could see his eyes shining as we turned the democrat and headed 
out of town—with one paw slightly raised and his nose pointing at us, in the hunting 
stance of a coyote” (178). On the heels of this foreboding scene, and with Beth constantly 
under threat of sexual violence, a “bachelor” makes advances towards her at a community 
event (181). Beth flees for the “safety” of her home, but once there, she finds a bleeding 
sheep whose genitals have been eaten off by a coyote: “Coyotes go for the genitals and 
soft belly of a sick sheep” (182). The sexual assault by her father follows with the real 
coyotes that have foreshadowed the scene replaced by shadowy ones: “Though my 
mother must have been awake, he came into my room, came to my bed as a black 
faceless thing, with only the form of a man” (184). Beth tries to cope with the horror of 
this encounter by dissociating into the blue flowers on headboard: “I removed myself into 
the forget-me-knots [sic] painted on the headboard of my bed, and watched from there, 
leaving all the fear and anger in my body” (184). She also fights back with her lightning 
arm, which tries to protect her: 
 He was a big black thing moving over my body, flattening me down to 
nothing, making me no more than a blanket on the bed. I felt nothing. I 
wasn’t there. He didn’t do that thing to me. That wisp of a black blanket 
under him wasn’t me. The lightning arm moved, that was all. It pushed at 
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the black shadow over it. My father took the lightning arm by the wrist 
and wrestled it down and made it part of the blanket he moved over, 
moved into. (184) 
 Further on in the novel, when Beth experiences a traumatic flashback to the scene 
in a dream, “coyotes put their claws over [her] mouth. They lifted [her] nightgown. They 
rubbed their wet tails between [her] legs. [. . .] When they had their fill, the shadows 
sighed deeply, came together, and took the form of [her] father. He lifted his weight from 
[her] body and left the room” (264). While John is clearly implicated in the abuse, as is 
Maud who “must have been awake,” coyotes stand in metonymically for John’s sexual 
assault. Bertha’s insistence that John is under Coyote’s possession links the animals here 
to the Coyote myth by blurring the connection between them. The connection between 
the real animal and the Native Coyote spirit is most clearly shown in the transformation 
of Coyote Jack: “His body flitted back and forth between man and coyote, then the 
coyote dropped on all fours and cowered away” (272). Following this, Beth sees Coyote 
Jack transformed back into a naked man. For Beth, coyotes and the Coyote of Native 
mythology have nothing to do with the restoration of agency and identity, Indigenous or 
otherwise; coyotes and the “trickster” Coyote function as uncomplicated symbols of 
horror and abjection. 
Kristina Fagan in “What’s the Trouble with the Trickster?” suggests that scholars 
are increasingly distancing themselves from the term, “trickster”:  
in as authoritative a source as The Cambridge Companion to Native 
American Literature (2005), the trickster is only very briefly mentioned, 
with the following sceptical commentary: “Whether such easy celebration 
[of the hybrid, postmodern, identity-shifting trickster] actually chimes 
with the lived reality or is more of a literary and utopian gesture has been 
a matter of some debate, as has the reason for its popularity with non-
Indian readers. Does it allow connections to be made across cultures or is 
it just more easily consumable by white readers because it has lost its 
specificity and communal identity in a cosmopolitan and postmodern 
mélange?” (79). And, in 2007, Ojibway scholar Niigonwedom Sinclair 
actually called for a moratorium on studies of the trickster. (14) 
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While there is no easy answer to the question of whether Anderson-Dargatz’s “trickster” 
is a hybridized, postmodern metaphor of trauma or a campy, sensational product for the 
delectation of non-Native readers, what does seem clear is that when non-Native writers 
incorporate Indigenous stories into their work, they should do so in ways that honour 
those stories. As Morra insists in her discussion of Anderson-Dargatz’s Coyote, “instead 
of burdening that figure with other layers of meaning that are of our own invention, we 
might perhaps open ourselves up to and learn about what the figure means for an 
Indigenous community” (88).
71
 
 While Anderson-Dargatz’s use of Indigenous stories of Coyote may be vexed by 
critical commentary outside the limited view of the novel as Beth writes it, for Beth, 
whose story this is, coyotes are her way to mediate and imagine otherwise 
unrepresentable traumas. The scrapbook functions in a similar way for Beth’s mother and 
works as a wordless arbitrator for her traumas. In both cases, trauma is not spoken but 
rather imaginatively experienced or recreated symbolically in the scrapbook. Beth thus 
fittingly concludes her narrative by emphasizing healing and transformation through the 
scripto-therapeutic act of putting her story into words. The final section opens with the 
sudden onset of spring, a season of transformation and new life which is mirrored by 
personal renewals for both Beth and Billy: for Billy, “It was as if he’d been remade, as if 
that old Billy had been sloughed off and he’d grown a new skin”; and for Beth, “Then 
again, maybe it was I who had done the changing, like those lizards, got a fresh pair of 
eye skins to look through” (285).  
 Importantly, the constructedness of Beth’s narrative is foregrounded in these self-
reflexive concluding pages where Beth locates the source of her catharsis: “I had 
acquired an urge to write everything down, set it down so I wouldn’t lose it” (287). Beth 
even makes her own paper so that she can put her thoughts into words. Beth’s memory 
book would be different from her mother’s: “It would be a book of words, my words” 
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 Morra’s plea is followed by a parenthetical address to those who might criticize her from the perspective 
of postmodern, Derridean theory which questions a singular, originary meaning: “(and, yes, I am aware 
that, in making this kind of assertion, I am flying in the face of the postmodern dismissal of ‘originary 
meaning,’ a dismissal that conveniently allows critics to side-step ethical commitments)” (88).  
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(287). But like her mother’s scrapbook, this book will be her safe place to sort out her 
feelings. Beth now understands her mother’s talking to her dead grandmother as a 
therapeutic act: “It was craziness, talking to a dead woman, but she spoke the words, got 
them out of her mouth, and that was what mattered. As Billy said, if you could only get 
things out of yourself—speak them, or write them down, or paste bits of them into a 
scrapbook—then you could sort things out” (287). Beth wants to put an end to her 
family’s history of traumatic hauntings: “I was determined to put my words down on 
paper, so I would never gabble to a dead woman as my mother did” (287).  
 In overtly defining itself as scripto-therapeutic, the novel makes its final plea for a 
reading of it as a text of healing. Beth is transformed from a helpless victim to a self-
empowered woman no longer afraid to stand up to her corrupt father: “‘You never touch 
me again. [. . .] Keep your goddamned hands off me. You’re my father, for Christ’s 
sake’” (290). John, too, seems to undergo a transformation, and, as he does, the ending 
seems to take on a storybook or fairy tale quality. John begins to cry after Beth 
reproaches him. He cries for three days, following which Maud loses her temper, slaps 
him across the face, and tells him to stop acting like a child. He then goes silent for three 
days (291). The implausibility of the scene with its mythic invocation of the number three 
seems to deliberately call into question the reliability of its narration. The sudden 
transformations and acts of healing almost seem contrived to conform to an essentially 
comedic ending where order is restored and romance prevails as Beth and Billy hold 
hands and look forward to the future (292). 
 Anderson-Dargatz’s concluding emphasis on the text as a storied construction 
serves as a reminder that the novel is, after all, an act of memory and its reconstruction. 
Whereas some critics have complained about the ending, such as Radu who calls it 
“sentimental,” I read it as part of the larger project of the novel to offer new and creative 
ways to depict childhood trauma by experimenting with multiple genres in an effort to 
capture experiences that exceed the boundaries of any one genre. Indeed, the novel 
continues to hybridize in its final pages which consist of an index of recipes and remedies 
in what seems to be a tribute to the novel as part of the feminine, domestic genre of 
settler writing such as Susanna Moodie’s and Catharine Parr Traill’s (293-94). The 
scrapbook and the novel as a whole pay homage to a much broader autobiographical 
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tradition of women representing themselves. The novel has also, as I have shown, paired 
and fused traumatic encounters with magic realism merging, as Macpherson notes, “‘fact’ 
and ‘fiction’—and the reader cannot quite be sure which is which” (2005: 99-100). The 
Cure for Death by Lightning stands as a representative example of the textual imperative 
in child sexual abuse narratives to mix genres in the formation of a traumatic and 
therapeutic imaginary that is at once a lived experience that needs testimony, a gothic 
horror, a magical realist nightmare and escape fantasy, and a scripto-therapeutic act of 
healing.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Fiction as Testimony: Telling Stories of Residential 
Schooling and its Legacies 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter extends my exploration of the ways in which Canadian writers 
explore the aesthetic and performative aspects of the traumatic imaginary to an analysis 
of the ways in which three Native writers purposefully use fiction to tell and to teach both 
Native and non-Native audiences stories of residential school abuses and their legacies. 
Through a close examination of Vera Manuel’s play, Strength of Indian Women, and two 
novels, James Bartleman’s As Long as the Rivers Flow and Robert Arthur Alexie’s 
Porcupines and China Dolls, I contend that these works complicate their generic status as 
fiction by functioning as didactic forms of testimony to residential school traumas 
broadly and, more specifically, to child sexual abuse at the schools. They do so, in part, 
through the primacy these writers place on the centrality of stories to individual lives, to 
the circulation of stories in their communities, and to the transformational power that 
stories have to teach audiences about the children who suffered multiple forms of abuse 
in government legislated, church-run residential schools.
72
  
In “Weesageechak Meets the Weetigo: Storytelling, Humour, and Trauma in the 
Fiction of Richard Van Camp, Tomson Highway, and Eden Robinson,” Kristina Fagan 
suggests that while PTSD is now considered to be what lies behind many of the social 
problems experienced in Aboriginal communities, Western conceptions of trauma do not 
necessarily apply cross-culturally and may not be adequate for understanding Aboriginal 
articulations of trauma (205). Fagan is influenced by Indigenous nationalist scholars who 
suggest that theories pertaining to Indigenous peoples should arise from their own 
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 To date, these works have been largely unexamined by scholars, although there has been increased 
attention to Alexie’s novel since its republication by Theytus in 2009. Much more widely studied is 
Tomson Highway’s Kiss of the Fur Queen (1998), to which I refer in my introductory analysis of the 
concept of trauma in the context of Aboriginal writing. 
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traditions and epistemologies.
73
 She suggests that these theories can be found in 
Aboriginal traditions of storytelling: “Stories, told and retold over generations, contain 
complex teachings about Aboriginal history, science, ethics, spirituality, and methods of 
survival. [. . .S]tories can provide means of both articulating and understanding traumatic 
events” (206-207). In Fagan’s analysis, writers such as Tomson Highway in Kiss of the 
Fur Queen use “storytelling to create ‘Aboriginal trauma theory’” (205). “Aboriginal 
trauma theory,” as Fagan defines it, arises not from external sources which are then 
applied to fiction, but is produced by the fiction itself. As I will show, this mode of 
storytelling serves both therapeutic and socio-political functions. As Jo-Ann Episkenew 
contends, “Contemporary Indigenous literature serves two transformative functions—
healing Indigenous people and advancing social justice in settler society—both 
components in the process of decolonization” (Taking Back Our Spirits 15). In 
circulating stories of the experience of being a child in the residential school system, 
these narratives seek to implicate Indigenous and settler readers as witnesses to creative 
forms of testimony that participate in the project of social justice. 
Rita Joe, in Song of Rita Joe: Autobiography of a Mi’kmaq Poet, writes that she 
“lost [her] talk” as a little girl at residential school: “You snatched it away; / I speak like 
you / I think like you / I create like you”; yet she searches for her “talk” so that she might 
use it to teach others: “So gently I offer my hand and ask, / Let me find my talk / So I can 
teach you about me” (55).
74
 The pedagogical impulse identified by Joe is shared by all of 
the authors I discuss. Chippewa author James Bartleman chose to write his first novel, As 
Long as the Rivers Flow, about the multi-generational legacy of the residential school 
system, because of his belief that “fiction is much more powerful than non-fiction” 
(“Interview”). In an interview with Shelagh Rogers, Bartleman explains that the 
disproportionate number of suicides among Native youths in fly-in communities in 
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 See, for example, Warrior, Robert Allen, Jace Weaver, and Craig S. Womack. American Indian Literary 
Nationalism. Albuquerque: U of New Mexico P, 2006. 
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 The “you” in Joe’s poem shifts from addressing the residential school system (“You snatched it away”) 
to a broader “you” that seems to address non-Native readers (“So I can teach you about me”). 
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Northern Ontario sparked his narrative and his desire to teach others about the legacies of 
residential schooling:  
I wanted to explore the life of one woman from the time of her birth to 
2002, to follow her, to get people to get to know her. [. . .] I wanted them 
to get to know the priest who abused her. I wanted them to get to know her 
daughter and her son, and to give people an idea about the real impact of 
the residential school system on individuals. And I also wanted to write a 
book which would be read by Native children as well, because it’s a book 
with a positive ending—that you have to take control of your lives. 
Secwepemc and Ktunaxa writer Vera Manuel’s Strength of Indian Women 
similarly employs a fictional form, a play, to testify to both the traumas and legacies of 
residential schools. In her foreword, Manuel emphasizes the play’s grounding in truth: 
“Stories about the abuse and helplessness of little children in residential school are true 
stories. Because of this, they are the most difficult to write. / I didn’t make up the stories 
told in Strength of Indian Women. They came from pictures my mother painted for me 
with her words, words that helped me see her as a little girl for the first time” (n. pag.). 
Both Cree writer Tomson Highway’s Kiss of the Fur Queen and Teetl’it Gwich’in writer 
Robert Arthur Alexie’s Porcupines and China Dolls are semi-autobiographical novels, at 
least partly based on these writers’ personal experiences of residential schools and, like 
Bartleman and Manuel, share an impulse to testify to as broad an audience as possible, as 
Highways puts it, the “unforgivable, monstrous evil” of residential schools. Indeed, as 
Highway said in 1998, these stories “should be published as the headline of every 
newspaper every day for 10 years” (Posner, “Highway is Back”). And Alexie, in “An 
Author in Waiting” (2002) said that he had e-mailed, in addition to CBC television and 
radio, David Letterman, Oprah Winfrey, and Dr. Phil in attempts to broadcast his story to 
a mass audience.  
This impulse to tell the story of residential school traumas—essentially, to use 
fictional forms to testify to them—is shared by Manuel, Bartleman, and Alexie in their 
effort to teach both Native and non-Natives about the after-effects that continue to be 
experienced in Native communities. As Bartleman insists, “We needed to have something 
which touched the hearts of Canadians and made them look at the impact of the 
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residential schools and the under-funding for education which Native communities have 
to cope with to humanize [them] and that’s why I wrote this book” (“Interview”). Sam 
McKegney argues that creative forms of residential school narratives, “offer profound 
complications to the historical record as it stands, commenting not only on how 
residential schooling is remembered but also on how its legacy ought to be reacted to, its 
transgressions addressed, and its survivors (and their communities) empowered” (Magic 
Weapons 17). This chapter seeks to explore these texts as creative forms of testimony that 
exist outside of Western epistemologies and standard historicizing methods and attends to 
the ways in which story-telling strategies are employed to implicate readers as witnesses 
and to circulate and create new knowledge and understandings about the legacies of 
residential schooling in Canada. 
 Before turning to Fagan’s conceptualization of the possibility of an “Aboriginal 
trauma theory,” I want briefly to contextualize the works I examine within the church and 
government apologies for the residential school system and the work of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) currently underway and set to conclude in 
July 2014. Church apologies in the early 1990s and high profile disclosures of sexual 
abuse suffered at residential school, for example, Phil Fontaine’s in 1990, ultimately led 
to the 1998 apology by Indian Affairs Minister, Jane Stewart. It was, in fact, Stewart’s 
1998 apology which resulted in the creation of The Aboriginal Healing Foundation in the 
same year. Manuel’s Strength of Indian Women, while published in 1998, was first staged 
in Vancouver in 1992, coterminous with the church apologies and on the heels of the 
public scrutiny in the late 1980s sparked by lawsuits by residential school survivors 
against the Canadian government and churches. Highway’s 1998 novel comes in the 
same year as the first government apology. Alexie’s 2002 novel follows this and precedes 
Stephen Harper’s 2008 apology. Bartleman’s 2011 novel follows the Harper apology and 
is the only work among those I consider to be published at the same time as the work of 
the TRC, and, as I discuss later on, may be a direct response to the present-day vacuum of 
national discourse on residential schools despite the efforts of the TRC. Bartleman’s 
novel also follows Harper’s 2009 statement to the media that Canada has no colonial 
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history (see Henderson and Wakeham 1).
75
 Aboriginal leaders and scholars have 
commented upon the glibness of Harper’s apology in light of his party’s policies and his 
subsequent personal denial of Canada’s colonial history. Episkenew, for example, quips:  
Harper’s 2008 apology was a momentous gift to the Aboriginal people of 
Canada, especially those who attended residential schools. By denying 
Canada’s colonial past in 2009 and refusing to continue funding for the 
Aboriginal Healing Foundation in 2010, the Prime Minister is, in effect, 
taking that gift back. I’m embarrassed to say that when I was a child, we 
labeled people who gave something and then took it back as “Indian 
givers”! (“Afterword” 193) 
 Harper not only gave with one hand and took away with the other; his apology 
completely overshadowed the earlier 1998 apology and stands as the apology that will be 
memorialized by the TRC’s recommendation that it be prominently displayed in all 
schools in the country. While this act offers the opportunity for a national 
commemorative practice for the abuses suffered at residential schools, it is hard not to see 
Harper’s apology as purely self-serving and self-memorializing, which is hurtful to the 
many Aboriginal people for whom the apology meant so much. In the context of all of 
the talk and apologizing about residential schools, Aboriginal writers, many of whom are 
themselves survivors of residential school, have sometimes chosen fictional forms over 
available discursive arenas such as courtrooms, the media, and, more recently, the TRC, 
to articulate individual and community wounds created by the Canadian government’s 
assimilative strategy through residential schooling. This chapter explores what these 
writers add to the current discourse of reconciliation and healing produced by the story-
telling initiative of the TRC. Keavy Martin cautions that it remains to be seen whether 
Canadians will give a genuine hearing to the TRC testimonies: “After all, it would have 
been easy to mistake the high-profile apology as the climax of this particular story. 
Continuing repercussions and further testimony make for a cumbersome denouement” 
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 Harper insisted that “‘We are one of the most stable regimes in history. There are very few countries that 
can say for nearly 150 years they’ve had the same political system without any social breakdown, political 
upheaval or invasion. We are unique in that regard. We also have no history of colonialism’’” (qtd. in 
Henderson and Wakeham 1). 
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(51). Fiction, however, can provide an alternate space of teaching and healing 
unencumbered by standard testimonial practices. 
4.1.1  “Aboriginal Trauma Theory” 
 This dissertation has been informed by Western conceptions of trauma that have 
arisen from the academy and culturally circulated through the memoirs and stories of 
Canadian writers. In the case of Aboriginal writers, however, Western academic 
conceptualizations of trauma applied to their narratives have the potential to whitewash 
Aboriginal understandings that might otherwise arise by boxing them into a foreign 
paradigm that understands trauma in culturally specific ways. Kimberly Blaeser argues 
that, “The insistence on reading Native literature by way of Western literary theory 
clearly violates its integrity and performs a new act of colonization and conquest” (55). I 
have struggled with my reluctance to apply Western trauma theories (with which I am 
most familiar) to Aboriginal texts on the one hand, and my lack of lived experience of 
Aboriginal culture, which in some ways limits my approach to the texts on the other.
76
 
One possible way out of the quandary is to take a hybridized approach to the texts, such 
as Deena Rymhs does in her discussion of Rudy Wiebe’s and Yvonne Johnson’s Stolen 
Life: The Journey of a Cree Woman. Rymhs notes the difference between testimony, as 
theorized by Felman and Laub, and accounts of racial, cultural, or class struggle in Latin 
American testimonio: “A crucial difference between the two is that while the latter bears 
witness to an event of the historic past, the testimonio typically engages a present, 
insurgent situation” (52). She views Stolen Life as a “convergence” of these forms of 
testimony which she situates in the dialogic exchange and collaboration between Wiebe, 
a non-Native, and Johnson, a Cree woman and descendant of Big Bear (52). While the 
activist impulse of testimonio as it intersects with the testimonial process of articulating 
and bearing witness to trauma provides a rubric for understanding Stolen Life, and, 
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 While my ancestry is Métis, I was raised in a family who considered themselves French, so all of my 
cultural traditions are French Canadian. My Native great-grandmother was shunned by her daughter-in-law, 
my French grandmother, who taught my mother to hate Aboriginals and to never admit to her own 
bloodline. My ancestry only became clear to me in the 1980s when, in an undergraduate course on Feminist 
Theory, I was required to research my matrilineal line for a project entitled “Unearthing Our Mothers.” I 
discovered my Native heritage in this way and called my project, “What my Mother Buried.”  
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indeed, could well be applied to all of the novels I examine in this chapter, the Western-
Latin American hybrid theory posited by Rymhs still fails to take Aboriginal conceptions 
of testimony into account.  
 In “Trauma, Power and the Therapeutic: Speaking Psychotherapeutic Narratives 
in an era of Indigenous Human Rights,” Dian Million critiques the dominance of Western 
theories of trauma: “Humans have a range of responses to social violence, the 
complexities of which are flattened by the received trauma narrative, now a master 
narrative with scientific security and international social justice carte blanche. Thus, other 
experiences and responses to social violence, particularly non-Western ones, are more 
often silenced in trauma’s logic” (385). She grants, however, that Western forms of 
public testimony, such as those provided by social programs, the justice system, and the 
TRC, provide a stage for Indigenous articulations of trauma that would otherwise remain 
closeted from public attention. As Million says, only after the framing of Indigenous 
experience within these structures, “did their narratives become Indian narratives, their 
speech Indian speech. Not until they had gained access to discursive arenas, the media, 
texts, television, the internet, and music, articulating their own words to existing 
discourses and rising to create their own” (382). Million suggests that Indigenous peoples 
have worked within the parameters of existing discursive practices to create their own 
means of articulating traumas, yet she critiques Western conceptions of trauma, in part, 
by arguing that they are part of the colonial apparatus that continues to subjugate 
Aboriginal peoples.
77
 Ironically, she locates the discursive power of Western 
individualistic notions of healing ironically in the language of justice and redress itself: 
The description and logic of trauma is hegemonic but it also appears to be 
the language of justice and redress. How might we differentiate those 
Indigenous knowledges and customary practices that lie outside of an 
international trauma paradigm? Such a differentiation is essential, as 
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 Roland Chrisjohn and Sherri Young have similarly criticized the individualistic model of Western 
therapy which locates “the problem” within the individual rather than locating the problem within the larger 
context of colonialism and the rise of residential schooling (118). They suggest that it is not enough to 
examine the individual problems of an Indigenous person. The “legal, political, social and economic 
forces” that are at the root of the problem must also be critically examined (119). 
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Indigenous thought and practice may counter and interrupt the production 
of the biopolitical subject, the subject of trauma that is a continuation of 
the colonized subjectivities I have critiqued here. What, for instance, is the 
intersection between colonial medical and psychological interventions and 
our desire for justice and health framed by Indigenous cultural and 
spiritual beliefs? What is the nexus between the desire for self-determining 
community-based action and our own self-management in social welfare 
and criminal justice systems? How might the practice of Indigenous 
subjectivities (to be Cree, to be Anishinabe, to be Inuit, to be Stolo) offer 
ways to not be a therapeutic subject? (383; original emphasis) 
The idea of not being a Western therapeutic subject opens up the possibility of being a 
nation-specific Indigenous subject empowered to tell a story of trauma in non-
medicalized, non-Western terms. What might constitute a specifically Cree or Anishinabe 
or any other nation-specific Indigenous theory of trauma has not yet been fully explored 
by scholars and is well beyond the scope of this project. I would, however, like to pursue 
Fagan’s broad notion of “Aboriginal trauma theory” to frame my own reading of the 
residential school narratives in a manner that seeks to respect the epistemologies they 
articulate. 
 Fagan puts quotation marks around “Aboriginal trauma theory” without providing 
a reference, which I take to mean that she is coining the phrase and possibly marking it as 
provisional. One of the problems of trying to isolate a definition of what might constitute 
a theory of trauma particular to Aboriginal peoples, one that is based upon the practices 
and traditions of their communities, is that the pervasive influence of Western culture and 
Western conceptions of trauma on Aboriginal communities may make this an impossible 
endeavor. Another issue is the problematic implication that an Aboriginal trauma theory 
might somehow offer a pure, authentic, and singular approach to painful events, as if it is 
tenable to say that there is one way, an “Aboriginal way,” to understand the traumas of 
heterogeneous Indigenous communities with a multiplicity of belief systems. Theories, as 
Gerald Vizenor further contends, while often applied to Aboriginal texts, never fulfill 
their dream of affixing meaning to narratives that slip from their grasp: “Theories never 
anticipate visionary or innovative narratives, and never allow for the clever, artistic 
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variations of Native storiers. Native narratives are literary art, and theories are 
translations or uncertain interpretations of that tensive union of memory, tropisms, traces 
of convergence, tradition, culture and the tease and irony of storiers” (50). These 
objections are overcome in Fagan’s analysis through her crucial stricture that Aboriginal 
trauma theory is not a preconceived set of premises which are applied to texts but rather a 
shifting set of understandings that arise from the stories themselves.  
I will first outline Fagan’s theorization of Aboriginal trauma theory, following 
which I will briefly incorporate one of her textual examples, Highway’s Kiss of the Fur 
Queen, to elucidate the workings of her theory. In arguing that Western trauma theory’s 
focus on individual therapy is a culturally specific approach and thus not necessarily 
applicable to Indigenous communities, Fagan points to the work of social anthropologist, 
Michael Kenny, to suggest that understanding any one traumatic event is a culturally 
informed act and “psychological interpretation is a creative act” (206). Kenny, in 
“Trauma, Time, Illness, and Culture: an Anthropological Approach to Traumatic 
Memory,” locates the Western therapeutic process in the act of telling the traumatic story 
to free the victim from past damage (153). Following the work of Pierre Janet, Kenny 
summarizes the process as “the construction of a story or ‘narrative’—a return to the 
scene of the crime in which the formerly dissociated material now finds a place in 
consciousness. As Janet said, ‘memory is an action: essentially it is the action of telling a 
story’” (154). Fagan thus reasons,  
When we consider that Aboriginal societies have their own distinct 
traditions of storytelling, it makes sense to consider that Aboriginal people 
may express the connections between past and present pain in ways that 
differ from Western therapeutic models. Aboriginal societies have evolved 
their own theories to explain the connection between past traumas and 
current misfortunes. (205-06) 
 Fagan suggests that these theories can be found in Aboriginal traditions of 
storytelling: “Stories, told and retold over generations, contain complex teachings about 
Aboriginal history, science, ethics, spirituality, and methods of survival. [. . .] [S]tories 
can provide means of both articulating and understanding traumatic events” (206-07). 
Aboriginal stories, moreover, are a means to express wisdom and knowledge indirectly. 
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Fagan refers to Kimberley Roppolo’s use of the term “indirect discourse” to describe how 
stories transmit knowledge (207). According to Roppolo, a pattern of speech typical of 
Native Americans is to imply meaning, rather than make direct statements, and expect 
their listeners to deduce it for themselves.
78
 Fagan therefore notes that “the direct 
communication encouraged by Western trauma theory often clashes with Aboriginal 
means of expression” (207). Direct testimony is thus likely to be a problematic endeavour 
for many Aboriginal people. 
In fact, Aboriginal stories can function as an indirect way to express what might 
count as evidence to traumatic events. Kimberly Roppolo argues that Native American 
arguments differ from those of the mainstream in their appeals to ethos: “In Native 
culture, experience in general—whether the experiences of the culture encoded in story, 
the experiences of an authoritative elder, or the experiences of an individual who shares 
the same cultural values—is held as evidence. In fact, this is precisely what invests a 
person with ‘authority’ in Native cultures” (306-07).  Roppolo says that a “rhetoric for 
Native American literary discourse would be tribally centered, with intertribal 
connections” (308). Ruppolo identifies “indirect discourse” as a “phenomena in Native 
speech” (316), one that is pervasive enough for her to call indirect discourse an “Indian 
rhetorical tradition” (320). She suggests that when “someone has done something wrong 
or foolish, when an error needs to be addressed, care is often taken, at least traditionally, 
that that person does not feel ‘put on the spot,’ that he or she can remedy his or her 
mistake without losing honor. Implication, rather than explication, is the usual means of 
conveying this message” (316). Ruppolo argues that an example of this form of 
communication is telling a story to convey a message (316). 
 I take from Fagan and Roppolo two guiding principles for conceptualizing what 
might constitute an Aboriginal trauma theory: first, that Indigenous knowledge and 
beliefs are embedded in stories, and one can look to the stories that Indigenous writers 
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 Roppolo’s use of the term “indirect discourse” to denote a pattern of Native American speech should not 
be confused with the grammatical term, “free indirect discourse.” See Kimberley Roppolo’s “Samson 
Occom as Writing Instructor: The Search for an Intertribal Rhetoric.” Reasoning Together: The Native 
Critics’ Collective. Ed. Craig S. Womack, Daniel Heath Justice, and Christopher B. Teuton. Norman: U of 
Oklahoma P, 2008. 303-324. 
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tell to gain access to how trauma is understood; and second, that indirect discourse is the 
preferred method of communication for many Indigenous peoples’ speech and narrative 
practices. What I found in my analysis of Manuel’s, Bartleman’s, and Alexie’s texts is 
both a reluctance and an imperative to talk about past traumas, specifically in these texts, 
child sexual abuse suffered at residential school. Fagan underscores the fact that there is 
often the need for Indigenous peoples to publically testify to past traumas, whether that is 
in the courtroom or for the TRC. She identifies “two contradictory impulses at work for 
Aboriginal people when it comes to speaking about sexual abuse. There is often a need 
for them to speak about traumatic experiences in order to change what is happening. But 
there is also a strong cultural prohibition against making direct or angry accusations” 
(209-10). Indeed, this push and pull between telling and not telling is a tension at work in 
all of the narratives I examine. Fagan suggests that “Storytelling and humour offer 
responses to this dilemma, and can act as alternatives to witnessing” (210). I want to 
extend Fagan’s theorization to argue that storytelling can also function as an alternative 
to testimony (not just witnessing) by providing writers with a means to express the 
traumas of residential schooling indirectly through the stories they tell in their fictions.  
 Tomson Highway’s autobiographical novel, Kiss of the Fur Queen, is a case in 
point. Like Alexie, who writes about his childhood sexual abuse for the first time in his 
novel, Highway similarly chooses the novel form to first disclose the abuses he and his 
brother, René, suffered at residential school. And, like Alexie, writing the novel serves a 
scripto-therapeutic purpose for Highway. For Highway, writing about his traumas was 
literally a matter of life and death. As he says to Judy Stoffman in an interview,  “‘If I 
couldn’t have written [Kiss of the Fur Queen], I would have killed myself—unless we 
confront the evil, it will kill you as it killed my brother.’”79 Talking or writing about 
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 Highway’s reference to René’s death as somehow connected to not confronting “the evil” is troubling. 
René died of AIDS-related complications, as does Gabriel in the novel. Gabriel’s promiscuous homosexual 
lifestyle following his abuse at residential school is contrasted in the novel to Jeremiah’s ascetic, almost 
monastic heterosexual lifestyle. Is Highway suggesting that René would not have been gay or promiscuous 
enough to contract HIV had he confronted his past sexual abuse by the priest at the school? The potential 
connection between homosexuality, sexual abuse, and illness/death is but one of the reasons that scholars 
such as Daniel Heath Justice have suggested that Kiss of the Fur Queen is a toxic text connoting a 
homosexuality which cannot be healed. I understand how such readings are plausible; however, a 
homosexual himself, Highway, in my view, unflinchingly explores the after-effects of sexual abuse on two 
brothers who respond differently to their past traumas. Jeremiah, modelled after Highway, is heterosexual 
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painful experiences is difficult, according to Fagan, given the cultural prohibition against 
communicating anger or sorrow directly, a sanction which she points out is played out in 
the novel when Jeremiah and Gabriel decide not to tell their parents about Father 
Lafleur’s sexual predations. Fagan argues that the cultural preference for indirect 
communication is a principal reason why Highway wrote the novel. Just as Jeremiah 
expresses himself through writing, “In a similar way, it seems that, in order to finally find 
a way to tell his own story, Highway turned away from the public world of the theatre, 
where he had previously worked, and then away from the autobiographical form in which 
he originally tried to tell his story, and to the more private and distanced world of the 
novel” (Fagan, “Weesageechak”  215). Fictional autobiographies, says Fagan, allow “one 
to speak of one’s painful experience while treating it as a fiction” (216). 
 Using the novel form also allows Highway to embed Cree mythological figures 
and stories throughout his fiction as a narrative strategy to tell his trauma story in Cree 
terms, outside of Western traditions of fictional autobiographies. Near the end of the 
novel when Gabriel is dying in a hospital, his father, Abraham, tells Gabriel and Jeremiah 
the Cree tale of the Son of Ayash, whose mother tells him, “‘The world has become too 
evil. With these magic weapons, make a new world’” (227). Margery Fee notes the 
creative and transformational power evoked by the Cree story: “As Tomson Highway 
made clear in his Kiss of the Fur Queen, music, dance, theatre, writing, and the other 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
in the novel for a reason: Highway wanted to suggest that the child sexual abuse he and his brother 
experienced by the priest did not lead to their homosexuality. Jennifer Henderson acknowledges that the 
novel “[. . .] takes the risk of associating the brothers’ sexuality—including Gabriel Okimasis’s 
unambiguous homosexuality—with their experiences of sexual abuse in the school” (180). Henderson 
details what she understands to be “the real scandal of Kiss of the Fur Queen, which is its willingness to 
draw associations (which are non-totalizing and non-determinative, but associations all the same) between 
trauma and identity, between sexual abuse and queer sexuality, and between sexual abuse and a queerly 
assumed First Nations identity. These associations are prohibited in a Left-liberal discussion on progressive 
grounds and for good reasons. The mere suggestion of a link between traumatic experience and non-
normative sexual practices, for instance, seems to produce a pathological taint that colours those practices 
as compulsive repetition. [. . . H]owever, without the kinds of associations that Highway insists on drawing, 
the subversive, productive possibilities of repetitions that allow differentiation and agency through their 
creative restaging of traumatic experience are unimaginable” (187-88).Still, Highway’s suggestion that his 
brother’s death could have been prevented vexes me. Child sexual abuse does not necessarily lead to 
promiscuity any more than it leads to homosexuality, and, even if René had not been promiscuous, he still 
could have contracted HIV, especially in the 1980s, when he was infected. Safe sex only became prominent 
in the late 1980s as a result of the “AIDS epidemic.” René Highway died in 1990. 
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arts—based on traditional roots—were to be the magic weapons with which Indigenous 
people would make a new world” (62). For Sam McKegney, the image was important 
enough to title his monograph on residential school narratives, Magic Weapons. 
McKegney emphasizes the educative and political impulse of Indigenous artistic 
practices in the novel. Like Tomson and René Highway, Jeremiah and Gabriel “take to 
artistic expression—the former through piano and writing and the latter through dance—
initially as a coping mechanism for past trauma and eventually as a means of combating 
the forces of oppression that have infected not only their own lives but those of thousands 
of Natives whom they endeavour to influence” (156). Highway’s novel champions the 
notion that literature can perform both personal and political functions: to heal and to 
instruct others about the legacies of residential school through a reclamation of the 
traditions and storytelling practices lost through colonial subjugation. The writers I 
discuss shortly—Manuel, Bartleman, and Alexie—share Highway’s emphasis on the 
pedagogical and political importance of telling the story of residential school abuses and 
legacies in specifically Indigenous ways. 
 As a form of testimony, Kiss of the Fur Queen is able to explore the complexities 
of child sexual abuse within the system of residential schooling without the constraints 
imposed by standard testimonial forms requiring evidence, facts, and the truth “beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Highway demonstrates the radical capacity of fiction to reveal its 
truths while insisting upon the troubled access to such truths. The central crisis of the 
novel is the rape of Gabriel by Father Lafleur, a story which is told from the perspective 
of both brothers. Jeremiah witnesses the scene and understands it, importantly, in terms 
of the Cree myth of the cannibalistic figure of the Weetigo: “Gabriel was not alone. A 
dark, hulking figure hovered over him, like a crow. Visible only in silhouette, for all 
Jeremiah knew it might have been a bear devouring a honey-comb, or the Weetigo 
feasting on human flesh” (79). Gabriel’s perception of the scene of his abuse is coloured 
by his dream-like state as the priest has attacked him as he sleeps. What Jeremiah stories, 
Gabriel dreams; in both cases, perception blurs reality. The scene of his rape, according 
to McKegney, lacks straightforward reporting because of Gabriel’s altered state of 
consciousness, troubling “the division between lived experience and (anti-historical) 
subconscious interference” (157-58). Despite this, the fact that sexual abuse is occurring 
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is never in question. McKegney argues that this scene of Gabriel’s rape functions to 
interrogate traditional forms of traumatic testimony: 
Neither brother is shown to be in a position to indisputably detail Father 
Lafleur’s assault on Gabriel.[ . . .] Yet the audience is never left with any 
doubt that the abuse has occurred, which cuts to the heart of Kiss of the 
Fur Queen’s implicit critique of standard historicizing tactics for the 
residential school legacy. When bound by Euro-Canadian legal definitions 
of “truth” and “fact,” contingent on the improbable attainment of 
“evidence,” the crucial cognitive endeavour of revisiting residential school 
trauma is limited in its capacity to influence people’s understanding of the 
broader causes and implications of residential school transgressions. For 
this reason, Highway presents the novel’s most crucial incident of abuse as 
factually uncertain, yet with enormous symbolic and evocative force. 
(158-59) 
Implicit in Highway’s novel, then, is a plea to permit fictional accounts of 
residential school traumas and legacies to stand in for conventional public forms of 
testimony. For McKegney, Highway’s novel re-imagines what counts as testimony: “Kiss 
of the Fur Queen is an extraordinarily political novel, and all the more so because of its 
seductive avoidance of well-worn paths of testimonial discourse and non-fictional 
political argumentation” (173). Through Cree orature and traditions, Kiss of the Fur 
Queen offers up an Indigenous testimonial imaginary to the lived experience of the 
Highway brothers. Aboriginal trauma theory arises from the stories told in Highway’s 
novel and by other Aboriginal writers who choose fiction to convey their knowledge or 
experience of residential school legacies. As Fagan insists, “Aboriginal stories and 
traditions are theory, and they can offer us fruitful ways to understand Aboriginal 
literature” (219). 
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4.2 Vera Manuel, Strength of Indian Women 
All of you went through so much. Someone should write about it. They 
should make a movie about how you survived. I feel real proud sitting 
here among you. You’re just like old warriors. (114) 
Strength of Indian Women 
First staged at the Firehall Theatre in Vancouver’s downtown eastside in January 
of 1992, Vera Manuel’s Strength of Indian Women was performed by a cast of 
Indigenous women in an area known for its poverty, crime, violence, drug use, and sex 
trade, but also and importantly for its activism. On the heels of the inaugural performance 
of Manuel’s play came the second annual Women’s Memorial March in the downtown 
eastside on Valentine’s Day in 1992. Initiated by First Nations women, the march 
commemorates missing and murdered Aboriginal women. Manuel’s play focuses on the 
disclosures and legacies of abuses suffered at residential school by a group of Native 
women. One of these elders, Agnes, recounts the night her friend and fellow residential 
school survivor, Annie, was murdered in Vancouver where the two worked as prostitutes. 
Agnes tells her story because, as she says, “It could just as easily have been me that got 
killed. Somebody has to talk about it. Somebody has to tell the truth about what happened 
to all those little girls” (102). As Manuel emphasizes in her foreword to the play, the 
stories she tells are true ones that need a public stage. The presence, then, of Indigenous 
women on stage telling what in fact are true stories of child abuse and the after-effects of 
residential schooling, which led Agnes and Annie to a risky life on the streets as 
prostitutes, alongside a real-life commemorative protest of missing and murdered 
Indigenous women pushes at the limits of the play’s fictional form by staging its 
personal, public, and political import beyond the lives of the characters.  The play 
functions as a form of public, staged testimony to residential school survival while it 
concomitantly implicates the audience as witnesses. For those audience members who are 
also survivors of residential school or have family members who are, the play enacts 
therapeutic disclosure of abuses followed by healing through the community of women 
who share their stories and through the reclamation of traditional Indigenous practices. 
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By emphasizing the play’s grounding in lived reality and truth, Manuel invites her 
audience to apprehend the play as testimony to the stories told to her by her mother about 
residential school and to Manuel’s own experiences as a child of residential school 
survivors. In response to Manuel’s foreword, Episkenew observes, “Manuel’s goal in 
writing and performing ‘Strength of Indian Women’ is to transform the current reality of 
Indigenous people by applying theatre to the problem of the intergenerational effects of 
residential schools” (Taking Back Our Spirits 166). According to Manuel, Strength of 
Indian Women came out of a short story she wrote called “The Abyss.” Manuel did not 
attend residential school herself, but both of her parents did, as did her two younger 
sisters and two younger brothers. As Manuel says, the residential school experience 
affected her whole family: “it visited us every day of our childhood through the replaying 
over and over of our parents’ childhood trauma and grief which they never had the 
opportunity to resolve in their lifetimes” (“The Abyss” 107; original emphasis). The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada uses this quotation in its on-line 
publication, They Came for the Children (79). As such, Manuel’s personal story has 
become part of the public testimonial process currently underway by the TRC. It is 
important to note, however, that Manuel’s form of choice for her testimony was through 
storytelling practices. Manuel discloses in her foreword to “The Abyss” the child sexual 
abuse that she, all of her sisters, and at least one brother suffered. Before she died, 
Manuel’s mother disclosed her own sexual abuse in residential school to Manuel and her 
sisters. Like Sousette in the play, Manuel’s mother “blamed herself for not being able to 
protect us and for not being able to help us when we were suffering” (“The Abyss” 107). 
Manuel says that her father was physically, emotionally and possibly sexually abused, 
although he never disclosed the abuse. He was, according to Manuel, often violent, 
although she does not name her abuser (107). For Manuel, writing “The Abyss” “helps to 
purge, and helps to heal my relationship with my mother” (107). Strength of Indian 
Women was similarly, as Manuel says, “pure therapy” (“Letting Go of Trauma”).  
 Not just therapy for herself, Manuel is very aware of the therapeutic potential of 
Strength of Indian Women for her audience and Indigenous communities. As a therapist, 
Manuel also understands the importance of creating an ethical and safe place with which 
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to exchange stories of trauma that always have the potential to re-traumatize listeners.
80
 
As she says in her foreword to the play, 
A tremendous responsibility is attached to telling the unresolved grief 
stories of First Nations’ people. Words have power; they cause us to feel 
the emotions of the story they are telling. [ . . .] The responsibility we hold 
in passing on these stories is to role model a healthy lifestyle for our 
children, who are always watching us for direction. When we share our 
life stories, we must create a safe place for those who come to listen, in 
order not to hurt ourselves or others. (76) 
In a public reading of the play on 17 May 2007 in Wisconsin, directed by Vera Manuel’s 
sister, Arlene, Arlene Manuel recommended that counsellors and spiritual advisors be in 
attendance because of the potential issues that the play would arouse for Oneida tribal 
members in the audience (Benton). It seems likely (although I have not been able to find 
any specific information to confirm it) that Manuel’s recommendation is based upon past 
experiences with audience members in the performance of the play. In Episkenew’s 
analysis of Manuel’s play, she suggests that “Many Indigenous people who either 
attended residential school themselves or are the children and grandchildren of those who 
did recognize these stories as truth” (Taking Back Our Spirits 164). That recognition by 
audience members represents an important moment of testimonial discursive exchange 
and connection through stories that also has the potential to open up past wounds for 
those listening to the stories told on stage. 
 The presence of Indigenous women on stage telling stories that Indigenous (and 
possibly non-Indigenous) audience members would recognize as true contributes to the 
real-life testimonial aesthetic of the play, particularly when one considers that Vera 
Manuel and her sister would sometimes participate as actors. In the published version of 
the play, two photographs appear below the title. One of those photographs is a 1998 
                                                 
80
 Vera Manuel began writing plays and poetry at the same time that she was also conducting group therapy 
workshops. She eventually brought writing and therapy together. As she says, “they were like two separate 
things I was doing and it kept me really busy, and then all of a sudden they both started coming together; it 
felt so natural, such a natural fit for me to start taking my poetry into the workshops. And I would get to see 
what a strong impact it had on people to get them to open up about their stories” (Interview). 
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production picture of Arlene Manuel playing Sousette with Vera Manuel as Lucy. 
Audience members who attended such a performance would have witnessed true stories 
of the Manuel’s replayed by family members. For the Manuel sisters, performing their 
family stories for an audience would have the therapeutic potential that comes with 
testimony in the presence of witnesses, which is the potential for the traumas to be heard 
and acknowledged. Prior to writing the play, Vera Manuel and her sister attended therapy 
sessions together. As Manuel describes it, “I put myself in therapy, in group therapy, and 
worked with my younger sister Arlene. We worked a lot together on this stuff and then it 
just naturally led me into the work that I do today” (Interview). The play, then, becomes 
part of their therapeutic journey as a family, and it does so through the act of storytelling. 
As Manuel says, “our greatest learning is through our storytelling, when people sit 
around in the circle and start talking about their lives and other people learn from their 
experience, and it’s very, very powerful” (Interview). Bringing her role as healer to the 
stage, Manuel creates what I would call a “theatre of group therapy.” 
The second photograph appears above and partially behind the picture of Vera 
and Arlene Manuel costumed as Lucy and Sousette. It is a historical photograph of 
children flanked by nuns standing in front of a residential school. Less obvious is the 
priest who stands beside the nuns near the right-hand corner of the photo. The notes to 
the play indicate that the “historic photo” was supplied by Vera Manuel (119). Both the 
play and the short story, “The Abyss,” open with a mother and her daughter looking at a 
photograph of the mother as a child posing with all the other children in front of the 
residential school she attended. In both texts, the wording describing the picture is almost 
identical and in both the daughter describes the photo to the mother who is having trouble 
with her eyesight: “It’s a bunch of little girls. Lots of them, standing in front of a big grey 
building. There’s a priest and a nun standing there with them” (Strength of Indian Women 
78).
81
 The almost exact repetition of the same scene and dialogue brings a verisimilitude 
to the exchange between mother and daughter and to the picture. In both the play and the 
story, however, the name of the residential school is fictionalized as St. Ignatius 
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 In “The Abyss” the lines read as follows: “‘It’s a bunch of girls. [. . .] lots of them standing in front of a 
big grey building. There’s a priest standing there with them’” (108). 
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Residential School in “The Abyss” and St. Eugene’s Residential School in Strength of 
Indian Women. In reality, Manuel’s siblings attended Port Alberni Residential School and 
it is possible that her parents attended the same school. Why would Manuel write and 
then re-write the same story as a play that she insists is true and then fictionalize the 
name of the residential school? Why provide an archival photograph of little girls, nuns, 
and a priest standing in front of a residential school without any indication of the date of 
the picture and without naming the school? After all, she does include the date along with 
production and photographic details of the other picture of her and her sister, Arlene. 
The absence of factual detail is even more interesting when one considers the 
primacy of the photograph to the play. The play opens with Sousette looking for the 
picture, which she shows to her daughter, Eva. The photograph sparks Sousette’s 
memories of residential school and serves as a visual springboard for the ensuing 
discussion with Eva about her experiences at residential school and also the experiences 
of her friends, Lucy, Mariah, and Agnes. The first memory that Sousette shares with Eva 
is Lucy’s sexual abuse by the priest at the school. Lucy becomes pregnant but the baby 
dies. As Sousette says, “Not just Lucy, other girls had babies, too. Lots of babies buried 
behind the school, buried in the school yard” (81). As this first scene draws to a close, 
Sousette picks up the photograph again: “As she speaks, the lights fade, and a slide of the 
picture of the girls in the school lights up on the back wall” (82). In fact, the photograph 
lights up the back of the stage throughout the play.  
In the absence of factual detail about the picture, it is easy to dismiss it as 
representative of any residential school with any group of Native students standing in 
front of it and any non-Native priest in the corner. Indeed, the name of the priest in the 
play is Father LeBlanc, a symbol of any white figure of corruption. I want to suggest, 
however, that the photograph supplied by Manuel likely comes from her own mother, 
Marceline Manuel, who was sexually abused by a priest at residential school. If it were a 
historical photo from another source, Manuel would be required to indicate its original 
publication or archival details. The play’s emphasis on testimony, which I discuss next, 
seems to me to lend credence to the argument that the play moves beyond the enactment 
of testimony to an indirect form of testimony through the “historic photo.” I contend that 
in all likelihood the audience is looking not only at a picture of Manuel’s mother but also 
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of the priest who abused her. If this is the case, then the play truly does function as an 
alternate form of testimony by providing a vehicle for Manuel to disclose a family legacy 
of abuses without having to endure the further trauma of filing a criminal complaint 
against the abusing priest and/or the residential school. Written well before the current 
TRC public testimonials, the play provided a stage for safe disclosure not otherwise 
available. 
The play is structured by the testimonies of Sousette and the other elders within 
the context of Sousette’s granddaughter, Suzie’s, traditional coming-of-age celebration. 
Suzie is thirteen-years-old. The play takes place over the three days of preparation in 
advance of the feast for Suzie. While Suzie is at the lodge for her two days of fasting 
prior to the ceremony, the women tell their stories of abuse at residential school. Sousette 
explains to Eva that she has spoken with her friends about the importance of sharing their 
history: “I talked to the others. We decided that you need to know everything, about the 
school, and about us. You need to know because of Suzie. It’s her history, too” (81). The 
upcoming ceremony anchors the play in hope and healing through the reclamation of the 
traditional Indigenous ceremony of becoming a woman through the next generation, 
represented by Suzie. Sousette and Eva look at a picture of Sousette wearing the buckskin 
dress that Suzie will wear for her ceremony. The dress was made for Sousette from skins 
from a deer hunted by her grandfather and subsequently sewn together by her 
grandmother with beads and shells. The dress is a potent symbol of traditional and 
healthy family legacies prior to the imposition of residential schooling. Eva’s coming-of-
age as a woman was not celebrated because of Sousette’s training at the residential 
school. Celebrations of this sort stopped, as Sousette explains to Eva, because “People 
were afraid of Indian ways back then” (83). “Indian ways” come together with individual 
stories to form a collective story that is also a testimony and an act of healing. 
 In Strength of Indian Women, then, testimony to childhood trauma does not 
conform to the Western model of an individual recounting past horrors to a singular 
witness, the therapist; instead, there is a gathering of voices as the individual stories of 
the elders come together as a collective to convey their full history. The women both 
testify to and witness their stories, with the audience as a community of witnesses. 
Christy Stanlake argues that Manuel’s play models the “reciprocal relationship between 
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the stories of a community and the story of an individual” (131). The relational aspect of 
traumatic testimony is an essential feature of Manuel’s approach to the trauma story and 
healing. The bulk of the remainder of the play is structured by the group of women elders 
telling their stories by taking centre stage under a spotlight. The light shining down on the 
speaker while the listeners sit on the couch and pay attention evokes a scene of testimony 
and witness within the comfort of Sousette’s home. For Stanlake, “The personal stories 
told by each woman adhere to a form of witnessing, in which the play’s conventions of 
realism break while each woman stands alone center stage to deliver her story directly to 
the audience” (112). The stage, then, brings the testimony out of the private sphere of the 
home to the public sphere of the community. For Sousette’s daughter, Eva, this represents 
the first time that she is witness to the history of her mother and Aunties, a history which 
is also her own. Sparked by the photograph of the elders as little girls at residential 
school, Eva wants to learn more about their experiences from her mother, Sousette, and 
from her friends; Lucy, however, is reluctant to speak: “There’s some things that I 
shouldn’t tell you” (90). Sousette intervenes by telling Lucy that Eva has a right to know 
their history, and she insists that Lucy tell Eva about the sexual abuse by the priest at the 
school. Sousette’s insistence upon the importance of Lucy’s childhood traumas to 
Sousette’s daughter’s understanding of the school system underscores the importance of 
community to residential school legacy discourse.  
As a Gregorian chant begins to play, Lucy takes centre stage. The liturgical chant 
evokes connections to lugubrious priests—here ritualistically preying upon young Native 
girls. Under the spotlight, Lucy discloses a scene of molestation by the priest. Agnes 
finds her throwing up behind the stairs afterwards and the two (with some of their 
friends) decide to run away from the school. They are caught and brought back, as Lucy 
says, by her “own people” (92). For Lucy, this is an important betrayal, the disclosing of 
which exhausts her and shuts down her speech. Sousette takes centre stage for Lucy to 
finish her story, which emphasizes that it takes a community of women to tell the story. 
Sousette fills in the gap of Lucy’s story by discussing the beating she witnessed of Lucy 
and Agnes by the nuns when the girls were returned. This act of witnessing by Sousette 
provides Lucy with the strength and support she needs to continue with her story: “Lucy 
stands to deliver the rest of her story with all the power she needs to conjure up the 
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image and to destroy it” (93; original emphasis). Signalling an act of collective healing 
whereby the women tell their stories to release the pain of their past, this stage direction 
is intended for the cast members rather than the audience by suggesting a cathartic 
posture for the actor. Yet the monologues quickly diverge from individual testimony and 
healing to group testimony and witness. Lucy thus moves from her own abuses to 
testifying to those of Agnes, who was beaten more severely than the rest of them because 
she was the “ringleader.” Just as Sousette witnessed Lucy’s trauma, here Lucy bears 
witness to Agnes’s. Following a relentless beating made worse because of Agnes’s 
refusal to cry, Lucy feels “broken herself in this moment” and says, “They broke her that 
day” (93). The picture of the girls at residential school lights up again as Sousette rejoins 
their individual experiences into a collective one: “They broke her body, they broke her 
heart, but they never broke her spirit. Agnes’ spirit lives inside each one of us” (93). 
Episkenew suggests that a characteristic of most Indigenous literature in Canada is that 
the community rather than the individual is the protagonist (Taking Back Our Spirits 
166). In this play, all of the women reciprocally share and testify to each other’s traumas. 
They do so as a group to the next generation, represented by Eva, for the generation 
following her, represented by Suzie, and for the present-day community of witnesses 
sitting in the audience. 
 Of all the elders, Mariah has the most fraught relationship with the act of 
testimony to past traumas. The last of the group of elders to arrive at Sousette’s house for 
the ceremony, Mariah has had a history of silences, including being silenced by Lucy, 
who has retained her girlhood antagonism toward her because of her perceived privileges 
at residential school. Mariah’s testimony to the group of women thus marks a significant 
break in her pattern of silence and represents the possibility for healing both Mariah and 
the friendships between the elders. Manuel believes that for healing to occur, one must 
acknowledge past traumas and grieve lost childhoods. This is hard work, which is why, 
as Manuel says, “people don’t go there. They slam on the brakes when they are feeling 
vulnerable and the tears come, but I think that’s really key in healing. Remembering 
things that have happened from the past and allowing ourselves to have those feelings, 
tears, anger, and grief about what happens, so that we can move past it and we can start 
changing those behaviours” (Interview).  
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Silent witnessing has been the hallmark of Mariah’s traumas. Accordingly, she 
begins her testimony by saying that she has been afraid to speak her whole life. As a 
Métis woman, Mariah has been othered by both Native and non-Native communities. She 
has lived “on the edge of two worlds” fitting into neither the white nor Native 
communities easily (104). She was taunted by classmates as the “teacher’s pet” at 
residential school and as a “Bill C-31 Indian.”82 In the white world, she was taunted as a 
“squaw” and “Pocahontas” (105). Her light skin, however, gave her the advantage of 
appearing less Native than the other girls at school in the eyes of the priest and nuns. 
Mariah is granted special privileges both because she looks non-Native and because she 
remains silent; however, this comes at the cost of her identity. As Mariah says, “because I 
was so good at saying nothin’ I became one of them” (106). Indeed, as she continues her 
testimonial monologue to the group of women, her refrain is “I said nothin’” (106). 
Mariah describes how she silently watched a nun throw a girl down two flights of cement 
steps for speaking her own language (105). Mariah says nothing as she hears girls being 
taken away by the priest at night. She silently witnesses a girl in the school delivering a 
baby and then watches that baby’s burial in the school cemetery (106). Mariah’s is a 
tragedy of silence. As she says, “My screams were silent and my agony all consumin’” 
(105). The community of women, particularly Lucy, are able to understand through 
Mariah’s disclosure that silence itself is traumatic when one is burdened with the act of 
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 Bill C-31amended the Indian Act in 1985 partly in an attempt to address its discriminatory provisions 
against Native women (and their children) who lost their status because they married non-Natives. The 
amendment allows limited reinstatement of status with a two-generation cut-off rule. This sounds simpler 
than it is. Status is complicated because the Indian Act was in many ways a document designed to get rid of 
Indians altogether. In The Truth About Stories, Thomas King argues that Bill C-31 will effectively rid 
Canada of status Indians. As set out in the Indian Act, there are two categories of status Indians: six-ones 
and six-twos. As King explains, “Six-one Indians are status and, for legal purposes, are considered to be 
full-bloods even if they aren’t, while six-two Indians are status and for legal purposes considered to be half-
bloods even if they aren’t” (142-43). As King understands it, Bill C-31 means that, “Six-ones who marry 
six-ones produce six-one children. Six-ones who marry six-twos produce six-one children. Six-ones who 
marry non-status produce six-two children. / And six-twos who marry six-twos, or who marry non-status, 
produce non-status children. And those children can never, ever be status. / Now that’s a good trick” (143). 
Marrying out of status for two generations will produce non-status children. King claims that fifty-percent 
of status Indians are now marrying people without status. He estimates that “if this rate holds steady, in 
fifty to seventy-five years there will be no status Indians left in Canada” (144). Labeling Mariah a “Bill C-
31 Indian” effectively defines her identity solely through a piece of legislation and highlights the 
divisiveness of the policy for Aboriginal peoples. As Episkenew says, “only in Indigenous Canada would 
people instantly know the meaning and significance of that label” (21). 
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witnessing the pain of others. Mariah is importantly given a stage upon which to begin 
her own healing journey by way of talking for the first time about her life of silent 
witnessing. The ethics of responsible witnessing are foregrounded through Mariah’s 
story, which circulates to the audience watching the drama unfold the burden that comes 
from being a spectator to trauma. Mariah’s testimony to the trauma of silence has the 
potential to foment the audience out of silence and into action for Indigenous 
empowerment and justice. 
 At this point in the play, all of the elders have taken centre stage to disclose past 
traumas or, in Mariah’s case, the trauma associated with being a silent witness. Together, 
their stories have accrued layers of meaning that exceed the limits of any one woman’s 
story. The final testimonial disclosures complete the story of the women through the 
testimonies of Sousette and Eva to the intergenerational legacy of residential school 
abuses. The institutional, loveless environment of residential schools has produced 
generations of children deprived of healthy models of parenting and appropriate loving 
relationships. The spotlight first shines on Eva as she recounts her memory of a past 
conversation she had with her mother, Sousette, at a point in time when Sousette did not 
acknowledge her own traumas: 
Do you remember how you used to beat me, Mom? Do you even 
remember the bruises? Do you remember the ugly things you used to call 
me, and all those times you left me alone. I wouldn’t have cared, if only 
you would have loved me. Do you even know what that means, love? 
Every time I go to hug you, you stiffen up. Do you know that you do that, 
Mom? Do you know how that makes me feel? And now I’m doing the 
same thing to Suzie. I push her away, Mom. I call her stupid, and I hit her, 
and I don’t want to. / Tell me again that residential school was good for 
you. (108) 
Episkenew discusses the pattern of abuse that is passed along to Eva because of 
Sousette’s lack of parenting skills: “Suzie, although two generations removed from the 
residential school experience, is still a victim of its violence and barbarity. Violence 
breeds shame, and shame breeds more violence. This is the despicable legacy of the 
colonial regime’s policy of ‘Indian’ residential schools, and without healing that legacy 
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will be passed down from one generation of Indigenous people to the next” (Taking Back 
Our Spirits 168). The promise of healing through a change in patterns of behaviour is 
represented through the unfolding new relationship between Sousette and Eva. Sousette 
tells Eva that she loves her, something that she has been unable to do in the past. When 
Sousette stands up in the centre of the stage to testify, she tells her group of friends and 
her daughter, Eva, about the times when she and another girl were sexually abused by 
Father LeBlanc in the infirmary. The purpose of this disclosure is not to dwell on the 
sexual abuse itself, although its disclosure is important for Sousette’s own healing. The 
focus is on how this abuse was shared by many survivors of residential school, 
preventing Sousette from being a good parent to Eva, and before this, her own mother 
from being a good parent to her: “the other women began to speak up. Even my mother, 
before she died, said that same thing happened to her. And my Eva, I couldn’t protect her. 
I was too busy running away” (113). In a moment of mother-daughter reconciliation and 
healing, Sousette rocks Eva in her arms, tells her that she loves her, and asks for her 
forgiveness. 
 The enactment of healing familial relationships damaged by the assimilative 
regulatory technologies of colonialism represented in the play through one of its primary 
systems of control over Indigenous bodies, residential schools, marks a significant 
discursive strategy to promote wellness in Native communities. Crucial to this endeavour 
is the reclamation of Indigenous traditions and practices, represented in the play by 
Suzie’s coming-of-age ceremony. Christy Stanlake connects this ceremony to the 
transformational power of storytelling: “as Suzie undergoes a ceremonial transformation 
into womanhood, the audience observes a dramatic portrayal of how storytelling creates a 
transformation within the women’s community” (112). Thus, as Suzie fasts and cleanses 
herself in advance of her ceremony, the elders, in a parallel journey, tell their stories to 
similarly purge themselves as they, too, mark a transformation to healing which also 
gestures towards reconciliation as they move from shame and silence to a community of 
prideful voices. The chance of healing and reconciliation lies with Suzie. As Agnes says, 
“Suzie will turn the whole world right side up again, the way it was meant to be, and we 
will celebrate” (113). All of the women help Suzie into her ceremonial dress as Suzie 
describes her visions at the lodge. The deer that came to her great-grandfather when he 
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was hunting for her dress visited her and told her that she would have a long life and her 
own daughter would wear the dress (115). With the visionary promise of a new legacy of 
Indigenous values, customs, and empowerment for women, Sousette, Eva, Agnes, Lucy, 
Mariah, and Suzie all leave together for the ceremony as an honour song begins (117). 
Manuel honours the strength and endurance of the community of women, while she also 
directly honours her own mother. One of the gifts given to Suzie is a blanket from her 
great-grandmother, Marceline, the name of Manuel’s own mother.  
In the epigraph to this section, I quoted Eva, who says to her mother and Aunties, 
“All of you went through so much. Someone should write about it. They should make a 
movie about how you survived. I feel real proud sitting here among you. You’re just like 
old warriors” (114). Eva’s valorization of the strength of the women elders and her call to 
spread the word of their survival through media such as film mirrors the performative 
work of the play itself and Manuel’s commemoration of her own family legacies and 
survival. As heart-wrenching as this play is, it is also and fundamentally a healing artistic 
enterprise that offers its writer, actors, and audience (including readers) the opportunity 
for therapeutic transformation through the powerful models for change represented by the 
three generations of women in this play. The “Aboriginal trauma theory” which emerges 
from Strength of Indian Women is one that thus emphasizes the communal and 
participatory elements of healing from trauma and the importance of telling one’s story 
both individually and as a collective to family and community members.  
4.3 James Bartleman, As Long as the Rivers Flow 
My book is fiction, but everything in it is based on fact. 
James Bartleman, “Canada’s Forgotten Native Children” 
When former Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario and member of Chippewas of 
Mnjikaning First Nation, James Bartleman, decided to write a novel about the legacies of 
residential schooling he did so, as he said to Shelagh Rogers, with a specific purpose in 
mind: to “educate, sensitize, and make Canadians a little more aware of what is going on 
in our own third World” (“Interview”). As Long as the Rivers Flow is a synthesis of 
Bartleman’s many trips to remote First Nations communities in Northern Ontario where 
he was invited to attend treaty commemorations, participate in healing circles, and speak 
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to elders. In one such community, the Wunnumin Lake First Nation, Bartleman was 
invited by Stan Beardy, Grand Chief of the Nishnawbe Aski Nation, to take part in a 
healing ceremony following the deaths of three teenagers who were part of a suicide 
pact
83
 (Medley). Bartleman perceived what he called an “epidemic of suicide among 
children and youth, which no one was paying any attention to in this country” 
(“Interview”). Given the political power and connections afforded to Bartleman by his 
previous experience in the Canadian diplomatic service, he would certainly have been 
able to find opportunities for public speaking about Native issues such as this. He chose, 
however, fiction as his stage. The choice is even more interesting when one considers the 
current work of the TRC which aims, in part, to lay similar educative groundwork to 
Bartleman’s novel and that, at least in theory, aims to pave the way for reconciliation 
between Canada and Aboriginal peoples. What then does fiction offer that public 
discursive arenas such as the TRC cannot? 
I would like to extend Bartleman’s statement regarding the lack of public 
attention to suicides among youth in remote, fly-in Native communities to suggest that 
the majority of non-Native Canadians are similarly not paying attention to the current 
work of the TRC, and to argue that Bartleman is responding to this discursive vacuum. 
Bartleman is hoping to instruct, as he says, both Native and non-Native readers about the 
history and legacies of the residential school system, not “to delight” as the Horatian 
platitude would have it, but to incite readers to new understandings of the consequences 
of the barbaric treatment of Natives in Canada.
84
 That Bartleman wrote and published his 
novel concurrently with the mandated work of the TRC is likely not a coincidence. 
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 The Nishnawbe Aski Nation represents of forty-nine First Nation communities, “whose traditional lands 
make up more than sixty percent of the area of Ontario running from the height of land to the James and 
Hudson Bay coast and from the Manitoba to the Quebec borders” (As Long as the Rivers Flow 245-46). 
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 Bartleman is careful to point out that his intent is “‘not to be a spokesman for the native [sic] people’” 
and “‘not to be a propagandist for native [sic] causes and to adopt a black-and-white position [. . .] but to 
try and come to some sort of understanding, and have the people who read the novel first of all look upon it 
as a novel, not as a pamphlet’” (Medley). I agree with him that the novel should not be viewed as an 
attempt to indoctrinate the public into a particular view of Native issues; however, Bartleman’s novel does 
provide historical information that is clearly aimed at those readers unaware of Canada’s treatment of 
Natives, just as Joy Kogawa’s novel, Obasan, teaches readers about the Canadian government’s internment 
of Japanese-Canadians during World War II. I would argue, in fact, that Bartleman’s novel, while perhaps 
falling short of the definition of propaganda, is unequivocally didactic, much more so than the intensely 
lyrical and literary novel of Kogagawa. 
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Outside of the forum of the TRC, fiction can provide a safe vehicle both for a public 
figure such as Bartleman to say what he wants about the legacies of residential school 
and for readers, particularly non-Native ones, to engage with Aboriginal issues through 
storytelling rather than testimonials or reports from the TRC, which despite being 
accessible on the TRC’s website, seem to be ignored and/or not talked about by the 
general public. Because Bartleman is not a residential school survivor, and neither are his 
parents, his novel is not a fictional testimony to his own experiences, as was the case with 
Manuel. Rather, his novel performs the broader work of public testimony through the 
more accessible form of storytelling. What matters to this novel is that the history and 
legacies of residential schooling in Canada are circulated to as broad an audience as 
possible to promote the possibility of social justice and change. 
As Long as the Rivers Flow presents an alternative to the public work of the TRC 
by offering readers a story that aims to teach the history and legacy of residential school 
traumas, yet one that seeks to move beyond what is always at risk with testimony, that is, 
a totalizing gaze on wounds. I argue that Bartleman’s novel functions as didactic public 
testimony for socio-political purposes in three ways: first, by elaborating the complex 
historical, socio-political issues of colonial violence, including but not limited to the 
assimilative strategies of residential schooling, by connecting damaging colonial 
legislation of the past to present-day social and political issues plaguing many Aboriginal 
communities; second, by highlighting Indigenous mythologies, specifically, Anishinabe 
stories and belief systems as both ways of knowing the world and as coping mechanisms 
to deal with trauma, so that Indigenous storytelling becomes an alternative to Western, 
psychoanalytic practices of understanding and healing; and third, by emphasizing the 
importance of healing and moving forward from past traumas. Originally entitled The 
Healing Circle, the novel draws attention to community healing through acts of purgative 
disclosure that are not ends in themselves but lead to healing by way of moving forward 
with one’s life and away from past injuries. Like Manuel’s play, healing in this novel is a 
group rather than individual process. Ojibway author Richard Wagamese calls himself a 
victim rather than survivor of residential school because his parents and extended family 
attended those schools and passed on a legacy of pain and suffering to him (157). 
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Wagamese hopes that as the TRC makes its way across Canada, people hear stories other 
than testimonials focussed entirely on pain:  
Both the commission and Canada need to hear stories of healing instead of 
a relentless retelling and re-experiencing of pain. They need to hear that, 
despite everything, every horror, it is possible to move forward and to 
learn how to leave hurt behind. Our neighbours in this country need to 
hear stories about our capacity for forgiveness, for self-examination, for 
compassion, and for our yearning for peace because they speak to our 
resiliency as a people. That is how reconciliation happens. (164-65) 
Wagamese’s emphasis on hearing stories of Aboriginal peoples’ capacity to move 
forward from past traumas is echoed by Bartleman in his novel, as it is by Manuel 
through the healing conclusion to her play as Suzie is poised “to turn the whole world 
right side up again” (113). Of crucial importance is the notion that moving forward does 
not mean forgetting the past or dismissing its relevance to the contemporary Canadian 
nation. I frequently hear non-Natives in discussing Canada’s colonial history say things 
like, “That was in the past,” or “What my ancestors did is not my responsibility,” or, as a 
university professor I know said to me, “Natives need to assimilate with everyone else.” 
It is especially for these Canadians that a book such as Bartleman’s holds promise. 
Hearing a TRC testimonial without the benefit of the parsing of issues that this novel 
provides risks re-inscribing the deleterious stereotypes of Natives as traumatized and in 
need of healing and rescue from benevolent white people. Bartleman’s novel models 
fiction’s utilitarian capacity to fill in the gaps of the colonial history many Canadians 
received and are receiving in our school systems as it seeks to model Native 
empowerment through self-determination and forging new life trajectories based on 
traditional Native epistemologies. However, I wonder what are the risks of this sort of 
didacticism? Does using fiction risk having readers not act because the form allows them 
to remain comfortably removed from the lived reality of Native communities today? Is 
non-Native guilt assuaged by acts of Native self-reliance and healing? Does the 
employment of Native literature to perform the work of teaching risk tainting its literary 
value?  
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Emma LaRocque cautions, “As constructive as ‘healing aesthetics’ may sound, 
we must be careful not to squeeze the life out of Native literature by making it serve, yet 
again, another utilitarian function. Poets, playwrights, and novelists, among others, must 
also write for the love of words. Healing is fast becoming the new cultural marker by 
which we define or judge Aboriginal literature” (168). Healing for Indigenous peoples 
has become, paradoxically, both necessary and vexed by monolithic perceptions that 
traumas singularly define a complex and variegated group of peoples. The “noble 
savage” famously depicted in Benjamin West’s 1770 painting, The Death of General 
Wolfe, has been supplanted in contemporary media by images of the wounded 
Aboriginal, traumatized, suffering, sometimes living on remote reserves in essentially 
third-world conditions, as in the recent Attawapiskat crisis where the Canadian 
government’s “benevolent” intervention took away the community’s right to self-
management. Prominent national media coverage of the unacceptable conditions of many 
remote reserves is important for these communities and sadly reveals in the Canadian 
government’s treatment of Native peoples a persistent attitude of colonial supremacy. 
However, such coverage also problematically foregrounds images of wounded Natives. A 
novel such as Bartleman’s runs a similar risk of unwittingly reinforcing the negative 
stereotypes of wounding and healing, and also of supporting the erroneous view that 
Aboriginal literature is always already utilitarian rather than literary and artistic. 
Bartleman’s choice to make child sexual abuse at residential school the central 
trauma of his narrative also carries risks. The sexual abuse of Native children in 
residential schools, as I discussed earlier, played a significant role in bringing public and 
government attention to the horrific experiences that many suffered at the church-run 
schools. And, as I also discussed, a singular focus on child sexual abuse without attention 
to the larger issues created by the devastating technologies of colonialism is dangerous 
because it has the potential to elide the multiplicity of violences inflicted by the Canadian 
government’s colonial laws and policies. A paradox of this dissertation is its thematic 
attention to child sexual abuse in the context here of the stricture of avoiding such a 
focus. At the same time, all of the works I discuss make child sexual abuse not only a 
prominent feature of their narrative, but also a significant and principal childhood trauma 
that needs to be reckoned with as a separate issue in addition to all of the other traumas 
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heaped on children forced into the schools. Yet, despite the focus on the damage created 
by the trauma of being sexually abused as a child, these writers also contextualize this 
trauma among others by also explicating the cultural decimation through, for example, 
loss of language, traditional practices, spiritual beliefs, and, importantly, the legacy of 
family dysfunction as a direct result of the government’s assaultive policies of 
assimilation. 
 Before I move on to discuss three possible ways in which Bartleman’s novel 
works as a form of didactic testimony to the legacies of residential schooling that, I think, 
complicate rather than replicate simplistic views of Indigenous communities as always 
and only traumatized, I want to trouble my own reading by pointing out a potential 
problem with Bartleman’s prologue to the novel. Because of the risks involved in telling 
stories about residential school traumas, I worried when I started reading As Long as the 
Rivers Flow about its opening emphasis on the sexual abuse Martha suffered as a child by 
the priest, Father Antoine, at residential school. Because Bartleman is the only writer I 
discuss who is neither a residential school survivor nor comes from a family with parents 
or grandparents who were survivors, I was surprised that he chose as a prologue to his 
novel a scene with Martha, now an adult, having a nightmare about being sexually abused 
as a child by Father Antoine. Over three decades have passed and Martha has children of 
her own, but she remains “a prisoner of the priest who had whispered that he loved her as 
he violated her body” (xi). The scene moves from Martha’s nightmare to her daughter 
Raven’s vision of three ghosts. They are her friends who have recently committed 
suicide. Raven is part of a suicide pact with them. They were all supposed to kill 
themselves when they turned thirteen. Meanwhile, the priest who abused Martha, Father 
Antoine, is now an old man living peacefully in Quebec City: “He had done things to the 
little girls in his care that had not been proper, but that was in the past. He was certain 
God had forgiven him and that the incidents had been long forgotten by everyone 
concerned” (xii). The contrast is clear and direct: Martha and Raven are both still 
suffering the consequences of Martha’s past abuses, while their abuser has comfortably 
moved on with his life. Like Suzie in Manuel’s play, Raven is thirteen-years-old. 
Bartleman is well aware of the importance of this age as one of traditional passage into 
womanhood. Here, rather than a coming-of-age ceremony like Suzie’s, the tradition is a 
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suicide pact, the product of the residential school legacy of the abuse her mother, Martha, 
suffered. 
 Strength of Indian Women retains a similar focus on inter-generational trauma 
and, indeed, on disclosing and healing from child sexual abuse. In As Long as the Rivers 
Flow, however, child sexual abuse suffered in residential school is directly linked to the 
rash of suicides among Native children and grandchildren of residential school survivors 
in remote communities by way of a single perpetrator from the past, Father Antoine, 
rather than also pointing the finger at the Canadian government’s legislation that required 
Native children to attend the schools. Bartleman does the important work of 
contextualizing this history in scenes that follow, but his opening emphasis has the 
hazardous potential to lead readers to conclude that individual perpetrators, such as 
priests, are to blame for the traumas rather than the shared blame of the Canadian 
government. Furthermore, readers might surmise that the residential school survivors 
who were not sexually abused are not suffering the many legacies of the schools. 
Bartleman may be unintentionally rehashing the Canadian government’s rhetoric of the 
early 1990s that said they cannot be held responsible for the actions of individual, sadistic 
priests by overplaying the significance of one type of abuse over others. Is sexual abuse 
somehow more sensational and is that why he chooses it? There seems to be a 
fundamental difference between what Manuel does with what is in her case lived 
experience of generations of sexual abuse and what Bartleman is doing. Bartleman’s 
opening sequence of scenes has a sleight-of-hand quality where, in his rush to make the 
connection between present-day issues in Aboriginal communities and the residential 
school system, he chooses to juxtapose two horrors—child sexual abuse and teenage 
suicide—to instantly, and too quickly in my view, hammer home his point, which is 
actually worth waiting for. 
 To be fair, the potential risks of Bartleman’s prologue are remedied by the 
historicizing and contextualizing work the novel performs in subsequent sections, to 
which I now turn in order to demonstrate the pedagogical strains of the novel which aim 
to promote understanding of present-day issues facing Native communities. Bartleman’s 
epigraph makes clear the connection that he repeatedly emphasizes in interviews and in 
the novel: “To the memory of the Native youth who have taken their lives as a result of 
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the Indian residential school experiences of their parents and of the parents of their 
parents before them” (original emphasis). In the novel’s afterword, Bartleman gives the 
“staggering” suicide statistics: “From 1986 to 2010, almost five hundred people, 
including sixty children under the age of fourteen and one hundred and eighty youth aged 
fifteen to twenty, took their lives in the territory of the Nishinabe Aski Nation out of a 
total population of fewer than 30,000 men, women, and children” (246).85 Bartleman’s 
voicing of the breakdown of family structures because of the residential school system is 
important not so much to scholars of Native issues who understand only too well the 
devastation caused by the assimilative project of the schools. His parsing of colonial 
history, however, is important to the Canadian public, many of whom have only ever 
been taught the colonial version of their country’s history.86  
 A novel that Shelagh Rogers recommends, however, might have the potential to 
make its way into the homes and minds of Canadians. If it does, readers will encounter a 
narrative voice which sounds a lot like James Bartleman’s public voice when he 
discusses the book and its purpose. There are numerous examples in the novel of its 
narrator giving mini-lectures on First Nations’ issues. Early on in the novel, the narrator 
describes the many ways in which the heretofore remote community of Cat Lake is 
changed by the opening of a new road for a few months in the winter. The road allows for 
                                                 
85
 In his interview with Shelagh Rogers, Bartleman summarizes the project of his novel by way of a brief 
history lesson: “Starting in the late nineteenth century the Canadian government engaged in this massive 
social engineering experiment in which their idea was that you would turn Native people into brown-
skinned white people by taking their children away from them at the age of six, putting them in residential 
schools, which were a type of orphanage, forbidding them from speaking their language, telling them their 
ancestors were burning in hell because they had not heard the word of the Lord, and using them as sexual 
toys, out of sight of any supervision. And this went on generation after generation, as a result of which the 
family structures of so many communities were destroyed. And then in the 1960s, the provincial 
governments moved into the child welfare area and they went into the communities and took away 
thousands and thousands of children and adopted them out across North America—[. . .] the “Sixties 
Scoop.” And so the communities just shattered. And so the families, they had never heard, in many cases, 
their parents and grandparents say they love them. And that is the major theme of the anti-suicide 
conferences that have been held in Northern Ontario that I have attended: “tell your children you love 
them.” There is an epidemic and a tragedy going on. The children are not at fault. What I wanted to do with 
this book is to give a voice to children who otherwise are never heard.” 
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 The TRC website contains a wealth of information that might help, for example, their informative, well-
written, and easy to understand on-line publication on the history of residential schooling in Canada, They 
Came for the Children; yet this work does not seem to be making its way to the mainstream non-Native 
public, who, in light of the lack of media attention to the TRC, have likely forgotten that the process is 
underway.  
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new construction, the introduction of satellite television, and access to cities in the south 
(81). Fast food outlets, movies, and malls quickly follow (82). The narrator then leads 
readers to look beyond the changes brought by non-Native consumerism to the issue of 
suicide: “And just as matters seemed to be going their way, the young people began to 
kill themselves, and not just at Cat Lake First Nation” (82). What follows is a list of 
actual First Nations in Nishnawbe Aski Nation possibly as a form of commemoration to 
the youth of these communities but also perhaps to name the First Nations for non-Native 
readers who may not have heard of them before. The narrator describes families 
“shattered emotionally and communities [. . .] left deeply scarred and in a state of shock” 
(83). The narrator rhetorically asks, “Why? Why?” all the suicides (84), and then 
provides the answer: 
Despite the signs of material progress, many of the communities were sick 
in their collective souls. In many families, the parents, grandparents and 
great-grandparents had spent their childhoods and much of their teenage 
years in residential schools where no one ever hugged them, unless it was 
to molest them. No one ever said, “I love you,” unless it was a prelude to 
sexual assault. Dysfunction had cascaded down through the generations 
with survivors neglecting their children as they had been neglected. Or 
worse, they sexually abused them as they had been abused. / But the main 
reason the young people were killing themselves, Martha suspected, was 
because they had lost their culture and had found nothing to replace it. 
(84) 
 Bartleman stacks and packs together the influx of material “progress” with 
residential school abuses with loss of parenting skills and family structures with loss of 
culture to unpack for readers what he clearly sees as a chain of cause and effect events. 
This pedagogical strategy represents an important deviation away from a singular focus 
on abuses being inflicted upon Native children at residential schools or, alternately, a 
monocular focus on present-day “dysfunction” in Native communities. Bartleman also 
uses his novel to instruct readers about Native issues beyond the barbaric residential 
schools. He spends time historicizing, for example, the formation of treaties, the reserve 
system, and government Indian agents. Again, I want to emphasize the importance of this 
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work for the many Canadians who have no understanding of treaties or the reserve 
system. Before taking up the issue of Martha’s childhood in residential schools, 
Bartleman puts together an easy-to-understand (tongue-in-cheek) description of the 
formation of treaties and reserves. An Indian agent arrives and announces,  
Your great father, His Majesty King Edward VII [. . .] is concerned about 
the well-being of his Native children who reside here in the northern 
wilderness. As a sign of his immense compassion, he has asked us to come 
here to sign a treaty with you that will protect you for all time. In return 
for ceding your rights to this land, every man, woman and child will be 
immediately handed a cash payment and a reserve will be set aside for 
your exclusive use. (12) 
The infantilizing of Natives as children is shown to be part of a rhetoric of 
benevolence. Commissioners promise yearly visits to provide more money to the 
community if they sign the treaty. The narrator-teacher explains that all of this was said 
to “people who did not know how to read and write and who had no concept of rights and 
land ownership as interpreted by the commissioners” (12). By signing the treaty, as the 
narrator elucidates, they “unknowingly authoriz[ed] outsiders to take the mineral and 
forest wealth of their lands and game wardens to enter their traditional territory to 
interfere with their trapping and hunting way of life. And every year that followed, the 
people of Cat Lake held a celebration to mark the anniversary of the treaty and the visit to 
their community of the Indian agent to pay the treaty money” (12). And, in case there is 
any confusion about the amount of treaty money they are paid, the Indian agent shows up 
and gives everyone in the band “four crisp, brand-new one-dollar bills” (16). In the years 
that follow, it becomes clear that the band Chief has a vastly different understanding of 
the treaty from what it is in reality. He believes the treaty is being ignored and wants 
Ottawa’s help because mining and pulp companies are helping themselves to resources 
on traditional lands. The Indian agent replies, “‘you should read the fine print in this 
treaty before you start complaining. Maybe you’d see that you don’t have as many rights 
as you think you have’” (17). He goes on to give them all a lecture on “progress” and 
suggests that they will lose their reserves and all be assimilated into the nation like “the 
Italians, the Dutch and the Chinese” (17). There are many similar examples in the novel 
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where the narrator elaborates upon the many abuses created by colonial technologies of 
power and control. As these scenes do not move the plot forward, they are clearly meant 
to provide readers with the historical and political context they need to better understand 
Bartleman’s main message, which is the terrible legacies of residential schools. 
 As Long as the Rivers Flow not only teaches, but it also emphasizes the 
importance of what and how Canadians are taught Native history in school. Following 
her years in residential school, Martha moves to Toronto and eventually starts taking 
university courses. In a Canadian literature course, she encounters the poetry of Duncan 
Campbell Scott for the first time. For the professor of the course, Scott is a “‘man of deep 
artistic sensibility and humanity’” (134), but Martha discovers through her research for 
an essay on Scott his view that “Indian should be assimilated, and the best way to do this 
was to send them to residential schools, to forbid them to speak their language, and to 
force-feed them the values of the white man’” (136). Martha is shocked by the racism of 
Scott’s poems, two of which Bartleman quotes at length, “Indian Place-Names” (134) and 
“The Onondaga Madonna” (135). Martha submits an essay on Scott’s racism for which 
she receives a failing grade, and for which the whole class receives a lecture on the 
dangers of mixing “political considerations with literary criticism” (137). Bartleman 
emphasizes the importance of creating new understandings through his depiction of 
Martha’s visit to the professor. She does not do so to contest her grade, but to explain to 
him that she is a survivor of the residential school system and “‘personally suffered a lot 
from the policy Duncan Campbell Scott did so much to put in place’” (137), and to seek 
understanding of how her professor could “‘admire someone who did so much harm to 
my people’” (137-38). The professor immediately exoticizes and sexualizes Martha in the 
same manner that Scott does the Onondaga Madonna, noting “she possessed a type of 
sensuality that was more appealing to him than the fresh-faced beauty of women much 
younger that he normally cultivated” (138).  
 While there is a moment of new understanding when the professor later confesses 
to Martha that he had “‘no idea such things were still going on during my lifetime in 
Canada’” (138), the reconciliation sought by Martha is complicated when she becomes 
the professor’s lover and is re-victimized, partly because she is flattered that someone 
with his prestige would take an interest in her, but mostly by the manipulations of the 
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lascivious professor who has “no idea” that he is performing another act of colonial 
violence. Professor Linden Marshall’s house, where Martha wakes up following her first 
night with him, is in the upper-class Toronto area of Forest Hill. The emphasis is on 
white privilege. Linden attended the elite Upper Canada College as a boy growing up in 
Toronto. He serves Martha a significantly “English breakfast.” Bartleman has Martha 
sleep with the enemy, so to speak, to facilitate his scathing critique of white intellectuals, 
in particular, English professors.  
 At a dinner party hosted by Linden, one of the invited professors inappropriately 
probes into Martha’s past sexual abuse at residential school and then tries to lighten up 
the conversation by suggesting she could make money by suing the church. He then 
suggests that she should read Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita because “‘literary critics and 
professors of literature, like those of us around this table have long considered it to be a 
wonderful and moving love story’” (145). The implication that pedophilia and the rape of 
a child could be construed as love in the novel and compared to Martha’s child sexual 
abuse by a priest in residential school is offensive to Martha and another teaching 
moment for Bartleman to illustrate the persistence of white privilege and baffling 
insensitivity to Native issues. Through these scenes, Bartleman demonstrates the ways in 
which the education system takes part in the continued colonization of Aboriginal 
peoples and the importance of dialogue and resistance to colonial teachings while 
showing the ongoing entrenchment of destructive, racist views of Aboriginal women as 
sexually available. That Martha becomes complicit in this troubling dynamic also reflects 
Bartleman’s wish to put on full display the complexities of Native disempowerment in 
Canada.
87
 
 As Long as the Rivers Flow not only makes connections between colonial history 
and present-day socio-political issues of Native peoples, it also works to privilege oral 
storytelling and Native belief systems as ways to articulate, understand, and heal from 
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 Bartleman completed his B.A. in History at Western University in 1963. Bartleman gave a public lecture 
at Western which I attended in March 2012. The talk was held in Conron Hall in University College. In his 
talk, he quoted Scott’s “The Onondaga Madonna” and pointed to a portrait of Brandon Conron hanging on 
the wall and said, “I took a course on Canadian literature from that man right there.” Brandon Conron (who 
retired from Western in 1975) is very likely the English professor upon whom Bartleman models his 
fictional character, “Linden Marshall.”  
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residential school traumas and their intergenerational legacies. Part One of the novel 
opens with the announcement, importantly in Anishinaabemowin, of Martha’s birth. The 
emphasis is on tradition, ceremony, community, and cohesion. A recurring pattern in the 
structure of residential school narratives is to depict an idyllic family in close connection 
to the community and living a traditional Native lifestyle before their happiness is 
permanently ruptured by the requirement to place their young children into residential 
schools.
88
 Before Martha is taken away to school, she grows up hearing her mother and 
Elders in her community tell stories of Nanabush (a trickster figure), Gitche Manitou (the 
Great Spirit), and the cannibalistic Wendigo. Bartleman thus emphasizes the importance 
of these sacred stories while he is careful to explain the Anishinabe belief in two parallel 
worlds: “‘the one we live in, and the Skyworld—the one we can’t see, where Nanabush 
lives with the spirits of the dead’” (8). Bartleman explains to the National Post that for 
his people, “‘there’s a blur between dreams and reality, where dreams are reality. [. . .] 
There really is no differentiation between the supernatural and the natural. As a matter of 
fact, you would say there is no such thing as supernatural. We live in a world where there 
are spirits’” (Medley). In the novel, the people who do not believe in spirits and 
traditional stories are the ones who spend too much time with missionaries and non-
Natives (8). The imposition of Christianity by missionaries meant that their traditional 
healers, shamans, were driven away: “‘That’s too bad, because they helped people. If you 
were sick in your body or in your head, they could travel to the other world and find ways 
to cure you’” (9). Bartleman thus both inscribes Indigenous storytelling into the novel 
while he also demonstrates the consequences of losing their traditional beliefs: here, the 
suggestion is that the ability for the Cat Lake community to heal itself was also taken 
away by the missionaries. In her interview, Shelagh Rogers asks Bartleman why he chose 
to highlight Native spirits such as Gitche Manitou and the Wendigo in his novel. 
Bartleman explains, 
These are Native archetypes, they are ones for which the hunter-gatherer 
people of the pre-Cambrian shield in Ontario and Manitoba, Quebec, have 
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 Tomson Highway’s Kiss of the Fur Queen and Robert Arthur Alexie’s Porcupines and China Dolls are 
two representative examples. 
202 
 
been the ones that perhaps going back thousands of years have been the 
mythical guardians of the people. And I think that to be healthy 
psychologically you have to have a sense of who you are and you have to 
have a sense of your own history and I wanted to reintroduce that or 
introduce that into the book for Native readers and to perhaps help non-
Native readers understand the psychology of the people. 
 The connection between Native mythologies, epistemologies, and “‘the 
psychology of the people’” is made clear from the moment Martha arrives at residential 
school and is greeted by a nun, whom she perceives to be either a Wendigo, the horrific 
half-human, half-beast or a frightening  Bearwalker (28). Martha, convinced she is in the 
hands of an evil spirit, begins to scream and fight back, a response for which she is 
eventually beaten. One of her first traumas at residential school, then, is apprehended 
entirely in terms of Indigenous mythology and happens at the same time that, ironically, 
her traditional culture is being violently taken away from her. Her clothes are taken away; 
her hair is shorn and deloused; she is forbidden from speaking her language; and she is 
forced into a regimented, loveless existence of Christian indoctrination. The nuns have 
not yet changed the way she thinks about the world, however, which is through her own 
stories. To comfort herself at night, Martha recreates the storytelling sessions she listened 
to as a child. As she remembers the creation story, stories of Nanabush and Gitche 
Manitou, “She then discovered the joys of making up her own stories and creating her 
own imaginary friends” (33). Martha learns to nurture herself through stories that become 
her internal medicine at school. Indeed, Martha puts into practice her traditional 
understanding of the existence of a parallel universe to create her own parallel world of 
stories that she has running in her mind throughout her day at school to help her cope 
(34-35): “And after one imaginary adventure ran its course, Martha would embark on 
another, and another and another, blotting out as much as she could the dreary daytime 
life of the school until it was time to go to bed and she could escape to her nighttime 
world of fantasy” (36). 
 As a seminarian, Father Antoine created his own fantasy world of pre-pubescent 
girls, whom he eventually started to molest. The bishop covered up the scandals and sent 
him to the Indian residential school in northern Ontario, “where presumably he could do 
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no harm” (40): “The day came, almost inevitably,” the narrator tells us, “when he could 
no longer control himself and he molested a little girl. At first he was afraid because she 
fled his office in hysterics and told the nuns that he had hurt her. But no one believed her 
and he realized that he was free to do anything he wanted without fear of sanction” 
(44).
89
 Martha quickly becomes one of Father Antoine’s chief targets for his sexual 
predations. He begins to abuse her and continues to for years until she grows into her 
body as a woman and he is no longer attracted to her. From the first night that the priest 
molests Martha, she loses her capacity to heal herself through stories: “try as she might, 
Martha was no longer able to use her imagination to escape the reality of life at the 
school” (48). Martha’s sexual abuse creates a traumatic rupture, a breakage in how she 
perceives the world, and it does so through the loss of an essential part of her culture and 
herself as a person, which is the ability to create and tell stories. This is a significant 
marker in the novel for the destructive changes this trauma creates in Martha as she 
moves into adulthood and out of the residential school system. 
 I would like to suggest that Martha’s sexual abuse carries with it the broader 
implications of what I want to call “story abuse”: the imposition of the colonial narrative 
upon Indigenous belief systems. As a child, Martha has nothing in her repertoire of 
Indigenous stories to understand the bewildering and horrific experience of being 
sexually abused by an adult man, a priest, whom all the children have been taught to 
revere. She has the story of the Wendigo to explain evil more broadly, but no story 
explains the violence perpetrated by the priest. The traumatic loss of her ability to story 
herself, to create a healthy life narrative by which she can live, strikes at the core of her 
identity. In this way, the novel seems to gesture towards the possibility of a culturally 
specific, Anishinabe trauma theory that posits traumatic wounds as breaks in personal 
narratives or what I am calling story abuse.
90
 Martha returns to her community as an adult 
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 Episkenew notes that the residential school environment actually attracted pedophiles: “Because they 
afforded staff unlimited access to children, absolute power over those children, and little scrutiny, 
residential schools attracted disproportionate numbers of pedophiles, who were free to wreak havoc on 
generations of Indian children” (50). 
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 I offer this reading as a possibility that exists within this novel, but I do not want to fossilize my reading 
as the one way that Anishinabe people understand trauma. 
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without her traditional language or way of life and without the ability to story a healthy 
personal identity.  
Anishinabe mythologies do, however, offer a healing antidote to Martha’s abuses 
through her dreams. In an extended dream sequence, Martha dreams of the elder who told 
her stories as a child about the Wendigo, whom he describes as a fearsome creature that 
can steal souls, and make its victims hate themselves and their culture: “The cycle will 
continue until a shaman arrives in the form of a raven to break the cycle” (62). The dream 
continues and Martha is attacked by a Wendigo who looks partly like Father Antoine. 
The Wendigo flies away with Martha, taking her to the residential school where nuns also 
appear as Wendigos. A raven swoops in and returns Martha to her family and friends 
(63). The narrator explains that to Martha and to most of her community on the reserve, 
“dreams were not the meaningless activity of cerebral neurons firing randomly during 
sleep but messages from the other world about the future” (63). Martha confides her 
sexual abuse to her friend, Joshua, who then helps her interpret her dream. Joshua 
explains to her that people used to believe that if you were bitten by a Wendigo, you 
would become one: “‘I think the Creator is telling you that Father Antoine is a Wendigo 
and he turned you into one as well by what he did to you. He’s letting you know that the 
monster inside you will push you to kill yourself, if not now, at some other time in your 
life’” (66-67). Joshua also says that Martha will lead someone else to suicide, but that the 
raven in her dream will rescue her. And here the reader is brought full circle to the 
beginning of the novel where Martha’s daughter, Raven, is part of a suicide pact, and to 
the novel’s conclusion, where the suicides of Raven’s friends and Raven’s own suicidal 
thoughts generate the healing circle which restores balance to the community. Anishinabe 
mythologies and beliefs thus shape Martha’s understanding of her traumas and offer the 
promise of healing through what becomes a collective act of disclosure and reclamation 
of cultural identity. 
 The final emphasis in the novel is on healing and reparation through 
reconciliation both with past traumas suffered at residential school and, importantly, with 
family members who have suffered childhoods with parents damaged by their 
experiences at the schools. The residential school Wendigo, if you will, provides a means 
of understanding this painful legacy. As Bartleman explains, 
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I’ve sort of given it a modern twist in saying that the harm caused by the 
residential schools [. . .] has implanted the Wendigo within the survivors, 
that as a result of being damaged, they developed feelings of great anger, 
of great hatred as well, which has twisted their lives, and meant that they 
are not good parents, even though they might want to be. And you have to 
find some way of banishing that Wendigo within you. 
For Martha, the “Wendigo within” has prevented her from being able to parent her two 
children, Spider and Raven. Spider was removed from her home as a young child because 
of Martha’s alcoholism and neglect, while Raven was raised by Martha’s mother so that 
Martha might find Spider and a life for herself in Toronto. When Martha’s mother dies, 
she returns to the reserve, but she is not able to function as a healthy parent: “Without 
realizing it, Martha began treating her daughter the same way the nuns had dealt with her 
when she was a girl” (200). The cycle of abuse is similarly played out in other homes 
with parents who, having been raised in a loveless institution, do not know how to love 
their own children. These children are now of greatest concern to Bartleman because they 
are killing themselves. Raven seeks out the advice of Joshua because of the suicide pact 
she has made. Joshua blames the residential school system for the problems young people 
are facing and suggests “‘holding a healing circle and inviting the priest who molested 
the mothers of the kids who killed themselves’” (206). Joshua’s hope is that the priest 
will apologize and that his victims will forgive him so that they might start their own 
healing process (207). 
 What might seem to be an over-simplified healing process of apology and 
forgiveness assumes greater complexity and substance as the healing circle becomes a 
space to share and reclaim personal stories and thus a therapeutic site of group testimony. 
Bartleman explained to Shelagh Rogers the connection between telling stories and 
healing circles: “when people are in a circle they are in communion with each other. They 
form a community, and they are able to reinforce each other. And telling stories is the 
age-old way for people to communicate, to entertain, but also to resolve problems.” The 
healing circles that Bartleman attended used a talking stick. When someone has the stick, 
they can talk for as long as they want and they cannot be interrupted. In the novel, the 
talking stick is used to foster a respectful atmosphere as community members are face-to-
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face with Father Antoine for the first time since residential school. The old priest takes 
the talking stick and restates the colonial narrative behind the implementation of 
residential schools: “‘You were just children of six when you arrived, knowing only the 
ways of the bush, and when you left at the age of sixteen, you were civilized, baptized, 
educated and ready to found families of your own. I am so proud of you’” (227-28). The 
voice of the unrepentant priest is drowned out by “cries of outrage” as the community 
bands together to condemn the priest for his abuse of the children. Joshua intervenes to 
try to explain to Father Antoine that unless he admits blame and apologizes, he cannot 
expect a reconciliation with his former students. The priest insists, “‘I gave them my 
love’” (228).  
 Despite the priest’s refusal to acknowledge his crimes, his former victims take 
turns with the talking stick to tell their stories of how their own children came to kill 
themselves because of their own failures as parents. The emphasis shifts from the painful 
experiences of the past to focus on how to improve their community in the present. As 
one father whose son took his life says, “‘we gotta stop blaming all the bad things the 
white man did to us for all the bad things we do to our kids. The last residential school 
closed in this province almost thirty years ago. We got to move on’” (232). My view is 
that Bartleman is not trying to redirect blame for the legacies of residential school onto its 
victims; rather, he is trying to model a form of healing that requires letting go of the past. 
This becomes clear when Martha takes the talking stick and begins to rework standard 
conceptions of apology and forgiveness. She says of apology, “‘I sure hope some good 
comes from all this suffering tonight. If it does, it won’t be because Father Antoine and 
the bishop showed any remorse. But I say, so what if they and people like them don’t say 
they’re sorry? Our pain is so great, we shouldn’t waste any more time on them. It looks 
like begging’” (237). Martha further suggests that while it is easy to offer up an insincere 
apology, the only way to move forward is through forgiveness, not for the benefit of the 
priest, but “‘to be able to start healing ourselves and get on with our lives’” (237). Martha 
hugs and forgives the priest, as do the parents of the children who killed themselves. The 
novel ends with a story that Raven tells of meeting Nanabush in a dream (238-240). The 
importance of this story is in its teaching that Raven can choose life instead of death 
precisely through traditional belief systems represented by Anishinabe mythologies. For 
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the community members who hear her dream, “They now understood that the land they 
lived on was sacred, and by forgiving their enemies and connecting with their ancient 
culture, they could find strength to heal their wounds. And that night, before the people 
went to bed, they told their children that they loved them” (240). 
 While the concluding emphasis on forgiveness and healing may seem almost 
cliché, I want to suggest that the cringe-factor that comes with over-wrought notions of 
community harmony and healing may have more to do with the easy cynicism that comes 
from the comfort of white privilege and childhoods in homes with loving parents than it 
does from the lived reality of Native communities needing to heal and move on from past 
traumas. In the end, healing is a restored state of wellness, happiness, and healthy 
behaviour patterns. For Bartleman, Martha’s act of forgiveness becomes an act of truth 
and reconciliation: “it’s the only way to banish the hatred within her. [. . .] If you’re 
going to be a parent, a member of society, you have to banish the hate within you and 
move on. And so that’s my sort of interpretation I guess of truth and reconciliation. [. . .] 
We forgive and we move on, and that’s a major message for everyone, not just Natives 
faced with residential schools” (“Interview”). At the beginning of this section I asked 
what fiction could provide that the TRC could not. The message of As Long as the Rivers 
Flow seems to be that truth and reconciliation come from individual and community acts 
of forgiveness and letting go rather than from official acts of apology and 
commemoration. 
4.4 Robert Arthur Alexie, Porcupines and China Dolls 
Contained in They Came for the Children, one of the TRC’s educational 
publications on residential schooling in Canada, is an archival picture of children at the 
Stringer Hall dining hall in Inuvik in 1970 (62). In September 1970, Robert Arthur Alexie 
was sent to live at Stringer Hall, one of a number of church-operated, government-built 
residences or “hostels” constructed in the 1950s and 1960s to accommodate Aboriginal 
students from small communities in the Northwest Territories while they attended school. 
Stringer Hall was essentially, as Alexie says, “a residential school without the school” 
(“Robert Arthur Alexie”). The photograph shows boys sitting at rows of tables on one 
side of the room and girls on the other. The camera angle foregrounds the boys, some of 
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whom look straight at the photographer while others try to hide their faces. I found 
myself trying to recognize Alexie’s face among the boys and I started to wonder: is it 
possible to posit a relationship between the circulation of the TRC educational document 
and the recent republication of Alexie’s semi-autobiographical novel, Porcupines and 
China Dolls, in 2009?
91
 Can a semi-autobiographical fiction such as Alexie’s offer up an 
alternative form of testimonial to residential school abuses and a creative act of 
instruction about its legacies, as a supplement to the work of the TRC? Can fiction 
function as a legitimate form of testimony? Having already read the novel when I saw the 
picture of the sombre, discomfited diners at Stringer Hall, I knew what the photograph 
could not possibly document but what the novel takes as its primary focus: the 
widespread sexual abuse of the children who stayed at Stringer Hall. While They Came 
for the Children chronicles in a broad way the many abuses suffered by children in 
residential schools, including sexual abuse, it is Alexie’s novel that provides a testimonial 
to this particular abuse, although it does so outside of the TRC’s forum and outside of the 
courtroom.  
I will argue that in its semi-autobiographical staging of Alexie’s alcoholism and 
suicidal thoughts following his stay at Stringer Hall, its initial reticence to consciously 
articulate the sexual abuse suffered at the hostel, followed by its exaggerated and 
repeated public disclosures of child sexual abuse by multiple adult characters in the 
novel, and its ambivalent relationship to healing, Alexie’s novel was written as a means 
for him to testify to the complexities, ambivalences, and contradictions of his experiences 
and their legacies in an imaginative strategy to speak the truth in ways that the fact-based, 
adversarial court system would not permit. To my knowledge, Porcupines and China 
Dolls is the only public forum in which Alexie tells the story of sexual abuse at the 
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 Porcupines and China Dolls was first published in 2002 by Stoddart. Stoddart went into receivership 
days after the release of the novel, which partially explains why it initially received so little attention. I am 
quoting from the Stoddart edition of the text. The 2009 Theytus edition contains, from what I can glean, 
minor editorial changes from the original edition. Note that the page numbers of the Stoddart edition differ 
from those of the Theytus edition. 
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hostel, and he does so indirectly through fiction.
92
 This recalls Fagan’s suggestion that 
“the direct communication encouraged by Western trauma theory often clashes with 
Aboriginal means of expression” (207). The fictional form of the novel grants Alexie a 
means of articulating traumas by way of an indirect discourse without compromising his 
entitlement to privacy. Furthermore, the novel form allows Alexie to tell his trauma story 
precisely as a story, by employing oral storytelling practices—repetition, exaggeration, 
and deliberate confabulation—as primary narrative techniques. The novel form also 
provides Alexie with a vehicle to open up a conversation with his community through 
story outside of more formalized practices such as healing circles or workshops. As 
Alexie says, “‘I’m not going to get five thousand Gwich’in to listen to me tell a story, so I 
give them my book. Maybe they won’t read it now, but they might in five or ten years. At 
least they’ll have the chance to read it, and that chance will be given to others as well’” 
(Richler 119; original emphasis). Porcupines and China Dolls arguably stands in as a 
storied proxy to conventional testimonials and, through its circulation to both Native and 
non-Native readers, represents the chance for change. 
Like Manuel and Bartleman, Alexie expressly and overtly aims to tell a story 
about the legacy of residential schools. As he says, “I wanted to tell a story about the 
effects of the residential school on the people who attended those mistakes in history, and 
their children, since the effects, I believe are multi-generational in that the emotions, 
whether we like it or not, are passed on from the parents to their children” (“Exercising 
[sic] your Demons”). The didactic impulse identified by Alexie is also reflected in the 
structure of the novel’s opening four chapters where Alexie first provides readers with a 
history lesson on the colonization of his fictional “Blue People,” including the arrival in 
1789 of Alexander Mackenzie, followed by the fur traders and missionaries in the 
nineteenth century, the 1921 treaty for his People, and ultimately the arrival of boats to 
take children away to residential school. The removal of children from their homes and 
the suffering they experience once at the schools is painfully detailed in the novel. The 
children are taken away from parents who “look like statues” (10) and, once at the 
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 Alexie has not publically indicated whether or not he personally suffered sexual abuse at Stringer Hall, 
so while the novel is “semi-autobiographical,” it is not clear that Alexie was sexually abused. 
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school, they are forbidden to speak their language. Their clothing is burned, their hair 
deloused and shorn, leaving the boys resembling porcupines and the girls china dolls. The 
porcupines and china dolls are deculturated others, young children living in a loveless 
institutional environment. Their cries at night are “heart-wrenching. It sounds awful. It 
sounds like a million porcupines crying in the dark” (12).  
Alexie juxtaposes these introductory contextualizing chapters with the legacy of 
the residential school system in the present-day community. Accordingly, chapter five, 
“A Typical Night,” opens in the “saloon” with an adult survivor of residential school, 
James Nathan, drinking himself into oblivion, a pattern of behaviour which has become 
his lifestyle. The bartender asks, “‘Usual?’” for the “millionth time,” and James answers, 
“‘Why not?’” for the “millionth time” (35). The “usual” is two vodkas and a beer. The 
refrain throughout these scenes is “‘Same ol’’” (41). The “same ol’” are repeated scenes 
of self-numbing through alcohol and sex where James becomes, according to his best 
friend Jake Noland, a zombie (43). James as a walking-dead adult recalls the earlier scene 
depicting statue-like parents watching their children being taken away to residential 
school. Not only culturally genocidal, the residential school system is shown to be 
homocidal in its life-draining, dehumanization of Aboriginal peoples. Broadly speaking, 
then, Alexie uses his novel to implicate past traumas of residential schooling in present-
day dysfunctions in the community. 
More specifically, the novel singles out childhood sexual abuse as the trauma 
most difficult for the characters to acknowledge and grapple with, while at the same time 
pressing forth an imperative to “disclose” the abuse. This push and pull between silence 
and public confession is at the heart of the novel’s blurring of reality as much as it is one 
of its core contradictions. A second principle dialectical pull is between healing, and 
imagining talking as a contributing form of therapy, and not healing despite this effort. I 
first examine the reluctance to confront sexual abuse as a grounding principal of Alexie’s 
indirect testimonial style. James (who is modelled after Alexie himself) represses but 
ultimately cannot contain his memories of childhood sexual abuse. Repeated disclosures 
of sexual abuse by James’s friends prompt his own disclosure as members of the 
community attempt to recover by sharing their stories of trauma with each other. Unlike 
Western-style talk therapy, however, the “talking cure” here is public, communal, and 
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story-based. The public disclosure at the two-day healing workshop literalizes through 
performance the therapeutic release of inner demons on public stage in a magical, 
masculinist spectacle in which the whole community takes part. I will suggest that this 
creative act of disclosure is a testimonial fantasy of what public accounts of abuse could 
be, that is, an act of empowerment rather than a ritual of shaming. Community and 
individual healing is radically disrupted, however, through a critique of the closure that 
healing implies. I will make the case that the novel is both testimony and therapeutic 
journey and a critique of testimony and the promise of healing. 
Implied in my argument that Porcupines and China Dolls is an indirect testimony 
to abuses suffered by children at Stringer Hall is that it is a testimony rather than purely a 
fiction. There are many reasons not to testify publically to childhood sexual abuse, 
whether testimony is through the court system or through the safer but still public forum 
provided by the TRC: the shame that sexually abused children feel is often carried 
forward into adulthood, and the difficulties associated with speaking about violations in 
which victims often feel complicit are compounded by the fear of being disbelieved. 
Public disclosures can be especially fraught for men who have been abused as children by 
other men because the heteronormative imperative still at work in society can further 
contribute to the shame. In the novel, for example, when Jake Noland tells his girlfriend 
about his sexual abuse, “He hung his head to hide his shame” (97). Fiction can provide 
the distancing necessary to make an account of one’s traumas without having to directly 
face a potentially incredulous, homophobic, or otherwise critical public audience.  
Alexie admits that he finds it easier to tell his story from a narrative distance. In 
an article written for Indian Country Today entitled, “Robert Arthur Alexie—An Author 
in Waiting,” Alexie writes about himself in the third person: “Robert graduated [from 
high school and Stringer Hall] in June 1974 and returned home to work and party and this 
he did with wild abandon.” Nonetheless, Alexie became Chief of the Teetl’it Gwich’in 
Band Council in 1989 in Fort McPherson where he lived with his common-law wife and 
three children: “And through it all, Robert continued drinking and was now becoming 
something he never planned on: an alcoholic and an abuser. He was sentenced, on two 
occasions, to time in jail.” In the early 1990s, “after years of abuse and abusing, Robert 
decided to seek treatment and went to Toronto. He’s not had a drink since, but the road to 
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recovery and healing was not easy. It’s a daily struggle and he relapses into his old way 
of thinking every now and then.” When reading the article it is easy to forget, as I did, 
that the author is Alexie himself. It is only in the final lines that Alexie confesses: 
“Robert is me, or I am Robert. And sometimes he finds it better to write in the third 
person.” The third-person voice allows Alexie the narrative distance he seems to require 
to tell his story, whether he tells it in an article about himself or in his novel. 
 The third-person singular employed by Alexie in the article seems also to grant 
him the freedom to clearly state the semi-autobiographical form of his novel: “The fact 
that the main character is tall, dark and wears a black leather jacket should not surprise 
anyone. The story is semi-autobiographical and the character is not an easy person to 
like.” When Noah Richler met Alexie he described him as “a handsome man with dark 
hair, evidently not prone to smiling [. . .] wearing black shades, black jeans, and a black 
leather vest over a khaki hunting shirt” (108). Porcupines and China Dolls opens with the 
following description of James Nathan: “He stood alone beside the highway in the Blue 
Mountains like he’d done so many times before. His tall, dark figure looked foreboding 
against the dark clouds. His black leather jacket glistened like blood-soaked armour from 
another time. His scowl told everyone and everything to keep their fucking distance. He 
looked like Death ready to go on a rampage” (1). The passage is an important signifier of 
Alexie’s masculine testimonial style. James is an unsmiling, fearsome warrior whose 
public disclosure of his childhood sexual abuse will also be staged in terms of warrior 
and battle imagery, a topic to which I will return. Interestingly, while the third-person 
article makes the connection between Alexie and James unequivocal, with Alexie freely 
confessing his alcoholism and abusive behaviour, the article remains silent about whether 
or not Alexie suffered childhood sexual abuse at Stringer Hall. 
 The novel, however, directly links James’s alcoholism to his recurring nightmares 
of sexual abuse. Of the three principal characters to disclose their sexual abuse, James is 
the last. James is haunted by his past in his dreams, but is unable to consciously articulate 
the traumas. The nightmares recur throughout the novel prior to James’s admission of the 
abuse. The first one is narrated at the end of “A Typical Night” when James has passed 
out after an evening of drinking: “He was quiet on the outside, but on the inside some 
serious shit was starting to happen and he didn’t want to be there. He wouldn’t remember 
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it tomorrow” (46). The nightmares follow a similar pattern: they open in fog which clears 
to a view of the boys’ shower room in the hostel and a little boy’s “dead and empty” eyes 
(46) and a “Soft, warm, white and hairy” hand (46). When James wakes up the next 
morning, the first thing that he does is start drinking. He is “One lost soul seeking 
oblivion,” seeking to forget (81). He and Jake go to the bar and, in an echo of the 
regimentation of time at the residential school, count the hours to closing time. James is a 
purposeful alcoholic: “Hey, an idea. Better get some booze up ’ere’n kill ’at idea” (54).93 
Like the mall in Highway’s novel, the saloon is a devouring, life-draining force. The 
pattern is repeated when James passes out mid-afternoon from drinking, and then wakes 
up from another nightmare of sexual abuse: “When he’d calmed down, he got another 
beer. [. . .] He checked the time—five-thirty. Eight hours till closin’ time. He thought 
about the dream. Fuck it. Can’t remember it, can’t hurt you” (62). Unlike survivors of 
child sexual abuse such as Fraser, James does not struggle to remember; he struggles to 
forget.  
 James’s willful repression of his sexual abuse by anesthetizing his thoughts with 
alcohol comes at a price. The novel opens and closes with a word-for-word repetition of 
the scene of James’s attempt at suicide: “All in one smooth motion he got down on one 
knee, put the barrel in his mouth, then pushed the trigger. He watched the hammer fall 
and closed his eyes. He tensed, waiting for the explosion. After a million years, he heard 
it: metal on metal. It was the loudest sound he’d ever heard” (2, 285). The question of 
whether James is alive or dead is only answered in the conclusion. The closing 
paragraphs of the novel add to this scene a healing ending with James alive and finding 
hope through his love for Louise; however, James remains suicidal throughout the novel, 
even after he publically discloses his abuse. While not talking is clearly associated with 
James’s alcoholism and suicidal thoughts, talking or disclosing the abuse is complicated 
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 Alexie employs Aboriginal patois, commonly referred to as “Red English” and sometimes “Rez 
English,” throughout the novel. Greg Young-Ing explains that “Aboriginal patois in its various forms is a 
cultural expression of how Aboriginal Peoples speak informally amongst themselves and communicate 
within their communities” (240). The Indigenization of English is but one way that Aboriginal peoples are 
reclaiming their power through words; as such, this variation of standard English should be granted 
legitimacy. As Young-Ing says, it should “receive a similar linguistic recognition/legitimacy recently being 
afforded to various forms of African American colloquial speech and the various forms of patois developed 
in the Caribbean and around the world” (240). 
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by the novel’s suggestion that there is no straightforward path to healing and no closure, 
except through the possibility of a healthy, loving relationship. If there is healing, it is 
relational rather than individual, and it is also connected to story. Thomas King suggests 
that for James, “whether he lives or dies depends on which story he believes” (118). 
James seems to choose the story of love rather than the story of self-hatred imposed upon 
him by the residential school system. Alexie writes of himself, “Writing the story has 
been a healing experience for him. It hasn’t been easy, but he’s glad he wrote it” (“Robert 
Arthur Alexie”). Healing for Alexie comes through the scriptotherapeutic process of 
using storytelling as a form of indirect testimony, while at the same time the novel 
emphasizes the process of healing rather than its endpoint of being healed. In this, Alexie 
makes an important contribution to how healing from severe trauma can be understood, 
that is, as a never-ending journey that is perhaps best told indirectly. Porcupines and 
China Dolls both performs and critiques testimonial practices of telling the trauma story 
in order to heal. 
 I have been putting quotation marks around the word “disclose” because all of the 
characters in the novel use the broad term to refer specifically to the disclosure of sexual 
abuse, as when Chief David’s wife says, “‘You mean you’re gonna disclose?’” (153). In 
the novel, “to disclose” means to disclose childhood sexual abuse. To speak about child 
sexual abuse by way of the infinitive, to disclose, encapsulates the contradictory 
therapeutic impulse in the novel by at once not explicitly naming the abuse yet implying 
that publicly disclosing that abuse is a requisite part of the healing process. Alexie insists 
that telling the story of abuse leads to catharsis: “That’s what healing is all about: talking 
or writing about your inner demons and moving on” (“Exercising [sic] your Demons”). 
Alexie, however, also suggests that he “unknowingly” wrote about “healing and non-
healing” in the novel (“Exercising [sic] your Demons”). And, in the novel, Jake adds a 
further variance: “‘A few years ago I heard a Chief up north say that healin’ was a 
journey ’n there is no end’” (170). Taken together, the three statements capture the 
contradictory, ambiguous healing practice of the novel as both healing and not healing.  
While writing about “non-healing” may have been unconscious on Alexie’s part, 
he consciously and repeatedly emphasizes the importance to the healing process of 
sharing the trauma story. As Bertha explains to Jake, “‘Once you’ve disclosed you have 
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to follow through. Talk about it to anyone who’ll listen ’n understand. It’s getting’ rid of 
it through talkin’ ’n cryin’ that’s gonna help you. If you don’t get rid of it, it’ll kill you [. . 
.] like it’s done to so many of our People’” (100). Bertha here refers to Michael Lazarus, 
a friend of both James and Jake, who killed himself and who was also sexually abused by 
Tom Kinney at the hostel. After Jake’s “disclosure,” catharsis immediately follows: “He 
felt exhausted and light. It was as if a million tons had been lifted from his soul” (100). 
What has been repressed for years erupts in a wave of disclosures. Jake talking about his 
abuse sparks Chief David to disclose his abuse and, eventually, James confesses to his 
own: “‘Happen to me too’” (158). All of the disclosures are delivered in an earnest 
rhetoric of healing by talking that seems to work in the moment, but that the novel never 
fully grants. Alexie seems to believe in and yet struggles with the efficacy of community-
talking therapy and healing that should come from that process. 
 James’s acknowledgement of his abuse occurs at a time when he has been sober 
for nearly a week, yet, and importantly in my view, the catharsis and healing which 
should follow comes to James in an altered state of consciousness, in a dream. Indeed, the 
chapter in which James’s dream of healing occurs, “Dream World,” is dedicated to 
detailing a therapeutic journey by James, Jake, and Chief David as they return to the 
mountains and the traditional lands of their People, and discuss their abuse with Elders, 
who also disclose abuse and decry the loss of their traditional way of life. The “dream 
world” represents both this dream of a return to tradition and James’s dream of healing. 
In James’s dream, he sees his parents in the cabin in which he grew up. His mother 
touches his face and looks at him with tenderness and compassion while his smiling 
father puts his hand on his shoulder. His parents leave and James sees himself in the 
cabin as a little boy: “The little boy looked at him with no emotion. He held up his arms 
as if he expected to be picked up. James picked him up and became one with the dream. 
He closed his eyes and felt a peace he’d never felt in his life” (166). To embrace and heal 
one’s “inner child” is a popular therapeutic construct and an essential part of recovery 
from addiction in the Twelve-Step Program of Alcoholics Anonymous. Alexie may be 
combining the Western-style treatment that he received when he was in recovery with 
Indigenous forms of healing through the reclamation of traditional values, connection to 
one’s family, and sharing stories of abuse. James’s relational dream of healing anticipates 
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the healing moment at the end of the novel when he finds peace through his love for 
Louise. In the novel, the imperative to disclose is part of a process to recover from child 
sexual abuse; however, the recovery comes, ironically, as a dream in the first instance 
and as a quick resolution to a scene of suicide in the final one. There is at once a 
profound impulse to recover from child sexual abuse and a radical failure to achieve it. 
And, yet, there is something deeply healing in James’s dream, suggesting that perhaps 
healing occurs in ways outside of standard therapeutic practices and understandings of 
what healing means. As in Shani Mootoo’s novel, healing is an act of the imagination. 
 James’s dream of healing precedes his public disclosure of child sexual abuse at 
the healing workshop. Moreover, the culmination of the therapeutic process represented 
by the cathartic promise of the healing workshop occurs not at the end of the novel, as 
with Bartleman’s healing circle, but about two-thirds of the way through. One expects 
healing to occur following the workshop and the workshop itself to be a therapeutic end-
point; however, James remains suicidal to the novel’s concluding pages. These deviations 
in standard processes of healing are even more interesting when one considers the 
fantastic elements of the public disclosure. Alexie seems to suggest that the public 
disclosure of trauma is as much an act of the imagination as healing and, more radically, 
perhaps he is suggesting that testimony should be a fantasy or can only be an act of the 
imagination. As I will show, Alexie’s staging of public testimony is at once an extended 
metaphor for the therapeutic process of releasing one’s inner demons to heal and a 
critique of the limitations of such an endeavour. In his discussion with Noah Richler, 
Alexie describes the underwhelming community response at a Gwich’in gathering when 
an Elder disclosed his sexual abuse. He was the first community member to do so and, as 
Alexie says, “‘It was like nothing had been said’” (108). Alexie’s frustration by his 
community’s apathy and failure to engage with the traumas of the Elder before them is 
one possible reason why Alexie stages such a grand spectacle of disclosure in the novel:  
“The anger that I felt in [Porcupines and China Dolls] was helpful 
because it allowed me almost to scream what I wanted to say. [. . .] I 
remember writing the part where the Chief gets up and discloses and the 
story almost goes into a kind of magical realism. It was a period in the 
community where everybody was going about their business as if it was 
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normal—normal to drink, normal to buy bootlegs, normal to be sexually 
abused. [. . .] It’s so dysfunctional, it’s normal.” (Richler 113-14; original 
emphasis) 
 If Porcupines and China Dolls was meant to wake up his community to the 
abuses suffered at residential school, Alexie’s over-the-top, theatrical staging of public 
disclosure holds out the possibility of doing so by reinvigorating an engagement with 
testimony in a way that avoids the pitfalls of public confession. Over one hundred 
community members arrive for the workshop looking like “they were there for some root 
canal work and wished it was over so they could get on to more important things like 
bingo or poker” and “few, if any, had a genuine interest in the healing process” (181). 
Alexie seems to suggest, however, that they do like to be entertained and they also enjoy 
a good story. By employing oral storytelling techniques with magical realist conventions, 
Alexie creates a spectacle of masculine empowerment as an antidote to the shame the 
characters have been feeling as they disclose their abuse to each other. I am calling the 
testimonial aesthetic that Alexie creates “masculinist” because of its emphasis on male 
power, super-human strength, and the story-line of warriors battling their inner demons 
rather than victims suffering through their confessions. Chief David is the first “warrior” 
to take the stage at the workshop. As with Bartleman’s healing circle, a talking stick is 
used, except in Alexie, its power is literalized. The band’s talking stick, which “gave 
them power and courage” has been ignored for years—“Gone like so many of our 
traditions”—but when Chief David picks it up, he grows ten feet tall (183). He begins by 
disclosing his abuse in a straightforward, testimonial style: “‘Thirty years ago I was 
sexually abused in the hostel’” (184). The narrative tone which immediately follows the 
disclosure is not earnest or sympathetic as one would expect but rather funny and 
magical: “One hundred people did a double take. They looked around to see if others had 
heard. What ’a hell did he say? / The sound of so many empty heads reverberating in the 
community hall woke a million, trillion gazillion demons, dreams and nightmares from 
their slumber. They poked their ugly little heads out of the ceiling, walls and floor to see 
what the fuck was going on” (184). It is hard to imagine what a fresh take on the public 
disclosure of childhood sexual abuse might look like, and yet that is precisely what 
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Alexie provides, in my view, so that his readers awake from their somnolence to witness 
a legend-in-the-making that they will remember and talk about in the future. 
Alexie’s myth-making testimonial strategy is intended to draw in audience 
members (and readers) to the disclosure process and is deeply rooted in some of the 
hallmarks of oral storytelling: repetition, the number three, hyperbole, engagement with 
the audience, and, for Alexie, a tongue-in-cheek style humour. The Chief begins each of 
his disclosures with, “‘Thirty years ago’” and, after each successive disclosure, the 
audience shouts, “‘Shit!’” then “‘Holy shit!’” and finally, “‘Holy fuckin’ shit!’” (184). 
“Chief David then grew twenty feet and held himself like a Warrior of Old” (184). Rather 
than testimony being a diminishing experience, it is empowering. The more Chief David 
discloses, the taller and fiercer he becomes. Again, note the use of repetitive syntactical 
formations governed by the number three: “Chief David grew thirty feet tall and spoke of 
suicides, killings and death. He spoke of anger, rage and terror. He spoke of hurt, shame 
and sorrow. He spoke of demons, dreams and nightmares, He spoke of the future, hope 
and healing” (185). This repetitive strategy is used, as it is with oral stories, to help the 
audience understand and incorporate the information into their working memories. The 
disclosure evolves from giving an account of suffering into an extended metaphor for 
conquering traumas by laying them bare: “Chief David then did something very few 
people have ever done. He reached deep down into the very depths of his tormented and 
fucked-up soul, pulled out the rage, anger, hate, sorrow and sadness by their roots and 
threw them on the floor for the world to see. He then proceeded to choke the little fuckers 
like they deserved it” (185). Despite the sparks which are now flying from the talking 
stick, the Chief ends his disclosure story in a realistic mode: “After a million years, he 
looked at his People like he’d just come from battle. [. . .] ‘This is where it ends. [. . .] 
This is where we make the change for ourselves an’ for our children’” (185). The Chief is 
storied as a returning warrior fomenting the rebirth of his community by way of his own 
process of healing. 
It is in this mode of realistic testimonial discourse that Alexie reveals his always 
ambivalent relationship to testimony and healing. Whereas the audience responds with 
wonderment as they watch the Chief grow taller and taller, when the disclosure ends with 
their Chief-warrior looking tired, looking like a real-life human being, they respond with 
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skepticism: “Is he tellin’ the truth? Is he lyin’? Is he doin’ this for sympathy? Is he nuts?” 
(185). Questioning the veracity, motives, and sanity of those who publically disclose 
childhood sexual abuse is an all too common response both by the judicial system and the 
general public. The sustained attack on Sylvia Fraser’s credibility is but one of many 
examples of the prevalence of such skepticism. Questions such as those of the audience 
in the novel are one of the main reasons why victims of child sexual abuse do not 
publically confess their abuse. The potential for incredulous witnesses to straightforward 
testimonies may also be why Alexie chooses magic realism as his principal narrative 
mode to disclose sexual abuse. In this, the suggestion is that perhaps people are more 
likely to believe a story, even if that story is clearly fantastical.  
 Alexie builds up his story of public testimony to epic proportions as Chief 
David’s disclosure is followed by Jake’s and then, finally, James’s as the climax. The 
chapter title, “The Battle for Souls,” is an early marker of the therapeutic, masculinist 
aesthetic at work in the scene as one of mythic combat rather than gentle healing through 
cathartic talk. I do not think it is a coincidence that James’s public disclosure is the 
climax of the scene and also the height of Alexie’s employment of magic realism. Alexie 
not only writes an indirect testimony to abuse through the novel; his fictional engagement 
with public disclosure is also an act of fantasy, story, and the creation of a legend. When 
James discloses his abuse to the audience, which has now doubled in size because word 
of the spectacle has spread, it is a testimonial-action-thriller and blood-sport. James as the 
hero of this epic battle opens with his typical humour and ferocity: “He grinned that 
friggin’ Nathan grin, then let loose such a horrendous godawful battle cry of rage, hatred 
and vengeance that the roof of the community hall blew off and scattered to the four 
winds” (191). James’s “demons, dreams and nightmares shivered in their rubber boots” 
(191) with good reason: “James Nathan started laying demons out left, right and centre. 
Demon arms, legs and heads were flying everywhere. One head fell into the lap of Old 
Pierre. He picked it up, poked out his beady little eyes and threw it on the floor” (192). 
Rather than their previous distanced incredulity, the audience is now actively involved in 
James’s “therapy” as witnesses and co-slayers of inner demons. An italicized narrative 
voice periodically interjects lines seemingly aimed directly to the reader as a further 
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solicitation to engage with James’s “testimony”: “He was a fucking sight to behold! I shit 
you not. You really had to be there!” (192).  
 James is not ashamed, nor is his veracity in question: he is a one-hundred-foot tall 
warrior whom young girls dream of marrying and young boys dream of becoming (192). 
Alexie piles on cultural references to his warrior-hero of disclosure, James, in an excess 
of imagery aimed to entertain: “James Nathan was like a knight in shining armour. He 
was like Kevin Costner in Dances with Wolves. He was like Crazy Horse charging into 
battle. He was like Geronimo at his best” (192). Jake and Chief David join James to kill 
more demons as the audience starts “singing some old Indian war song”: “It sounded like 
the Mormon Tabernacle Choir singing The Messiah on acid. It sounded like a million 
Plains Indians all singing at once” (193). While completely over-the-top and replete with 
non sequiturs, the scene evokes stereotype after stereotype in its attempt to capture the 
scale of what is happening and to show the event as the work of healing, while retaining 
its sense of humour and its purposeful intent to wake up the community to the legacies of 
residential school: “The three Warriors heard this war song and it gave them strength and 
courage. There was such a fucking commotion what with blood, guts, arms, legs and 
heads flying every which way that no one breathed or blinked an eye lest they miss a 
thing” (193). In the end, “James, Jake and Chief David stood above slain demons and 
nightmares like great big fucking Warriors of Old covered with blood, sweat, guts, tears 
and pride” (193). 
 The spectacular disclosure scene represents what public testimonies should be but 
rarely are: empowering for the people giving the testimony and enlivening for their 
witnesses. Cool air blows through the community hall following the slaying of demons: 
“It smelled clean. It smelled like new beginnings” (194). The audience is filled with 
admiration for the three disclosure-warriors. They are not shame-filled victims but proud 
heroes literally standing tall. Furthermore, rather than being an emasculating process, the 
disclosure actually enhances the virility and desirability of the warriors (194-95). Alexie 
writes an idealized, very male fantasy of public disclosure, but then undercuts it by 
bringing the narrative back to the much starker reality of realistic testimony the following 
day: “What really happened at the community hall in Aberdeen that day? Despite all the 
blood and gore, it was all very simple: three men disclosed. They talked honestly about a 
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sexual abuse that occurred thirty years ago. They spoke of oral sex and sodomy. They 
spoke of the shame and the pain of being alone” (197). Alexie’s disclosure scene is a 
wonderfully magical remediation to what he goes on to show is the painful process of 
bearing witness to testimonies of childhood abuse.  
 The contrast is perhaps most striking in the courtroom scene at the preliminary 
trial of Tom Kinney, the man who abused Chief David, James, Jake, and many others. 
James sees Kinney “smirk” as he is led out of the courtroom (266). James loses his 
composure and threatens to kill the man. When a rookie RCMP officer suggests that he 
could lay charges against James should he attack Kinney, James lashes out at the officer: 
“‘Where the fuck were you when that bastard stuck his cock up my ass!’” (266). There is 
a significant disparity between the empowering and magical disclosure scene and the 
traumatic reality of the courtroom where James is not growing taller in the confrontation 
with his demons but must be restrained lest he slay his real demon, Tom Kinney. The 
graphic language of James’s abuse, while typical of the horrific detail expected of victims 
in the courtroom, is precisely what witnesses or readers are most likely to tune out 
because it is too unsettling and explicit to hear and too difficult to discuss. Alexie’s 
magical disclosure scene accomplishes the task of confession without falling into the 
graphic testimonial discourse revealed in the court scene. 
 Porcupines and China Dolls performs and debunks testimony as surely as it 
enacts and deconstructs healing. For all of the demon-slaying dramatized at the healing 
workshop, the push and pull between healing and not healing is still in evidence. Jake, 
though forty-feet tall and having staked himself to the stage to battle his demons, is 
empowered but not healed. Following his disclosure he shouts his now familiar refrain: 
“‘Healin’ is a journey—there is no end!’” to which James responds, “‘Ain’t ’at ’a fuckin’ 
truth!” (188). Keavy Martin observes that “Alexie flouts his readers’ expectations 
regarding the preordained progress of a healing journey” (49). Indeed, the morning 
following the workshop, when Brenda asks James what his plans for the day are, James 
thinks to himself, “Maybe blow my brains out” (205; original emphasis). As Daniel 
David Moses says in dialogue with Terry Goldie, “some people just cannot be healed. 
Their wounds—or at least the wounds in their community—are so deep and abiding” (ix). 
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The novel emphasizes that there is no straightforward path to healing and no 
closure. For the community members, the workshop sparks dialogue about the event and 
even reinstates an interest in their traditions. They gather as a community, bring out their 
ceremonial drums, and their Elders start speaking to each other in their own language 
(201-203). The reclamation of traditional Indigenous values and practices is a marker of 
healing in all of the texts under consideration here. And, yet, Alexie troubles this healing 
narrative: “People were calling their relatives in other parts of the territories and in other 
parts of Canada. In one week, Chief David, James and Jake would be known all over the 
NWT. In two weeks, they would be forgotten” (199). Alexie’s novel is not without hope; 
rather, it seeks to capture the complexities of the healing process precisely as a process, 
not an end in itself. As Chief David says, “‘In the last few days, we’ve seen something 
happen in our community. We’ve seen People disclose an’ we’ve seen the drum return if 
only for one night. I wish I can tell you it’s going to be like this forever, but we all know 
it isn’t. Not unless we work together to keep it’” (222). For Martin, Alexie’s refusal to 
bring closure to the work of healing becomes a sort of meta-narrative for the potential of 
Canadian national reconciliation discourse to assuage non-Native guilt by bringing 
closure and thus forgetting to the issues:  
The end points of healing, or of closure, here remain continually beyond 
the grasp of readers and characters alike, and denied this state of grace 
they are forced to continue to grapple with the challenges of the process of 
healing—or simply of continuation. Government rhetoricians and average 
Canadians alike have much to learn from this inconclusivity; as Alexie 
demonstrates, this push for closure is in many ways a longing for 
oblivion—for the luxury of forgetting and for the absolution of amnesia. 
(61) 
 The push for closure which Martin deftly perceives as part of a rhetoric in the 
service of public amnesia is, in the first instance, a critique of the healing promise of 
public testimonies to residential school traumas. Porcupines and China Dolls offers an 
imaginative rethinking of what public disclosure could be if fiction were a sanctioned 
mode of testimony. If Aboriginal trauma theory arises, as Fagan contends, from the 
stories Aboriginal peoples tell, then Alexie’s trauma theory radically subverts Western 
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conceptions of healing. His story and thereby his theory reclaims storytelling and the 
imaginative capacity to reshape experience by opening and closing sutures to wounds that 
can never fully heal, yet always have the capacity to transform: by imagining other ways 
of talking, by thinking of new ways to testify, and by inspiring a community of readers to 
think creatively about the legacies of residential school. Alexie’s indirect and intensely 
imaginative approach to telling his story through fiction unravels Western conceptions of 
healing practices without ever succumbing to hopelessness.  
4.5 The Chance for Change 
Strength of Indian Women, As Long as the Rivers Flow, and Porcupines and 
China Dolls are all examples of writers employing fiction as a form of testimony to 
residential school abuses and their legacies in purposefully utilitarian artistic practices 
with clear pedagogical and therapeutic goals. In this sense, these works correspond to 
what Jace Weaver has coined “communitist literature,” that is, “a combination of the 
words ‘community’ and ‘activism.’ Literature is communitist to the extent that it has a 
proactive commitment to Native community” (xiii). Manuel, Bartleman, and Alexie all 
express their commitment to using literature to reach their communities to foment, as 
Alexie said, at the least the possibility for change. Episkenew asserts that the activist and 
educative capacity of Indigenous writing is often aimed at settler readers: 
 Indigenous narratives serve a socio-pedagogical function in that their 
objective is to change society by educating the settler readers about the 
Indigenous perspective of Canadian society. The narratives implicate 
settler readers by exposing the structures that sustain White privilege and 
by compelling them to examine their position of privilege and their 
complicity in the continued oppression of Indigenous people. (Taking 
Back Our Spirits 17) 
My contention is that the fictions examined here are communitist in Weaver’s sense and 
also socio-pedagogical in Episkenew’s. I would add that the communities these writers 
aim to instruct and incite are both settler and Indigenous. Native and non-Native 
audiences are implicated as witnesses to testimonial storytelling and asked to understand 
the complexities of residential school legacies through the lens of fiction. I cannot say 
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that these fictions will change the hearts and minds of the Canadian reading public, but, 
as Alexie suggested, stories represent the chance for change.  
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Conclusion 
5 Storied Truths 
 This dissertation makes a plea for understanding the place of story and the 
imagination in accounts of child sexual abuse trauma. I looked first at the work of Sylvia 
Fraser to explore the ways in which her factual memoir functions as a trauma story—one 
that has been misread and criticized by scholars—with consideration to the ways in 
which her first novel is an early subconscious testimonial to her abuse. Chapter Three 
examined fictions without pretense of testimony. Like the works discussed in the first and 
final chapters, the novels I analyzed reflect the same commitment to the incorporation of 
fictional strategies to represent traumas as aesthetically through the “traumatic 
imagination.” The residential school fictions I explored in the final chapter of this project 
reveal a deep writerly engagement with fiction as a tool for public testimony. Taken 
together, all of the works I discuss here suggest that generic distinctions between fiction 
and life-writing need to be reconceived in stories of childhood trauma to allow traumatic 
truths to surface unhinged from generic conventions and the demands of truth-telling. 
Child sexual abuse narratives demand a different kind of writing and a different kind of 
reading. 
 In his 2003 CBC Massey Lectures, Thomas King famously said, “The truth about 
stories is that’s all we are.” This foundational principal has guided my theorization that 
memories of child sexual traumas are fundamentally imaginative and performative acts of 
rewriting what can never be fully or accurately remembered without recourse to stories. 
The narrator in Fall on Your Knees says, “Memory is another word for story, and nothing 
is more unreliable” (270). If the “truth about stories is that’s all we are,” and if “Memory 
is another word for story, and nothing is more unreliable,” then we are nothing more—
and nothing less—than a collection of unreliable stories in a constant state of revision. 
Neurologist Antonio R. Damasio suggests that “the endless reactivation of updated 
images about our identity (a combination of memories of the past and of the planned 
future) constitutes a sizable part of the state of self as I understand it” (239). He suggests 
that the story of who we are as human beings is constantly shifting: 
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At each moment the state of self is constructed, from the ground up. It is 
an evanescent reference state, so continuously and consistently 
reconstructed that the owner never knows it is being remade unless 
something goes wrong with the remaking. [. . .] Present continuously 
becomes past, and by the time we take stock of it we are in another 
present, consumed with planning the future, which we do on the stepping-
stones of the past. The present is never here. We are hopelessly late for 
consciousness. (240; original emphasis) 
 Damasio not only argues that human consciousness is in a constant state of 
motion and flux; he also suggests that subjectivity emerges from the capacity of language 
to “engender verbal narratives out of nonverbal ones. [. . .] Language may not be the 
source of the self, but it certainly is the source of the ‘I’” (243). Who we are depends on 
how we story ourselves at any moment in time. What all of this suggests to me is that 
there needs to be a place for the storying imagination in any narrative account of the self, 
particularly in cases of trauma where identity stories are radically interrupted by the 
imposition of abuse. Childhood sexual abuse is also childhood identity abuse or, if you 
will, story abuse. Childhood sexual traumas leave victims with an imposed adult story 
that, while incomprehensible to the child, forever rewrites her personal narrative. Giving 
retrospective account of these traumas, whether through life-writing projects or fictional 
genres, necessitates rewriting the story by a present remembering consciousness which 
looks backward precisely in order to look forward to the future already being written. 
 What remains unanswered in this dissertation and what requires further study is 
the extent to which traumatic testimony can incorporate the revisionist story-telling 
capacity of the survivor into the narrative account of trauma. What would an allowance 
for the imagination mean for the judicial system? Is there any way for trauma survivors to 
tell their story as a story which is judged on if it successfully conveys its traumatic 
truths? Can the persistent question—“Is she lying?”—ever be dispelled if story and the 
imagination are granted legitimacy? I think there is a difference between lying, that is, the 
deliberate fabrication of events, and storying, which is putting the event into a narrative 
that makes sense without pretense to exact representation. Acknowledging the 
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impossibility of truth in trauma narratives opens up the possibility for new 
understandings of what counts as truth, that is, for storied truths. 
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